Defence`s Feeds

Construction has started on the first Gowind 2500 corvette built in Egypt at Alexandria Shipyard.

The explosion which shook Kabul on 19 April 2016 was so large  its reverberation could be felt throughout almost the entire city. All that day, and the next, the death toll continued to rise. Official figures currently stand at 68 killed and 347 injured, but the real numbers are likely to be higher. The scale of the attack, and the complete disregard for civilian life in carrying it out, shocked the population and led to a mix of anger, exhaustion and defiance. There were calls for revenge and acts of courage and resilience. AAN’s Martine van Bijlert takes a closer look.

How it happened

At 8:55 on Tuesday morning, Kabul was shaken by an explosion so loud that many people in different areas of the city thought it was close to them. After some initial confusion, it became clear that the former 10th Directorate of the National Directorate for Security (NDS) had been the target. The building is located just south of the Kabul River, to the southeast of the city centre, next to the large Eidgah mosque and the national stadium. Still mostly known under its old name, D10, it is now a separate entity under the presidential office and responsible for the close protection of senior government officials and other VIPs.

A medium-sized lorry truck, apparently filled with hundreds of kilos of explosives, was driven into a poorly secured parking lot next to D10 (which, it turns out, belonged to the well-known kuchi leader, Naim Kuchi), positioned next to the western wall of the compound, after which the explosives were detonated. (For a picture of the aftermath of the truck bomb, see here). The explosion breached the compound’s wall and, according to this report,  killed 22 inside (fifteen cadets that were immediately behind the wall, two guards in the towers and five others in three separate buildings), after which three gunmen wearing D10 uniforms, entered the compound. They started shooting the staff that had not been killed in the explosion. Those targeted reportedly included a group of new recruits who had been in a training session.

In the reporting on the attack gruesome details emerged, among others the information that several cadets who had managed to find cover, were massacred by the attackers. According to Tolo News, after the initial explosion the gunmen shot at least 20 cadets and staff.  It took the government security forces two hours to regain control of the compound. Two of the attackers were killed in the ensuing gun battle (an alleged picture of one them, clean-shaven and wearing a government uniform, can be found here), while a third, according to Tolo News, removed his uniform and escaped. (1)

As is usual in these kinds of attacks, there are also alternative readings of the events. People have, for instance, questioned where the attackers were supposed to have come from, which in turn has fed theories that they may have already been inside when the truck bomb detonated, and may have even come from among the staff or the recruits. MP Zaher Sadat, for instance, was quoted on One TV on 20 April 2016 accusing “specific people” of masterminding the attack: “It had already been planned. If you look at the dead bodies of martyrs, you notice that the majority of them were killed with gunshots. It means that before the suicide attack, our security soldiers were shot dead with weapons.” (BBC Monitoring Afghanistan News, 20 21 April 2016).

A city badly hit

Throughout the day, and the next, the toll of the dead and injured continued to rise. It currently stands at 68 dead and 347 injured. Initial figures, based on ambulance and hospital records, cited 28 dead, but the next day the deaths of those inside the compound – which was immediately cordoned off, with nobody let in – seemed to have been added. Many believe the actual numbers to be even higher, in particular since the NDS has its own hospital and to a certain extent can keep the total number of its deaths and injured from the public eye (although pictures of what people on social media have been describing as “young martyrs” have been circulating).

Emma Graham-Harrison of the Guardian, a former long-time Kabul correspondent, commented that “while the target was elite [referring to elite security forces] – the victims, as so often in these attacks, appear to have been mostly ordinary civilians. About 30 dead and more than 300 injured were caught in the wrong place at the wrong time – hit by shrapnel at a bus stop on their way to work, flying glass in shops and homes nearby, or stray bullets as they tried to take shelter.”

The strength of the blast meant that the shockwave and debris hit the residential and commercial areas in the vicinity. People were walking alongside the roads and river. Houses, schools and businesses were struck, as well as a crowded bus and taxi stand from where minibuses  to other provinces departed. The blast collapsed houses and shops nearby and shattered windows in a radius of around 1-1.5 km (which accounted for a large number of the injuries). Parents rushed to schools in the area, checking whether their children were safe.

The city’s ambulances frantically ferried the wounded to the city’s hospitals, loading the vehicles beyond capacity, sometimes with ten or twelve injured into cars only made to carry one or two. They were joined by police ambulances. For more vivid detail on how the ambulance service performed, see this New York Times article. Hospitals were overwhelmed with hundreds of wounded people, so much so that they could not allow relatives in to check on their patients.

Improvised blood donation centres  were set up to accommodate the large numbers of people who came forward to donate blood, in a sign of solidarity and defiance, as people were looking for a way to do something practical and constructive. According to this report, up to 3.3 million cc of blood was donated with donation drives launched in 20 provinces (see for instance here). On Twitter, some people said they had to go from hospital to hospital, as many were crowded and capacities were overwhelmed.

The nearby Eidgah mosque sustained considerable damage, as did a large number of warehouses and businesses. (See this video towards the end). The deputy chairman of the Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industries (ACCI) said it estimated the total cost to businesses of the blast to be at least 10 million US dollars. “On both sides of the [Kabul] river we have one hundred warehouses,” said ACCI deputy Khan Jan Alkozai. “Food, power tools and construction materials and most of the stock has been destroyed.”

UNAMA condemned the attack in a strongly worded statement, saying that  “This attack shows the devastation caused by the use of explosive devices in urban areas and once more demonstrates complete disregard for the lives of Afghan civilians.” According to Tadamichi Yamamoto, the Secretary-General’s Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan, “[T]he use of high explosives in civilian populated areas, in circumstances almost certain to cause immense suffering to civilians, may amount to war crimes.”

Taleban claim responsibility

The Taleban were swift to claim responsibility, despite the massive harm to civilians. In a statement  posted on the various Taleban-linked websites, they specified the target and the reason for the attack: “The Kabul security apparatus – especially its notoriously brutal intelligence agency – is our prime target after the foreign invaders. Yesterday the Mujahideen managed to eliminate their target rather successfully and handed quite a justifiably warranted punishment to the savage operatives based inside.”

Whereas in the past, the Taleban have often denied their involvement in attacks that affected many civilians, this time, instead, they simply denied the casualties, dubbing the reports “enemy propaganda.”

The Taleban thus claimed that the Directorate 10 building, due to its security importance, was built in an area with no adjacent civilian buildings or movement – which was clearly not the case – and that the attack had only destroyed the targeted building, killing staff members of this department inside their rooms. They did concede that “due to the force of the explosion, windows of buildings at a far distance were also shattered – naturally injuring people albeit lightly, a situation which is unfortunate.” (2)

The attack’s messages

The attack sends several messages. It is, first of all, the first large complex attack of the year in Kabul (there was a smaller complex attack on the Le Jardin restaurant on New Year’s Day, which killed two and injured fifteen neighbours or passers-by). It is also the first major attack since the announcement of the “Omari Operation,” the Taleban’s so-called spring offensive that was announced on 12 April 2016. The attack is thus designed, not only to lash out at one of the country’s security organs, but also to grab headlines and undermine morale, as part of the psychological battle in which both sides – the government and the insurgency – seek to portray the other as an impotent and spent force.

There is also an obvious and significant symbolism in hitting the security department that is tasked with protecting the government’s high officials. Moreover, it is also very personal. As noted by The Guardian, the personal protection of officials in Afghanistan is often organised among relatives or close family friends — people who can be trusted. So by hitting the VIP protection squad, the Taleban did not only target the national security apparatus, but also individuals with close ties to the government’s leadership. This is illustrated by the fact that among the reported victims were a nephew  of Vice President Sarwar Danish, two bodyguards of Minister of Foreign Affairs Salahuddin Rabbani  and bodyguards of CEO Abdullah Abdullah.

The attack also indicates a clear willingness by the Taleban to risk mass civilian casualties. This is not the first time. There have been several attacks before with large numbers of dead and injured – some of them claimed by the Taleban, others not. The bombing that seems to come closest, in terms of magnitude, casualties and method, was the detonation of a massive truck bomb in the Shah Shahid area in the night of 7 August 2015.  That explosion took place shortly after midnight, when a truck laden with explosives hit a speed bump, killing eight to fifteen and injuring between two and four hundred people (estimates varied). The attack looked to have been an unintentional premature detonation – primarily because of the lack of ‘targets’ in the area.

It was already obvious at the time that, had the truck bomb reached whatever its intended target might have been and been detonated during the day, the number of casualties would have been staggering. (For a picture of the massive crater see here. A short video of the aftermath of the explosion can be found here, while this video has footage of the truck’s detonation captured by a security camera.)

The Taleban at the time denied responsibility, claiming the explosion had been caused by “a targeted air or missile attack in which a large bomb was deployed that created a huge crater in the ground.”  That statement on the Shahamat website, at the time, describing the Shah Shahid incident as “perplexing” and having “no semblance with attacks of Mujahideen,” was very different in tone from the one in response to Tuesday’s bomb attack. (3)

Questions on security and government capacity

The attack, so close to the heart of the security and government apparatus, seemingly based on very precise intelligence and possibly aided by inside assistance, has raised questions again as to the government and security forces’ capacity to keep the capital safe. Commentators on social media and MPs in parliament asked how the attackers managed to reach the compound despite the city’s security checks.

Tolo News conducted an experiment to see how hard it is to drive a truck through the city. The video, that was aired one day after the attack, on 20 April 2016, shows the truck being waved through several check posts – reportedly travelling from Pul-e Charkhi to the river, traversing five check posts and a distance of seven kilometres without a single question being asked. Although the truck did appear to be empty, which might explain away some of the police’s laxness, the findings of the program did little to instil confidence in the effectiveness of the police’s ‘Ring of Steel’ security cordon.

On 21 April 2016, two days after the bombing, the Ministry of Interior announced it had fired four – relatively low ranking – police officials in Police District 1, including the district police chief, in connection with the attack. Minister of Interior Taj Muhammad Jahed additionally ordered the police “to hunt down the terrorists” and use all resources available to protect the city from a repeat attack.  It is an admonition that for the moment sounds somewhat hollow.

Other reactions

In the aftermath of the attack, the government sought to regain the initiative by taking a strong and belligerent position. President Ashraf Ghani claimed that this act by the “enemies of the people of Afghanistan” showed their “weakness and defeat in the face of the national defence and security forces.” Later, while visiting the injured in the Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan hospital, he also vowed that the government would “avenge every drop of blood of its people” and repeated that the attack had been “a desperate, un-Islamic and inhumane act that represented a culture of ignorance.” CEO Abdullah said something similar when he stated “this criminal act… shows the depth of wildness and criminality of the enemies of Afghanistan” (shown on Ariana News TV on 19 April 2016).

There was a marked, and unsurprising, change in tone with regard to the prospects of peace talks – possibly in anticipation of a backlash for having been too soft. CEO spokesman Jawed Faisal was quoted by The Guardian as saying; “Before, we had a focus on a peaceful solution, but now there’s been a shift in strategy: to hit [Taleban] where it hurts the most. We’ll be hitting them with full force, with all means available. They did not answer positively to the peace call of the government, they answered with bullets. If they want war, we’ll give them war.”

Wahid Omar, former spokesperson for Karzai and recently appointed as Afghan ambassador to Italy was quoted by a Tolo News journalist as saying that war was the solution.

There were also calls for the immediate execution of Taleban fighters who are in government custody and who have already been sentenced to death. The demand seems to have originated with former NDS head Rahmatullah Nabil on his Facebook page, later followed by Special Representative of the President for Good Governance Zia Massud. There have been the usual calls on social media to retaliate against Pakistan, if there is another such bombing.

First Deputy Speaker of the Meshrano Jirga Farhad Sakhi, blamed Pakistan specifically: “It [Pakistan] sends terrorists from other side and here it sits at the negotiation table with us. We will never compromise with them” (as shown on One TV on 19 April 2016). The Afghan government has not come out directly accusing Pakistan of complicity, although Omar Aziz, the Kabul NDS chief, said at a press conference the attack was “organised outside the country.” CEO Abdullah, moreover, let it be known on the evening of the attack that he had postponed his trip to Pakistan that had been scheduled for early May “after initial evidence of today’s suicide attack” (see his Twitter account here and here).

There were some other voices. In its editorial on 20 April, state-run Anis Daily said that the attack could not undermine peace talks. “The recent aggressive and suicide attack by the Taliban group have made our people disappointed about ensuring peace… But, we must not lose opportunities of peace talks with the Taliban and other terrorist groups, but we must utilize them.” Independent Hasht-e Sobh Daily in its editorial on 19 April, however, called the attack unprecedented and urged the government to admit its “failure in the peace efforts.” (BBC Monitoring Afghanistan News, 21 April 2016)

A hardening of positions

The use by the Taleban of such a huge amount of explosives, in a residential area, and their – almost unprecedented – willingness to claim such an attack (while still denying the scope of the carnage) could signal a hardening of their position vis-à-vis civilians living in government areas. Whereas the Taleban, in their 2015 spring offensive statement still said that “top priority will be given to safeguarding and protecting the lives and properties of the civilian people,” in the 2016 statement the protection seemed more conditional: “During the span of Operation Omari, in areas including villages and cities where the Islamic Emirate has established its rule, the lives and property of the dwellers will be safeguarded as is its duty.”

It will be important in such an atmosphere to keep the hope of peace alive, however small, and to ensure that the desire to avenge will be curtailed. A hardening of positions on both sides will only lead to more suffering and to a greater disregard of rights and protections by all sides.

 

(1) The Taleban also released a video of supposedly one of the attackers, who claimed that his treatment in captivity (apparently in Bagram) had inspired him to become a “martyrdom seeker:”

I will never forget the scene when I was at the prison, the government people would use severely abusive words against the young Mujahideen. When you would swear to them on the holy Quran, they would tell us that I don’t care about your Quran and your God.

I will never forget these words. The jail term that I passed further strengthened my belief as compared to the past. When I saw their treatment at the jail, it further increased my emotions. When I got released I did not go home directly, I came to the lines of martyrdom seekers.

(2) The statement in response to last Tuesday’s attack also claimed that, “Following the incident, the enemy organs circulated some pictures which were either not of the event or in some cases not even from Afghanistan.” This seems to refer to several pictures that circulated on social media showing a huge fireball above high-rise building, that were indeed clearly neither in Kabul, nor from this incident. (There had been a column of smoke immediately after the explosion but no fireball). Another picture that was apparently taken in the aftermath of a bombing in Pakistan a few years ago, was also fairly widely circulated. This however, is more likely to have been the consequence of the regular mindless sharing of images on social media, than an orchestrated propaganda campaign.

(3) The statement in response to the Shah Shahid explosion said that because the incident was so perplexing they had dispatched an investigation team (as they did not want to lay blame without being sure). The investigation concluded that neither the Emirates leadership, nor the local “Mujahideen leaders” had been involved as “Such bombing campaigns are not the aim of Mujahideen nor is it considered any kind of achievement and most importantly, Islamic principles do not sanction such actions. We strongly condemn this incident and whole heartedly sympathize with our countrymen who were either martyred, injured or lost property in this plot. … The lives of civilians are very precious to us. We will never allow our Mujahideen to ever carry out bombings aimlessly and in crowded areas and will strictly cling onto Islamic rules in this regard.”

 

Russian Konkurs Anti-Tank Guided Missile

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Jorge Domecq, the EDA Chief Executive, will be taking part in the Security Jam on 26 April at 9 AM CEST to discuss issues of future military engagement. The Jam is a massive online brainstorm which will gather thousands of experts on security, development and human rights from around the world.

Discussions will focus on a broad range of issues ranging from fighting terrorism and transnational criminal networks to gearing our police and military forces towards 21st century conflicts or building new global partnership to reflect a changed world.

Mr Domecq will focus on the topic of future foreign military engagement.

How does it work?

The 2016 Security Jam is organised around six topics, running in parallel for 77 straight hours on April 25-28, 2016. In writing only, participants develop solutions at the strategic, tactical and operational levels of the various issues at hand.

The Jam is held on a state of the art platform with powerful data mining tools and statistics. Senior think-tank experts moderate discussions and guide Jammers towards recommendations.

Jammers can take part in discussions from as little as 15 minutes to as much as 77 hours. All contributions are in writing, and the Jam can be accessed using any device - computer, laptop, smartphone - from anywhere in the world.

Register  

To participate and to share your insights with a global network, you need to register.

Indian Talwar Class Guided Missiel Frigate

The seventh edition of the Personnel Recovery Controller and Planner Course (PRCPC), a project initiated and supported by the European Defence Agency (EDA), was held from 4-15 April 2016 at Poggio Renatico Air Base, Italy. The event was hosted for the second time by the European Personnel Recovery Centre (EPRC), a close partner of the Agency.

All in all, 19 students from six Member States (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain) benefitted from the knowledge and experience of a cadre of instructors from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

The main focus of the course is to train staff officers in supporting their commanders in Personnel Recovery related issues. The course is designed for personnel who hold personnel recovery positions in tactical operation centres (TOCs), personnel recovery coordination cells (PRCCs) or joint personnel recovery cells (JPRCs). Most of all, the course aims at ensuring that sufficient trained personnel is available to support future PR activities.

Personnel Recovery (PR) is a vital element of modern operational planning as it provides a security net for deployed personnel. Most importantly, it boosts morale and acknowledges national as well as European Union responsibilities to effect the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel deployed in the context of Crisis Management Operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

The next EU PRCPC will take place in Veszprem, Hungary from 30 May to 10 June 2016 and will be organised by the Hungarian Defence Forces. EPRC personnel will support this iteration with instructors.

Background

The EDA PRCPC project was established on 30 May 2013 as an EDA Category B project under the lead of Sweden. As of today, it includes six contributing EU Member States (cMS): Austria, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands and Sweden. On 31 May 2015, the cMS agreed to extend the PRCPC Cat B project until 30 May 2017. The EPRC is a potential candidate for the continuation of the project.

The EPRC closely cooperates with the European Defence Agency. It was created on 8 July 2015 by seven nations (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom) with the aim of improving the four phases of Personnel Recovery (Preparation, Planning, Execution and Adaptation) by developing/harmonising the Personnel Recovery Policy, Doctrine and Standards through clear lines of communications with partners/stakeholders (nations and international organisations), and providing assistance in support of education and training, exercises and operations.

 

More information:

• 6th edition of Personnel Recovery Controller and Planner Course (March 2016)

The Centre for Security Governance (CSG) is pleased to announce a new series of reports as part of its ‘Non-State Security Providers and Political Formation in Conflict-Affected States’ project, funded by the Gerda Henkel Foundation. Four CSG Papers will present the findings of three case studies—Afghanistan, Somalia and South Sudan— alongside a synthesis report providing a

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Throughout March 2016, Shindand district in Herat province witnessed heavy fighting. Clashes between two rival insurgent groups were followed by a string of ANSF military operations. With substantial help from Quetta, the local pro-Mansur Taleban group has swept away a pro-Rasul outfit that had recently proved less aggressive towards the government. This new outbreak of long-standing tensions in Shindand has thus resulted in a Taleban advance in the strategic Zerkuh area, a large but unknown number of displaced people and higher levels of violence against civilians. AAN’s Fabrizio Foschini examines the complexity of the conflict and its background, the legacy of which still seems to influence the way different actors play it out.

A recent spate of fighting has once again put Herat’s Shindand district in the spotlight (see previous AAN reporting here). Between 7 and 9 of March 2016 infighting between two rival Taleban groups caused massive casualties in the district, which led to the eviction of one faction, that of Mawlawi Rasul’s supporters led by Mullah Nangialay, from their home turf in the Zerkuh area of the district. Successive military operations by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and, lastly, a limited comeback by Nangialay’s fighters in the area, have not significantly altered the gains made by the pro-Mansur Taleban group, led by Mullah Samad.

The fighting was significant, not only for the number of casualties, but also for the involvement of Taleban fighters sent in from Quetta and for the implications of a shift in the balance of power in the broader western region. Shindand, which borders restive areas of Farah province, has long been one of the most violent, least state-controlled areas in Herat. The causes of its conflict are, however, to be found more in the competition among the local political elites – and the external patronage they were able to secure – than in the infiltration of insurgents from bordering areas.

A background of Shindand conflict

Shindand residents found themselves in an odd situation at the fall of the Taleban in November 2001. As the only district of Herat with an overwhelming Pashtun majority, they had ended up supporting the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan ­– the Taleban regime – during its contested conquest of Herat in 1995 and its subsequent tenure there, and they had reasons to fear reprisals. As soon as it was clear that the Taleban would abandon Herat city, powerbrokers in Shindand made a move to prevent them from using their area as a last stand against Ismail Khan’s troops’ push from the North. Only a few of the Shindandi leaders who had held important ranks within the Taleban regime fled; the rest organised into a local shura and braced themselves for what was to be expected: retaliation for their support of the Taleban.

A few days after he captured Herat on 12 November 2001, Ismail Khan attacked Shindand. The forces that had organised as a local council withdrew to the Zerkuh area immediately to the south of the district centre, a valley thickly dotted with villages where a significant portion of Shindand’s population resides. Zerkuh had been at the core of local politics from the times of the jihad, from where mujahedin fronts operated when the communist government was in control of the district centre and of Shindand’s main strategic asset – the military airbase built by the Soviets in the 1960s. Zerkuh had already resisted Ismail Khan’s attacks in the years between 1993-1995, when relations between the then amir of Herat and the Pashtun mujahedin from Shindand, formerly affiliated with Hezb-e Islami, had deteriorated, until the latter welcomed and assisted the Taleban’s conquest of the city. (1)

The military leader in Zerkuh at the time of the fall of the Taleban was a strongman from Farmakan village, Amanullah. For the next two years, between 2002 and 2004, people in Zerkuh withstood attempts by Ismail Khan to capture the area, as well as a de facto blockade that severed their connection with the provincial capital and forced them to travel to Farah for all their needs. The ethnic polarisation stirred by the confrontation helped them enlist some support from Pashtun politicians, such as then Kandahar governor Gul Agha Sherzai.

No doubt there were several former Taleban among them, and Amanullah himself had in the past cooperated with the regime. However, they managed to avoid becoming a target of NATO operations, insisting on their willingness to accept the new government and establishing links to President Karzai. Instead, when in April 2004 the Kabul government, with US support, orchestrated the removal of Ismail Khan from his position as Herat governor, Amanullah and his men played a pivotal role, attacking Herat from the South and advancing as far as the city airport.

Although Amanullah was not given any official position, he remained highly influential in Shindand. He had a hand in the appointments of successive district governors and enjoyed good relations with the Afghan government and its foreign supporters, as well as the Taleban, who, in the meantime, had started to reorganise and mobilise. In 2006, however, he was killed in a local blood feud. As often in contemporary Afghanistan, there can be several different motives for a political killing, given the numerous actors and competition involved. In the case of Amanullah, the motive was likely revenge in the context of a land dispute that had recently seen Amanullah’s supporters kill a former local ally, Arbab Bashir. And then there was the fact that the latter was a Barakzai, a minority tribe in Nurzai-dominated Zerkuh, but one heavily-patronised by important national politicians. Finally, there was also the long-standing vendetta with Amanullah’s arch-enemy, Ismail Khan, by then a minister in Kabul but never disconnected from the politics of his province of origin.

Whether it was provincial or national powerbrokers, who patronised local appointments, the district leadership posts in Shindand gradually slipped into the hands of Amanullah’s enemies. When in April 2007 a US airstrike killed two of his brothers, along with a number of other civilians, the family’s former ties to the Taleban took over. Raz Muhammad, aka Jawed Nangialay, Amanullah’s son, brought the closest relatives to Quetta and officially joined the Taleban. In the following months, Shindand was the stage of more airstrikes that ended in massive civilian casualties. Zerkuh, in particular, with most of its traditional elite antagonised by the government and on the run, underwent a significant radicalisation and became a bastion of the insurgency. Despite being based mostly in Pakistan, in subsequent years Amanullah’s son, Nangialay, would become the most renowned Taleban commander in the district. Many of Amanullah’s former sub-commanders joined the Taleban as well, either for ideological reasons or for opportunity.

The ANSF were unable to keep the valley under tight control, despite the presence of US army outposts. From 2009 onwards the government started to rely on militias recruited among the local armed groups, first as part of the Local Defense Initiative (LDI) and then under the banner of the Afghan Local Police (ALP). Shindand’s ALP, one of the first in the country, was established almost exclusively in Zerkuh, which accounted for most of the 325 ALP slots allocated to the district. On one hand, the establishment of the ALP managed to decrease anti-government activities of the more opportunistic armed groups. Indeed, many militiamen formerly affiliated with Amanullah and Nangialay, often with links to the Taleban, were recruited into it. One of Nangialay’s cousins, Haji Amir Muhammed, a former Hezb-e Islami commander who had previously been cooperating with the US Special Forces, became an ALP officer. Complaints that the recruiting process had been influenced by powerful individuals and by the foreign troops present in Zerkuh were made by some tribal elders and by local authorities. In particular, vociferous complaints by Lal Muhammad Omarzai, then district governor and long-time rival of Amanullah’s family, show that Amanullah’s Nurzai sub-tribe, the Qulizai, if not the actual fighters now connected to Nangialay, were given a large share of the ALP positions in Zerkuh.

The establishment of the ALP thus created a rift within the district’s security forces, with splits and often conflicting loyalties between the Afghan National Police and the ALP or among the latter’s ranks. This state of affairs resulted in a steady trickle of assassinations and retaliations, with abuses often carried out against civilians. This stood in the way of a normalisation of life and society in Zerkuh and kept local tensions alive among the different communities inhabiting the valley (as many as eight Nurzai sub-tribes, plus some Barakzais and Tajiks). Anti-government propaganda continued to find fertile ground among the population, and the more ideological Taleban groups soon started to target the ALP with a deadly campaign of attacks on check posts and the assassination of commanders. By late 2014, most of the ALP commanders that were still alive had relocated to Herat and their militiamen had either defected or been cowed into inaction. The Taleban were increasingly putting pressure on Shindand district centre.

It is at this stage that, in late 2014 or early 2015, Nangialay decided to move back to Zerkuh and to reside there permanently, even bringing back his family from Pakistan.

Climax, stall and new fault lines of conflict

Despite initial reports that his return to Shindand had bolstered Taleban activities there, Nangialay’s anti-government activities gradually lost momentum – at least in comparison to the other main Taleban leader in Zerkuh area, Mullah Samad. The latter, an ideological Taleb who had previously run a madrassa in Farmakan village, was in charge of the Taleban front controlling the southern part of Zerkuh valley, which is less populated, more rugged and further away from the district centre. Samad had proven to be the most active insurgent leader during Nangialay’s absence, and even after the latter’s return he turned out to be the more aggressive of the two.

Nangialay’s sudden departure from Pakistan may have been linked to differences within the Quetta leadership. His family background justified the assumption that his main aim was to re-gain his father’s role in Shindand by all means, and this could have raised doubts about his ideological commitment among Taleban leaders. It is possible that he had developed concerns for his safety, prompting his return – or flight – to Shindand. His abandoning Quetta and distancing himself from the Taleban leadership also meant relinquishing economic benefits. He was clearly on the lookout for new patronage when, shortly after his homecoming, rumours started to circulate that he was about to join Daesh. (2) It is hard to say whether it was lack of material resources that led to his quiet behaviour, or rather paved the way for a preparatory phase to establish a tacit pact of non-belligerence with the local authorities. Looking at the spatial distribution of forces in Zerkuh, however, it is apparent how the northern area that Nangialay controlled in 2015, approximately one-third of Zerkuh, largely coincided with the extension of the previous ALP program (which had bases in Bakhtabad, Urayen, Sonuwghan and Farmakan). This area represents the most strategic part of the valley, a sort of buffer that partially shields the relevant government assets of the district centre and the airbase from the more remote areas to the south adjoining Farah province. Nangialay’s inactivity enabled the beleaguered government forces to have some much needed respite. Indeed, problems started to arise between Nangialay and Mullah Samad’s groups, including armed clashes in September 2015. A Taleban commission sent there to adjudicate the dispute reportedly ruled that Nangialay had to leave and hand over command to Mullah Samad.

In early November 2015, Mawlawi Rasul and his deputy Abdul Manan Niazi visited Shindand to lobby Nangialay for his support (for background and bios, see a previous AAN dispatch here). Given the challenges to his leadership by Mullah Samad and the pressure he was subjected to by the mainstream Taleban, either to fight the government or leave, the adhesion Nangialay offered to Rasul was probably more strategic than ideological. Nangialay was appointed military commander for the Western region by the pro-Rasul faction. Heavy clashes occurred between Nangialay’s men and Mullah Samad’s forces on 10 and 11 December 2015, with the latter taking more casualties. No side managed to make a breakthrough, though, and a standstill ensued.

The stalemate lasted for a few months, until one side was able to receive significant reinforcements. These came in the form of a mobile column of Taleban fighters sent in by Quetta in the early days of March 2016 to help Mullah Samad mount a major attack on Nangialay’s territory. Reported numbers of these reinforcements vary, with figures as high as 1000 quoted by some local sources interviewed by AAN, consisting of a majority of pro-Mansur fighters originally from Shindand or from neighboring Farah and Helmand provinces, and including a certain proportion of Pakistani (as well as Panjabi) fighters. What everybody agreed on was that these were part of the shock troops used as ‘troubleshooters’ by Akhtar Muhammad Mansur, that had until then largely been employed to fight the Daesh threat in Nangarhar or the dissident Mansur Dadullah/IMU front in Zabul. Locals from Shindand claim they recognised the leader of this contingent as Pir Agha, the by now notorious commander of the Taleban ‘Rapid Reaction Force’ for the southern region.

Their arrival bolstered Mullah Samad’s faction, which had likely hitherto enjoyed a larger following. In a determined sweep, they managed to completely evict Nangialay’s fighters in just two days, on 7 and 8 March 2016. Fighting was brief but vicious: the first day saw the most casualties with Nangialay’s men falling back on a defensive line at Chahar Qala, within sight of his headquarters in Farmakan, which he had to abandon. By the end of the second day, with his troops demoralised, outgunned and outnumbered, and after having lost many vehicles in the fighting, he was forced to leave Zerkuh altogether to Mullah Samad. His fighters, together with their allies from Abdul Manan Niazi’s group, dispersed to other districts of Herat and Farah provinces, some reportedly travelling as far as Gulestan district of Farah where another prominent pro-Rasul commander, Baz Muhammad, gave them shelter.

A number of Nangialay’s supporters who had previously been part of the ALP program sought shelter in the ANSF base in Shindand district centre with Nangialay’s cousin, Haji Amir. Whether it was because Haji Amir managed to procure not only shelter, but also to lobby for pro-active support from the ANSF for his kinsfolks, or because the ANSF command in Herat had grown reasonably concerned about the shift in the balance of forces in Zerkuh, the ANSF reaction to these developments was unusually swift. Reinforcements were moved in and less than a week later, from 13 to 15 March 2016, military operations, including significant airstrikes, took place within Zerkuh, targeting the victorious Mullah Samad’s faction. The ANSF however did not seem to be interested in holding ground as much as limiting the extent of the Taleban victory and now unified control of the valley. Mullah Samad’s insurgents seemed committed to consolidating their gains in northern Zerkuh, despite the fact that Pir Agha’s contingent had reportedly left immediately after the battle against Nangialay. An incident occurred in Azizabad on 11 March 2016, where a mixed ANA/ANP convoy coming from Herat to the Shindand district centre was ambushed by insurgents coming from Farsi district (the Taleban shadow governor of Farsi was killed in the encounter). This showed that the Taleban acted coordinately to try and stop reinforcements getting through by seeking support from neighboring districts. In the following days, hit and run attacks on ANSF checkpoints were carried out by insurgents, some up to the gates of the district governor’s compound.

The ANSF military operations took a second, more vigorous turn around the end of March. On 27 March 2016, a commando raid penetrated deep into Zerkuh, hitting Nangialay’s former base in Farmakan during the nighttime and killing a number of Mullah Samad’s fighters there. In the following days clashes between the ANSF and the Taleban continued in the Shahrabad and Bakhtabad areas, that is, at the entry of Zerkuh valley. Yet again, despite increased government focus on Shindand – on 29 March, Herat governor Muhammed Asef Rahimi visited the district centre – and claimed that as many as 30 villages in the district had been cleared of insurgents (Herat TV News, 27 March and 2 April 2016). Local reporting suggests that no real attempts were made to establish stable government positions in Zerkuh; at least not directly.

In the meantime, Nangialay was reported to either have surrendered to the government or to have travelled to Herat to seek government support. Besides these unconfirmed reports, it is remarkable how the second ANSF offensive resembled a preparatory operation to weaken Mullah Samad’s grip on his newly conquered areas and possibly allow Nangialay to stage a comeback. This is exactly what happened in the first week of April. According to locals and security analysts in Herat, some of Nangialay’s fighters reorganised and established three checkposts in the Chahar Mahal area in the northernmost tip of Zerkuh, a few kilometres south of the district centre.

Pro-Mansur Taleban have long accused their rivals of being on the government’s side. At the onset of the attack on Nangialay led by Mullah Samad and Pir Agha, Qari Yusuf Ahmadi, one of the Taleban’s spokesmen, released a statement to the effect that the operation had been aimed against “local bandits and Arbaki militiamen” who were “being backed by Kabul administration troops and aircraft.”

Too close an association with the government can, quite understandably in a place with a history of conflict and radicalisation like Shindand, lead to a loss of prestige. If Nangialay had indeed sought government support, he must have resented this being made public. In fact, one of the Shindandi elders interviewed by AAN hinted that one of the reasons for Haji Amir to facilitate the extension of ANSF support to his cousin was to weaken Nangialay’s position inside their Qulizai clan, so he could enhance his own chances at leadership, or at least to make the former Taleban commander look less charismatic and more dependent on the state. Peshawar-based Afghan Islamic Press reported that Nangialay released a video clip in which he denied surrendering to the government and that a spokesperson for Rasul’s Taleban faction had instead accused local supporters of Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansur, that is Mullah Samad, to have handed over the Zerkuh areas under their control to the government forces based on a deal (Islamic Press News Agency, 27 March 2016).

It seems plausible that since late-2015, Nangialay had started to try to fit into his father’s shoes, that is: to keep one foot in the Taleban camp, in particular in the faction allowing him more room for manoeuvre in his relations with the state, and one foot in the (local) government. Given his charisma, family renown, and the strategic location of Shindand for all Taleban operations in the north-west, the pro-Mansur Taleban faction could not tolerate such a state of affairs in view of their announced spring offensive. (3)

Another reason for the timing of the decisive Taleban military operation in early March 2016 is probably related to the area’s poppy cultivation. Taleban spring offensives in areas like Shindand or Farah, where opium production is extremely widespread, usually take place after the harvesting in late April. The earlier attack on Nangialay in Shindand can also have been motivated by the will to expand their territory in order to increase the share in the taxation of opium, the Taleban’s ushr, which is collected right before the harvest. The present state of affairs would mean an increased revenue for Mullah Samad, unless the viciousness of the fighting in March, that must have kept many locals away from their fields at the critical time of saw, ‘weeding’ in the local parlance, had spoilt Zerkuh’s production this year.

Shindand crisis: what are the short and long-term consequences?

When reports about the scale of the fighting in Shindand first made it to Herat at the beginning of March 2016, the humanitarian community grew concerned about the possibility of a major crisis in a non-accessible area. There were reports of retaliatory violence and looting against communities that had supported Nangialay (including gruesome tales of mass beheadings. The local authorities from Shindand claimed that as many as 2000 families of internally displaced persons (IDPs) had left Zerkuh. In this scenario, OCHA took the somewhat bold step of deploying a mission to the conflict area. This mission reached Shindand district centre by 17 March 2016, but could not find evidence of a large number of IDPs having taken shelter there. Allowing for exaggerated figures provided by local authorities, it seems likely that a number of displacements indeed took place. Those among Zerkuh’s residents who could afford it, members of the elite or people with some previous connection there, probably moved to Herat city, while the rest went to neighboring districts of Farah or temporarily left their homes but not Zerkuh altogether. It is quite possible that the majority of them did not choose the district centre as a destination due to the mistrust that many residents felt towards the government given almost a decade where the valley had been out of the control of the government. Perhaps, more simply, it was because the district centre itself, almost on the frontline, offers little protection for those whom Mullah Samad’s Taleban would want to target.

The extent to which Samad’s winning faction affected reprisals on Nangialay’s supporters is, however, unclear. Tales of ferocity surrounding, in particular, Pir Agha’s troops could have spurred families with ties to Nangialay to move out. But attempts on the part of Mullah Samad to bring the situation back to ‘normality’ came soon afterwards. He reportedly allowed the only clinic in the valley, which had been shut during the fighting and which is located in Nangialay’s former territory, to re-open. In gatherings on 21 March 2016, he assured relatives of the losing side “that the Islamic Emirate does not hold personal animosity towards anyone.”

Even if there was no mass retaliation in the conquered areas, levels of violence against Shindandis living in and out of the district have increased as a result of the conflict between the Taleban factions, putting additional pressure on a population already traumatised by years of conflict. There have been incidents that can be understood as reprisal killings for the support given to one faction – or efforts to intimidate potential supporters of the other side. On 8 April 2016, gunmen attacked a house in Chahar Mahal, the same village in northern Zerkuh where Nangialay’s fighters have been able to re-deploy, and killed two of the residents. One of them, Suleiman, was reportedly the father of one of Nangialay’s lieutenants.

A few days earlier, on 4 April 2016, Haji Aref Godandar, the recently elected head of the Shindand Qaumi Shura (People’s Council), was killed in broad daylight in a central area of Herat city, while his teenager son was injured. The Taleban claimed to have ambushed a “hireling commander” at dawn. Haji Godandar was in fact, as his takhallus (‘nickname’) implies, no more than a trader and tribal elder. He wielded influence in Shindand, however, and the Taleban may have thought it better to eliminate a potential catalyst of support in the district.

The extension of violence to the far away provincial capital may be an isolated occurrence, but recent developments in Shindand, which constituted a significant victory for the pro-Mansur Taleban, mean a further deterioration of security there. In the best case scenario, a string of attacks, assassinations and retaliations (commonly seen during the 2009-14 ALP experience) might repeat itself, only, this time, much closer to the district centre. At worst, the Taleban will be able to mount more ambitious operations from their redoubt of Zerkuh as part of their Operation Omari. Despite the government reaction and the re-establishment of some degree of control for Nangialay at the entrance of Zerkuh valley, his is not a buffer that guarantees to hold anymore.

Shindand is a strategic area not only for Taleban movements and operation planning in the northwestern region, but also for the government and allied western troops. Shindand airbase, although currently mostly reduced to the role of training ground for Afghan pilots, remains one of the largest military airfields in the country suited to host air forces. Shindand also has a long and chequered history of US Special Operations Forces’ activities. Furthermore, given that much of the current involvement of allied western troops in the Afghan conflict consists of air support and special forces operations, recent tactical decisions in Shindand appear to bear the imprint of previous militia experiments. Perhaps this is with the aim of defending a long-term strategic asset – the airbase – at minimum cost: with the lives of militiamen who do not even belong to the ALP, but rather to a different insurgent outfit rival to the mainstream Taleban.

However, past experience should have proved to the Afghan and NATO commands that playing up rival militias in a fragmented environment like Shindand, no matter how remote the link of patronage is, only makes the game there tougher and eventually helps the roughest players to emerge, to the detriment of the long-term security situation.

 

(1) Ismail Khan himself hails originally from Shindand district, although the district never constituted a power base for him, and in fact was often outside of his grip. Strikingly, this populous but peripheral district is the birthplace of many important political leaders, both among the local Farsiwans (now mostly referred to as Tajiks) and the Pashtuns, for example Alauddin Khan, late deputy of Ismail Khan and one of Herat’s most respected mujahedin, and Humayun Azizi, former minister and current governor of Kandahar.

(2) According to some locals interviewed by AAN, these rumours were circulated by Nangialay’s rivals inside the Taleban, in order to create concern among the Iranian security forces about the possible presence of an ISIS group on their borders and to limit Nangialay’s potential for movement in that direction.

(3) There are, of course, other additional layers of conflict brought up by local analysts, which connect the recent developments to the political landscape of Herat and involve other players as well. The past connection between a lesser Taleban commander from Zerkuh’s small Tajik community living in the Emarat area, Kamran, who sides with Mullah Samad, and the former amir of Herat Ismail Khan was mentioned as a sign of the continuing enmity of the latter towards Amanullah’s family and the role he could be playing in Shindand’s conflict.

 

British AIM-132 ASRAAM Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile

Ministers of Defence today met in the European Defence Agency (EDA) Steering Board, under the chairmanship of Federica Mogherini in her capacity as Head of the Agency.

The EDA presented among other things progress of the four cooperative capability programmes, the interim report on the implementation of the Policy Framework for Systematic and Long-Term Defence Cooperation as well as a preliminary implementation roadmap for a dual-use strategy on RPAS regulation.

Furthermore the Agency highlighted the key findings of the hybrid threats table-top exercise it conducted last month. The exercise involved some 80 experts from Member States, EU institutions and NATO. It underlined for example the critical importance of strategic awareness to allow Member States to detect and identify hybrid threats. The detection of hostile hybrid threats is the most challenging and yet most important aspect of an effective defence posture in this context. Greater levels of information and intelligence and close cooperation between civil and military actors were identified as important. Additionally, rapid decision-making and deployment of the necessary capabilities needs are necessary. While in a hybrid threat scenario civil actors might be in the lead, the military must stand ready and provide decision-makers with the full scope of military capabilities if necessary. Specific focus should be given to the ability to communicate. Therefore the resilience, redundancy and protection of CIS networks remains vital and the contribution of more secure defence systems (including those using satellites) is important.

“The exercise was very useful as it allowed us to stress-test military capabilities in a hybrid threat environment. It also underlined the importance of close co-operation between military and civilian stakeholders in a hybrid threat scenario. However, we also saw that existing military capabilities should not be completely reoriented towards countering hybrid threats as the full spectrum of military missions must be considered”, Jorge Domecq, the Chief Executive of the EDA said. A second exercise in June will focus on the way ahead in different capability areas.

Ministers of Defence were also presented with an interim report on the implementation of the Policy Framework for Systematic and Long-Term Defence Cooperation. The interim report – which was compiled on the basis of questionnaires sent to and completed by the Member States – highlights that the policy framework is well supported. The focus on information-sharing through the Agency’s Capability Development Plan as well as the Collaborative Database is deemed crucial by a large majority of Member States.

Defence Ministers endorsed a preliminary implementation roadmap for a dual-use strategy on RPAS regulation involving questions of rulemaking, standardisation, technological solutions and issues of cyber security. The EDA will now start consolidating the roadmap with the European Commission and other relevant actors. 

The Steering Board tasked the Agency, in close coordination with Member States, to engage with the Commission in the preparation of the Space Strategy for Europe, to ensure that common military views of Member States are taken into account. Furthermore, the EDA will support Member States’ dialogue and consultation with the Commission in order to contribute to the European Defence Action Plan.

Jorge Domecq, the EDA Chief Executive, also informed Defence Ministers of recent activities in R&T. Between 2004 and the end of 2016, the Agency will have managed research projects with a total value of around € 1 billion in contributions by the Member States.  Mr Domecq also stressed that the EDA will continue to actively support Member States in their discussions with the European Commission in view of defining and agreeing on the research topics and priorities, the rules as well as the working modalities of the Preparatory Action (PA) on defence-related research scheduled to be launched in 2017.

More information:

• Council conclusions on Countering Hybrid Threats

The SSR Resource Centre is pleased to present a new series on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) in Myanmar that is led by Dean Piedmont of the Peacebuilding, Reintegration & Stabilization Group (PRSG) in collaboration with the Centre for Security Governance.   This blog series features analysis on the state of DDR and SSR

Want to keep up to date on the SSR field? Once a week, the CSG’s Security Sector Reform Resource Centre project posts pertinent news articles, reports, projects, and event updates on SSR over the past week. Click here to sign-up and have the SSR Weekly News Roundup delivered straight to your inbox every week!   SSR Resource Centre

2015 was again a busy year for the European Defence Agency (EDA) in supporting Member States to enhance European defence capabilities and cooperation. The Agency’s main activities and achievements of last year are summarized in the EDA’s 2015 annual report which has been published just now. 

You will find in the report a succinct overview of new developments which occurred in 2015 such as the adoption of the revised EDA Council Decision, as well as of the progress made in implementing the revised Capability Development Plan (CDP), the four key capability programmes and the roadmaps for future cooperation projects. Support to operations, research and technology (R&T), Single European Sky, exercises and training, energy and environment or VAT exemption on cooperation projects are additional EDA activities which progressed substantially in 2015 and are showcased in the report. All major 2015 EDA facts & figures are also included.

Have a look here!

A new UN report highlights how access to healthcare and education in Afghanistan, particularly for children, is being increasingly compromised by violence, threats, intimidation and abuse of facilities. The number of verified incidents over the last three years (2013-2015) in particular shows an increase in recorded incidents of threats and intimidation, as well as a continued considerable number of deaths, injuries and abductions. The violations, to a differing extent carried out by all parties to the conflict, directly harmed or impacted health and education personnel, reduced the availability of healthcare and limited children’s access to education and medical facilities. AAN highlights the UN report’s main findings.

The year 2015 was the bloodiest year in Afghanistan yet. And children were particularly hard hit: one in four documented casualties was a child. (1) UNAMA’s data on civilian casualties for the first quarter of 2016, released on 17 April 2016, shows a continued increase in the numbers of civilian casualties, including an increase in child casualties:

The Mission has documented a five per cent increase in women casualties (195 women casualties – 52 deaths and 143 injured) and a 29 per cent increase in child casualties (610 children casualties – 161 deaths and 449 injured) compared to the first three months of 2015. Ground engagements caused the highest number of women casualties, followed by suicide and complex attacks, and IEDs. For children, ground engagements killed and maimed the most, followed by unexploded ordinance and IEDs. (1)

A new UN report now shows how children are additionally affected by the on-going conflict through incidents that affect their access to health care and education across Afghanistan.

The report, which is based on data collected over the last three years (from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2015) by the Human Rights Unit of UNAMA and UNICEF focuses on conflict-related attacks and incidents on education and health care facilities. It paints a grim picture of post-transition Afghanistan, showing how the number of incidents involving education and health care facilities and providers sharply increased in the last three years. (2) The conflict-related incidents had the effect that children were either denied access to education or missed their immunisations due to limited access to the health facilities and providers in 2015. Hospitals were damaged or destroyed by targeted attacks and crossfire, and many schools and health facilities were closed – and often remained closed – due to insecurity, threats or military use.

Nicholas Haysom, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan called the findings of the report “deeply troubling” and emphasised that it was “simply unacceptable for teachers, doctors and nurses to be subjected to violence or threats, and for schools and medical facilities to be misused or attacked.”

Infographic from UNAMA Report published on 18 April 2016

Schools under attack

Afghanistan has made significant progress in terms of primary and secondary education enrolments rates since 2001. In 2014 more than 8 million pupils were reported to be enrolled in schools, 39 per cent of them girls. The average annual growth rate, from 2001 to 2012, was said to have been nine per cent (according to a 2015 Ministry of Education review report). The conflict has, however, had a dampening effect in terms of access to education. As noted by the Education Ministry in the same report: “insecurity often include[s] attacks on schools resulting in closure of schools for long periods of time, shortage[s] result in long walking distance to schools, – all these factors negatively affect enrollment and retention rates and ultimately students’ learning.”

In 2015, the UN documented 132 conflict-related incidents affecting education facilities and education personnel (as compared to 63 incidents in 2013 and 71 in 2014). Of the 132 incidents affecting access to education, the UN report documented the highest number of cases (38) in the eastern region (23 in Nangarhar province, nine in Kunar, five in Laghman and one in Nuristan). An additional 27 incidents were recorded in the western region (12 in Farah province, seven in Herat, six in Ghor and two in Badghis), and 26 incidents in the northeastern region (16 in Kunduz province, seven in Badakhshan and three in Baghlan).

According to the Ministry of Education, as reported by AP recently 615 schools in the country’s 11 most volatile provinces had to close because of violence in 2015. For example, in Helmand alone as reported by Pajhwok more than 50 schools had been closed in the provincial capital and three nearby districts of southern Helmand province, as of November 2015, due to clashes between security forces and insurgents. (See also previous AAN reporting on the situation in Helmand here  and here). The UN report, which only counted conflict-related incidents that constituted a violation of applicable national and international laws and that could be verified by multiple sources, (3) had the following figures:

More than 369 schools closed partially or completely, affecting at least 139,048 students (65,057 boys and 73,991 girls) and 600 teachers.

According to the report, 75 educational personnel or students were killed, injured or abducted during 2015 (11 deaths, 15 injured, 49 abducted); all but one of the cases were perpetrated by anti-government elements. There were 29 direct attacks on schools (a decrease from 2014 and 2013 when respectively 34 and 30 direct attacks were recorded).

In cases where schools were used for military purposes (a total of 35 incidents), the government forces were at fault in two-thirds of the cases:

In 2015, 35 schools (compared to 12 schools in 2014 and ten schools in 2013) were used for military purposes for a cumulative total of 1,311 days, the majority (24) by Pro-Government Forces. Military use of schools varied from a few days to months, and impeded access to education for at least 8,905 students (5,614 boys and 3,291 girls). Anti- Government Elements used at least 11 schools in Nangarhar, Nuristan, Logar and Kunduz provinces for military purposes.

The highest number of incidents of schools being used for military purposes during 2015 was documented in Kunduz province, where 15 schools were used by the pro- government forces, affecting 6,680 students (3,980 boys and 2,700 girls).

Girls most affected

The UN report documented 19 incidents in 2015 where anti-government elements directly 
or indirectly limited girls’ access to education, including direct restrictions such as: complete bans on education for girls, restrictions on girls’ attendance beyond 4th or 6th grade, or explicit prohibitions on girls attending school without a female teacher. The 19 incidents also included “other forms 
of violence, which impeded girls’ access to education such as: threats and intimidations, two school-burnings, two improvised explosive device attacks
and one incident of abduction.”

Of the 14 recorded incidents 
of threats and intimidation against teachers and students, nine incidents led to the closure or partial closure of a total of 213 schools (including 94 mixed schools that were closed to girls only), affecting at least 50,683 girls. In Shindand district of Herat province alone, between June and December 2015, threats and intimidation carried out by anti-government elements led to the closure of five girl schools and the suspension of female classes in 94 mixed schools, affecting at least 27,103 girls.

The report notes that “The increase in attacks impacting education attributed to the Taliban – 82 incidents compared to 29 in 2014 – contradicts a decree issued by Mullah Mohammad Omar in 2011 instructing his followers not to attack schools or intimidate school children,” as well as a 2012 declaration by the Taliban that they were not against the education of girls.” (For more details on the Taleban’s education policies see these two AAN reports, here and here).

Increased number of incidents on health care

As reported earlier by AAN in March 2016, health workers have been coming under increasing pressure from all sides in the war. This is confirmed by the newly released UN report.

The UN report documents an increase in the number of incidents affecting access to health care, with 125 incidents reported in 2015, compared to 59 in 2014 and 33 in 2013. In 2015 20 health workers were reported killed, 43 injured and 66 abducted. Overall, anti-government elements perpetrated 109 of all verified cases affecting access to health services in 2015 (the UN report attributes 15 incidents to pro-government forces and one remains unknown).

Similar to the findings in the education sector, threats and intimidation of health personnel constituted the majority of the cases – with 64 incidents making up 52 per cent of all verified cases. Approximately one third of all health-related incidents took place in the eastern region which experienced 40 incidents: 23 in Nangarhar, ten in Kunar, six in Laghman and one in Nuristan (all attributed to Anti-Government Elements). In the northeast, UN documented 21 incidents, attributing eight incidents to Pro-Government Forces (five in Kunduz and three in Badakhshan) and 13 incidents to Anti-Government Elements (nine in Kunduz and four in Badakhshan). Additionally, 18 incidents were documented in the northern region, all perpetrated by Anti-Government Elements (seven in Balkh, three in Faryab, three in Samangan, three in Sar-e Pul and two in Jawzjan).

Of the ten recorded cases where medical facilities were used for military purposes, the perpetrators were anti-government elements in 80 per cent of the cases (8 incidents); in the remaining two cases pro-government forces used the facilities for the military purposes.

Compared to
 23 in 2014 and 15 incidents in 2013, the UN documented 64 incidents of threats and intimidation in 2015. Threats and intimidation targeting health personnel led to the closure of at least 19 clinics, including 12
in the eastern region (11 in Nangarhar, all attributed to ISIL-Khorasan Province and one in Kunar attributed to anti-government elements).

The violence also affected the vaccination campaigns:

A total of 89,873 children could not be vaccinated during the December 2015 Sub-National Immunization days. These children are mostly from Kunar (12,638), Nangarhar (59,650) and Helmand (13,493) provinces.

UN calls for greater responsibility

The UN called for the immediate cessation of indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks that target or affect civilians and civilian objects, including schools and hospitals, and calls on all parties to the conflict to ensure that perpetrators of attacks on education and health institutions, personnel and beneficiaries are held accountable. Such attacks – except in highly exceptional cases – amount to violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law 
(for more details on the rules of war, see here).

 

 

(1) In total the UN report documented 1,943 civilian casualties (600 deaths and 1,343 injured) in the period between 1 January and 31 March 2016. This represented a 13 per cent decrease in deaths and an 11 per cent increase in injuries, compared to the same period in 2015.

(2) The UN report notes that due to on going insecurity and access constraints “figures provided may underrepresent the number of incidents attributed to the parties to the conflict and the severity of the impact of conflict on children.” The methodology used for monitoring and verifying the incidents is the same as used for the regular reports by UNAMA on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, with all reported incidents having been verified by three sources.

(3) The UN counted only those cases that constituted a violation of the applicable international humanitarian law, international human rights law, international criminal law and national legislation. In particular, UN applied the international legal framework that Afghanistan is a party to, such as the four 1949 Geneva protocols and the second protocol of 1977, which relates to the protection of civilians in a non-international armed conflict. Under international humanitarian law, attacks against civilians and civilian objects, including schools and hospitals, are generally prohibited. Additional Protocol II prohibits acts or threats of violence when the primary purpose is to spread fear among the civilian population.

The country is also the signatory to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which establishes as a war crime “intentionally [directing] attacks against buildings dedicated to […] education […], hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives.

When collecting the data, the UN applied Security Council Resolution 1998 (Monitoring and reporting attacks on schools and/or hospitals and related protected personnel), which highlights the impact of armed conflict on the safety, education and healthcare of children, and calls for greater action to ensure that schools and hospitals are protected. The resolution refers to “attacks on schools and hospitals” as an umbrella formula both for attacks directed against schools and hospitals, as well as indirect harm resulting from conflict-related violence. This definition includes all acts that lead to the total destruction, compromised functioning or partial damage of educational and health institutions, as well as harm to protected persons, including killing, injuring, abduction and use of civilians as human shields.

 

 

Indonesian Bung Tomo Class Corvette

On 21 April, SEDE will hold a public hearing to address the cyber defence and resilience from the CSDP perspective at the EU level and national levels. How to build the resilience and efficiently protect critical infrastructures? Which are the cyber warfare capabilities in our changing world? Given that cyber security stays high on the European agendas and is one of the Presidency priorities, it will be extremely interesting to gather different experts and hear which their insights are.
Location : Paul-Henri Spaak 5B001
Programme
Programme
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs will hold on 20 April, jointly with the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, a hearing on "Securing the External Borders of the EU - a challenge for External and Internal Security".

The objective of the hearing is to discuss the way the EU's naval operation to combat people smuggling in the Mediterranean, border assistance and capacity building in the Sahel, and Frontex operations function together. The current crises in the EU neighbourhood demonstrate how deeply internal and external security are interlinked.

Location : Room Paul-Henri Spaak (5B001), Brussels
Further information
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Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP