European Union

Wizz Air Hungary v Commission (TAROM II; Covid-19)
State aid
State aid: the General Court dismisses an action brought by Wizz Air in respect of aid granted by Romania to national airline TAROM in order to provide compensation for the damage suffered owing to the COVID-19 pandemic

The Committee on Foreign Affairs questioned Dubravka Šuica, Croatian candidate for the Mediterranean portfolio, on Tuesday.
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Length of video : 208'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Length of video : 218'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

A seven-member strong delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) travelled to the United Kingdom from 28 to 30 October 2024. This was the first official visit of the Committee abroad in this parliamentary term. The delegation discussed possibilities for strengthening of the EU-UK partnership, in particular in foreign and security affairs.
This visit was also be an opportunity to exchange views on issues of global and regional significance such as the Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the situation in the Middle East and tensions in the Indo-Pacific.
Press announcement
Programme : [EN]
Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Headaches in the morning

Maybe it’s some kind of Stockholm Syndrome, but since the Tories left office I have not felt the same urge to write about British European policy.

Equally possibly, it might be because I feel a bit broken by another government with a lack of clear purpose in this domain. Labour, like their predecessors, seem to be stuck at the point of realising this whole Europe thing might be a bit more complicated than they thought, so extemporise until they can work it all out some more.

This was brought to a certain head last week for me off the back of some comments I made in an interview. In it, I said:

“The secrecy right now lets others claim he [Starmer] has no plan – or worse, is just looking to make deals where he can.”

Various people have pushed back on this, mostly by reading it as ‘Starmer actually has no plan’. While I’m not quite arguing that, the impression that this is the case seems somewhat self-evident: communication is focused on what won’t happen – free movement of people, membership of Customs Union or Single Market – and on the nebulous ‘reset’.

This needs more thought and reflection, because there are several things going on here, all of them consequential and none of them clearly determinant.

First up, we need to be a bit clearer about what we’re/I’m talking about. In the broadest terms, there’s a difference between what we might term a vision, a strategy and a plan.

David Henig’s fine piece speaks to this difference by noting that we know what the UK wants of working with the EU; namely cooperation in any and all areas within the envelope of non-membership of the Customs Union, Single Market or full EU membership. That includes the usual litany of items such as an SPS agreement, fisheries access and security.

That is a plan (or rather, a series of plans); specific and localised actions to take. But it’s not really a strategy or a vision.

The UK has long failed to settle on – or even consciously discuss – its vision for relations with the EU and its predecessors. The point of relations sits uneasily in the wider uncertainties of how the UK wants to position itself in the wider world or of what kind of place it wants to be. You can insert your favourite Dean Acheson quote here [although seeing the other two ascribed to him, it might become my least favourite one].

Below any high-minded vision of who we are and what’s our place in the world, there is strategy, which starts to translate down towards the broad thrust of activity. In this case,  the questions are whether the current red lines are fixed and whether they derive from some higher purpose or instead are a function of party politics of the last few years.

Put differently, there’s nothing wrong with red lines, but you need to be able to understand why they exist and what purpose they serve if you are to defend them and to use them in your negotiations with the EU.

In this, I’m rather old-fashioned in thinking that party politics most usefully stops at the water’s edge and that external relations should speak to the needs of the country as a whole. But your mileage may vary on this.

At present, the defining mechanism seems to be one informed by the imperatives of trying to neutralise a tricky topic in party political terms, while also recognising specific needs and asks, combining to produce the external relations version of the Woolie’s pick and mix: lots of choice, lots of things you’ve never seen before and not the most sustaining of diets.

Secondly, we have to be alive to why people talk about wanting a vision/strategy/plan.

Clearly, the lack of strategy or vision is not for lack of ideas out there. The absence of a more articulated Labour policy has left groups from across the political spectrum to offer programmes and priorities (this is a good place to get some overview).

Because these are typically isolated from the need to attend to the party politics that the government has decided to be hemmed in by, they come with their own visions and strategies.

Right now, a lot of that comes from pro-European voices that take doing (much) more with the EU as A Good Thing. The youth mobility impasse has been a recent rallying point for them, both on what they see as intrinsic merits and on wider signalling or a desire to multiply connections.

Even my own position – that the government needs its own vision and strategy to create a durable relationship with the EU – still comes with an agenda of wanting to avoid big swings in policy.

From the government’s perspective, this is a complication: moving on a specific point risks opening up broader implications for relations just at the point when they seem to wish to hold off such things. Hence, havering on youth mobility despite very broad backing from interested groups and public opinion.

Again, this comes back to the lack of a robust vision and strategy that the government can lean on as justification for what it’s doing.

Finally, we have to separate rhetoric and action.

Just because politicians and pundits talk in a particular way, it doesn’t mean that they follow through on that in their action. In the present case, there is clearly a huge amount of interaction and activity between the UK and EU (again, a good overview here).

Last year’s fun over EV car batteries is a case in point, where lots of work went into avoiding a mutually-damaging situation: exactly the kind of issue that bubbled along in the specialist media, but which would have been a much bigger problem if not addressed.

To that extent, lacking a strategy hasn’t held back a lot of work, on things that need dealing with now.

But working towards any kind of relationship that is robust and resilient requires more than just reactive management of stuff that pops up. As the 2000-2010s showed very vividly, lots of small choices and steps can lead to radical outcomes: ‘not banging on about Europe’ became ‘let’s not talk about it’, leaving others to fill the gap.

—

To pull all this together, Labour’s issue appears to be not that dissimilar to David Cameron in the 2000s: a desire to park the ‘Europe’ issue and deal with other things that needed attention (and don’t cause so much anguish) leaves the field open to others to make their play for agenda-setting, which probably results in outcomes that are ultimately more adverse for the government than would otherwise have been the case.

This points to the need for finding a happier medium between obsessing and ignoring EU relations. Like any other significant part of public policy, there has to be sufficient engagement to follow through on agendas/visions if that is not to become a point of instability.

Knowing what you aim to achieve – and why – would be a helpful start in determining that level. To delay will only reduce options and make it harder to impose order and stability over the relevant activity.

The post Visions, strategies and plans: Deconstructing Labour’s EU policy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Abstract 

This paper examines the European Union’s (EU) approach to artificial intelligence (AI) governance, focusing on the period from the publication of Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI (2019) onwards. It explores the EU’s strategy to address its “digital gap” in AI development and adoption. The study employs a theoretical framework synthesizing concepts of AI policy as a “horizontal area” (Niklas and Dencik 2020), “tentative governance” (Kuhlmann and Rip’s 2018), and an “ethics first” approach (Floridi 2018). The analysis reveals and discusses the EU’s distinctive prioritization of ethical considerations in AI development, manifested through substantial public investments and flexible regulatory interventions. 

 

Introduction and Theoretical Framework 

“Europe’s digital gap”: this is how analysts at the McKinsey Global Institute in 2019 described Europe’s lagging behind global leaders such as the USA in the realm of AI development and adoption. They cautioned that while digitization is essential for the advancement of AI, Europe continues to lag approximately 35% behind the United States; a trend that has not diminished in recent years. More recently, the State of the Digital Decade 2024 report highlights both progress and challenges in Europe’s digital transformation, including in AI adoption. While there has been advancement in areas such as 5G coverage and digital skills, the report notes that the percentage of enterprises using AI increased by a mere 0.4% in 2 years, from 7.6% in 2021 to 8.0% in 2023, significantly below the 75% target for 2030 (see State of the Digital Decade Report, 2024, Annex 2). The analysis emphasizes the need for European Union (EU) countries to strengthen their actions and be more ambitious in achieving the Digital Decade’s goals, in order to ensure EU’s future economic prosperity. 

Europe’s technological divide is not only evident in the slow adoption of AI technologies but also in the stark disparities in AI investment between Europe and global leaders, like North America. A European Commission’s (EC) 2018 report illustrates the severity of this investment disparity, revealing that private AI investments in Europe totalled only €2.4-3.2 billion, compared to a much higher €12.1-18.6 billion in North America. This significant difference in investment underscores Europe’s struggle to foster a competitive AI ecosystem, one capable of stimulating innovation at the same pace as its counterparts. Scholars, such as Mazzucato (2017) caution about the impact of chronic underinvestment in high-risk, early-stage research, emphasizing the importance of public investment in fostering innovation, and warning that underfunding in these critical areas can lead to stagnation in technological advancement and economic growth. In the case of AI this gap is particularly concerning, because the transition from basic research to practical application can be extraordinarily short (Sepp Hochreiter, 2023), and many European enterprises still lag behind global competitors due to challenges in rapidly translating research into practical applications (State of the Digital Decade Report, 2024, Annex 2). 

The persistent digital divide underscores the critical importance of pan-European AI policy initiatives in accelerating AI adoption. To analyse this complex landscape, the present discussion adopts a theoretical framework that synthesizes three key theoretical concepts from existing literature and policy approaches. First of all, this is Niklas and Dencik (2020) theorization of AI policy as a “horizontal area” that spans multiple domains and sectors. The scholars highlight the dual role of state intervention in this process, which encompasses both public funding for research and regulatory oversight for industry. Secondly, Kuhlmann and Rip’s (2018) concept of “tentative governance” refers to flexible and adaptive regulatory approaches needed to address the dynamic and rapidly evolving nature of AI technologies. Thirdly, the “tentative governance” policy concept is extended by drawing upon Floridi’s (2018) guidance about “ethics first” approach to AI development and governance.  

The EU’s regulatory stance distinctively prioritizes ethical considerations in AI development and deployment, a principle firmly established by the 2019 Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI, which have laid the foundation for subsequent AI policy frameworks. Thus, the subsequent brief chronological analysis will examine key European AI-related policies and programs from 2019 onwards through these three theoretical lenses, focusing on how these initiatives aim to bridge the digital divide while adhering to principles of responsible and ethical AI development through flexible and adaptive “tentative governance” approaches. 

In accordance with the theoretical guidance about the dual role of state intervention in AI policy, the discussion will first explore public funding as a catalyst for ethical AI innovation, followed by an assessment of key recent EU AI policy interventions. This structure reflects the complementary nature of research funding and regulatory measures in shaping the European AI landscape. 

 

Public Funding as Catalyst of AI innovation 

In response to the challenge of the “digital gap,” Europe has increasingly relied on public funding and collaborative research initiatives as strategic tools to bridge this divide. Importantly, these funding initiatives integrate the ethics-first approach, ensuring that ethical considerations remain at the forefront of EU’s AI development strategy. 

Horizon Europe, with its substantial budget of €93.5 billion for 2021-2027 (note that this total includes all areas of research and innovation, not just AI), serves as the centrepiece of this strategy, deliberately committing to “act as a synergetic force across the EU funding programmes.” Within this, a significant portion is allocated to digital technologies, including AI. For instance, the “Digital, Industry and Space” cluster, which encompasses AI research, has been allocated €15.3 billion. Public investment acts supports innovation in critical technologies, while also emphasizing the development of ethically aligned AI systems. For example, Horizon Europe’s Ethics Appraisal Process is designed to ensure compliance with ethical standards throughout EU-funded research projects and now includes a mandatory ethics appraisal procedure for proposals that raise ethical issues. 

This approach is complemented by other initiatives within the European AI ecosystem. The Digital Europe Programme (DIGITAL), while separate from Horizon Europe, synergizes with it by focusing on building strategic digital capacities and deploying digital technologies. DIGITAL has an overall budget exceeding €7.9 billion for 2021-2027. The programmes will collectively invest €1 billion per year in AI, which totals €4 billion over four years (2021-2027). Both Horizon Europe and Digital Europe require ethics review procedures, even though they are more robustly defined within Horizon Europe compared to DIGITAL. This integrated funding strategy aims to establish a seamless continuum of support from foundational research to market deployment, with ethical considerations embedded throughout.  

European initiatives emphasize not only funding for research projects but also support for training and mobility programs. For instance, the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions, with a budget of €6.6 billion under Horizon Europe, specifically targets researchers in AI and other cutting-edge fields, while also promoting ethical awareness in AI research. Additionally, the European Innovation Council (EIC) has allocated €10.1 billion to promote breakthrough innovations, including AI, from laboratory settings to market products, with a focus on responsible and ethical development.  

Individual member states are also making substantial investments in AI. For example, the German Federal Government (2020) has pledged €3 billion for its AI strategy up to 2025, which includes a strong emphasis on “AI made in Europe” that adheres to European ethical standards. France’s National Strategy for AI (SNIA) had a budget of €1.5 billion in public funds for five years (2018-2022). The second phase of France’s national AI strategy (promulgated in 2021) dedicated a total of €2.22 billion for AI over the next 5 years, of which €1.5 billion in public funding and €506 million in private co-financing, with ethical AI development as a key priority. 

Collectively, the investments discussed in this section represent a substantial commitment to AI advancement. In its Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence Review (2021), the European Commission estimates that the combined public and private investments in AI in Europe could reach €20 billion per year over the next decade. This level of investment represents a significant step towards closing the AI investment gap and fostering a thriving AI ecosystem in Europe that prioritizes ethical considerations. 

 

Regulatory Interventions 

The ensuing brief overview will discuss key European AI-related policies and programs promulgated since 2019.  

The analytical exposition begins with the publication of the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI by the High-Level Expert Group on AI. These guidelines laid the ethical foundation for Europe’s approach to AI development. An emphasis was placed on principles such as human agency, privacy, and non-discrimination, reflecting an “ethics-first” approach to AI governance. This initial step was of great importance in establishing the foundation for future policies. It signalled Europe’s commitment to developing AI systems that not only push technological boundaries but also align with fundamental European values. The guidelines has served as a compass, guiding subsequent regulatory efforts and shaping the European vision of “trustworthy AI.” 

Recognizing that AI development is intrinsically linked to data availability, the EU launched the European Strategy for Data in 2020. This strategy aimed to create a single market for data and envisioned a future where data flows freely within the EU while adhering to strict privacy and data protection rules. Moreover, it sought to democratize AI development by ensuring fair access to data, preventing the concentration of power in the hands of a few large tech companies.  

In 2021, the EU launched the Digital Decade policy program, setting ambitious targets for Europe’s digital transformation by 2030. This program recognized AI as a key technology for achieving these goals and emphasized creating a “secure and performant sustainable digital infrastructure.” The Digital Decade program marked a shift from isolated policies to a more comprehensive vision of Europe’s digital future. It contextualized AI within broader digital transformation goals, highlighting the interconnectedness of various technological advancements and societal changes. 

Proposed in 2021, the AI Act is a landmark legislation that would become the cornerstone of European AI regulation. As analysed by Veale and Zuiderveen (2021), it adopts a risk-based approach, categorizing AI systems based on their potential societal impact and implications for individual rights. This nuanced approach allowed for stringent oversight of high-risk applications while fostering innovation in lower-risk areas. Therefore, the act exemplifies the concept of tentative governance, providing a flexible framework that could adapt to the rapid pace of AI development.  

In 2022, the EU introduced the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act. While not AI-specific, these acts played a crucial role in shaping the regulatory environment for AI technologies in Europe. They set rules for online platforms and digital markets, indirectly influencing the development and deployment of AI technologies. These acts demonstrate tentative governance through their layered approach to regulation, with different rules applying to different sizes and types of digital platforms, allowing for adaptability as the digital landscape evolves. 

Running parallel to these regulatory efforts is Horizon Europe, the EU’s key research and innovation program for 2021-2027. While not exclusively focused on AI, Horizon Europe provides significant funding for AI research and development, fostering collaboration between academia, industry, and the public sector. Horizon Europe embodies tentative governance through its adaptive funding mechanisms and focus areas, which can be adjusted to address emerging AI challenges and opportunities. 

As seen from this brief exposition, from the ethical guidelines of 2019 to the risk-based approach of the AI Act and the adaptive research funding of Horizon Europe, there is a consistent pattern of flexible, adaptive governance strategies, which prioritise ethical considerations. These strategies allow the EU to navigate the complex and uncertain landscape of AI development while maintaining a balance between technological innovation and ethical considerations.  

 

Conclusions 

The EU must proactively harness the potential of AI to prevent becoming merely a consumer of solutions developed elsewhere and to capitalize on the transformative opportunities this technology presents. The EU’s approach to AI governance combines increased public funding with increasingly more flexible and adaptive regulatory frameworks. It aims not only to close the AI gap with global leaders but to establish Europe as a pioneer in human-centric, trustworthy AI that balances innovation with ethical considerations and societal needs.

The post The European Union’s AI Governance Agenda: Ethical Investment and Flexible Regulatory Approaches appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

 

The sum total of all human knowledge, spanning hundreds of thousands of years or more, is an amazing feat.

But there is no single human on earth who knows all this knowledge, nor any group of humans who could assimilate or understand it all, not even the tiniest fraction of it.

Artificial intelligence, however, is on track not only to eventually assimilate all knowledge ever gathered by humans, but also to understand it, analyse it, and uncover new knowledge yet to be discovered by humanity.

Professor Geoffrey Hinton, known as the “Godfather of AI” and who recently won the Nobel Prize for Physics, recently said that in future AI will always win any argument with a human because AI will be vastly more intelligent and knowledgeable than any human or humans.

That of course represents both an opportunity and a threat to all Homo sapiens.

Already, AI knowledge and intelligence have made dramatic strides in rapid time, with more enormous developments anticipated soon.

With that in mind, I asked AI (Chat GPT 4o) to write a hypothetical essay imagining, “What would Europe be like today if the EU never existed?”

It produced a 1,200-word article in just five seconds, which I am publishing below.

I could not have written it better, and certainly not in five seconds. (I now feel redundant!)

• EUROPE WITHOUT THE EU? – written by Artificial Intelligence

The European Union (EU), born out of the ashes of two devastating world wars, has reshaped the continent’s political, economic, and cultural landscape over the last seven decades.

Imagining Europe today without the EU requires rethinking the history of post-war integration, cooperation, and peace, all of which are tied closely to the Union’s existence.

This hypothetical essay explores the possible political, economic, and social outcomes of a Europe where the EU never came into being. Such a scenario likely would have featured more nationalist tensions, economic fragmentation, and weakened global influence.

• Political Fragmentation and Rising Nationalism

One of the EU’s greatest achievements has been maintaining peace among European nations, especially between historical rivals such as France and Germany.

Without the EU, it is possible that Europe’s political landscape would have remained far more fragmented, and nationalist sentiments, which have historically fueled conflict, might have taken a stronger hold.

The post-war period was a fragile time, and without the push for cooperation through institutions like the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later the European Economic Community (EEC), the continent might have experienced ongoing territorial disputes and rivalries.

In this scenario, the absence of the EU would have likely led to a weaker and less coordinated approach to political crises.

European countries might have formed smaller, more regional alliances based on shared interests or historical ties, such as between France and the Benelux countries or between Scandinavian nations.

However, without the overarching EU framework, these alliances could have been less stable and more prone to collapse in the face of diplomatic challenges or economic downturns.

Moreover, individual countries might have pursued more inward-looking policies, potentially leading to heightened xenophobia, ethnic tensions, and populist movements, especially in response to crises like migration.

• Economic Instability and Trade Barriers

The EU has been instrumental in fostering economic cooperation, trade, and development across Europe.

Without it, Europe’s economy would likely be more fragmented, with less integrated markets and higher barriers to trade.

The Single Market, which allows goods, services, capital, and people to move freely across borders, would not exist, resulting in numerous customs checks, tariffs, and different regulatory standards between countries.

The economic powerhouses of Europe, like Germany and France, may have dominated trade agreements, potentially sidelining smaller nations.

Southern and Eastern European countries, which have benefitted enormously from EU development funds, might have struggled to modernise their economies and infrastructure without access to this financial support.

Regions that are today economically aligned with stronger economies through EU mechanisms would be left more vulnerable to recessions and financial crises.

Moreover, the absence of the euro would likely result in a patchwork of national currencies, which would be subject to frequent fluctuations and speculative attacks. Exchange rate instability could cause market volatility, hampering investment and long-term growth across the continent.

Countries that might have otherwise adopted the euro would remain vulnerable to currency crises, similar to what some European nations experienced in the early 1990s before deeper monetary integration began.

• Weakening of European Global Influence

Today, the EU stands as one of the world’s largest economic blocs and an influential political entity in global affairs.

Without the EU, Europe’s ability to project influence on the world stage would likely be diminished. Individually, European countries, even major players like Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, would have less leverage in global institutions such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The EU’s collective bargaining power has allowed it to negotiate favourable trade agreements with other major economies, such as the United States, China, and Japan.

Without this united front, European nations would have to rely on their individual negotiating power, which would vary significantly between large and small countries.

Smaller nations, in particular, would struggle to secure favourable terms in bilateral agreements with economic giants like the US and China.

Additionally, the EU’s strong stance on environmental protection and human rights would be much weaker without its existence.

Many of the region’s most progressive policies on climate change and digital privacy, for instance, have come from the EU’s ability to implement regulations that transcend national boundaries.

A Europe without the EU could mean less ambitious climate goals and fragmented environmental policies, hindering global efforts to combat climate change.

• Social and Cultural Divide

The EU has also played a significant role in promoting cultural exchange, education, and the free movement of people, which has fostered a greater sense of European identity.

Programs such as Erasmus, which allow students to study abroad in different European countries, have enriched lives and increased understanding between cultures.

Without the EU, the free movement of people would likely be restricted, making it harder for Europeans to work, study, or live in other countries.

A Europe without the EU might have maintained stricter immigration controls, not only between EU members but also between other European countries, such as those in the Balkans or Eastern Europe.

This could lead to fewer cultural exchanges and less intermixing of ideas and traditions across borders. Countries would be more inward-looking and nationalistic, which could deepen cultural divides and reduce the cohesion that the EU has sought to foster.

Furthermore, the EU has been at the forefront of human rights and democratic values, pushing countries to improve their governance in exchange for membership or access to its market.

In a scenario where the EU never existed, there would be less incentive for countries in Eastern Europe, for example, to embrace democratic reforms after the fall of the Soviet Union.

This could lead to more authoritarian regimes in Europe and potentially a rollback of the democratic principles that have flourished since the end of the Cold War.

• Security Concerns and Fragmented Defence

One of the EU’s most significant, if sometimes underappreciated, roles is its contributions to collective security.

Through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and its coordination with NATO, the EU has helped maintain peace and stability in Europe. Without the EU, defence cooperation between European nations would be less integrated, potentially making Europe more vulnerable to external threats.

The continent would likely rely more heavily on NATO, but the absence of EU-led initiatives for crisis management and peacekeeping could lead to a weaker, more disjointed response to security challenges.

Without the EU, European nations might have pursued more individualistic defence policies, which could have strained relations between countries, leading to a less secure and less cooperative region.

Countries in Eastern Europe, which today benefit from EU support in facing pressure from Russia, might have faced greater vulnerability without the backing of a united Europe.

• Conclusion

A Europe without the European Union would likely be a more divided, unstable, and economically fragmented region.

Without the EU’s framework for political and economic integration, European nations might have struggled to maintain peace, coordinate on global issues, and compete in the global economy. Fragmentation, both political and economic, could have deepened, making the continent more susceptible to internal tensions and external threats.

While it is impossible to predict every outcome in this hypothetical scenario, the EU’s contributions to peace, prosperity, and cooperation are undeniable.

Without the EU, Europe today might resemble the fractured and conflict-prone continent of the early 20th century, rather than the relatively peaceful and prosperous one we know today.

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• Video: Why Britain Joined the EU



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The post What would Europe be like if the EU never existed? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Length of video : 34'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

On 17 October, SEDE Members will discuss the Annual Report on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) presented by the Rapporteur MEP Nicolás Pascual de la Parte (EPP, Spain). ...
While the EU is facing multiple and unprecedented threats to its security and new crises in its neighbourhood, especially since Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, this first CSDP Annual Report of the 10th Parliamentary term will set out the European Parliament's assessment of CSDP's readiness to address the challenges in the current complex geopolitical and security context. It also provides recommendations on the main avenues for strengthening policies and actions for the future along several dimensions, including institutional decision-making progress, the joint development of military and armament capabilities and the urgently needed issue of how to finance European defence.
Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Anna P. Lohse

Facilitated by the freedom of movement within the European Union (EU), the Erasmus programme established in 1987, and the Bologna Process initiated in 1999, physical intra-European student mobility has become a taken-for-granted aspect of higher education. Student mobility—whether for a short-term stay or the completion of an entire degree—is the core phenomenon of higher education internationalisation. The latter has gained significant importance on the policy agenda of countries worldwide over the past decades in light of short- and long-term economic goals (e.g., generating tuition fees, recruiting skilled migrants), the strengthening of international cooperation, and an increase of academic quality and students’ intercultural competencies. Internationalisation strategies now exist on national and institutional levels (Crăciun, 2019); outlining goals and measures involving various stakeholders including education ministries, foreign ministries, national higher education agencies such as the DAAD, British Council, or Campus France; university administrations, and interest groups.

 

An age of disruption

Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic greatly disrupted established practices and regulations of higher education internationalisation. After the Brexit referendum, there was uncertainty about whether the United Kingdom (UK) would continue to participate in the Erasmus programme and whether EU students would still have visa-free, discounted access to British degree programs. With the COVID-19 pandemic, global student mobility largely came to a halt for the first time in history. There was speculation about whether Brexit and the COVID-19 crisis would mark a turning point in higher education internationalisation. Regarding Brexit, some predicted, for instance, that British-European higher education relations would never be the same as before the referendum. Concerning COVID-19, there was speculation that the pandemic might usher in an era where physical mobility would no longer be the core focus of internationalisation, but rather transnational online degree programs.

However, when we look at the literature on institutional change and stability (e.g., Mahoney, 2000, Ebbinghaus, 2005), we find that societal institutions such as the church, nation states or higher education systems are relatively resistant to change—even in the face of major disruptive events. This is because of path dependencies, which exist, for instance, due to powerful actors preventing change in order to stay in power or because new policies and practices are not considered ‘normal’ by society.

 

Examining the disruptions’ impact in three major European higher education systems

The uncertainty about the status quo of European student mobility, combined with the diverging expectations of contemporary witnesses and the institutionalist literature, is the setting of my dissertation monograph Higher Education in an Age of Disruption. Comparing European Internationalisation Policies. In my book, I explore how Brexit and COVID-19 impacted student mobility policy and practices in England, France, and Germany between the years of 2016 and 2021. The three selected countries are not only among the top destinations for degree-seeking international and Erasmus students, but also represent different types of higher education systems. England is comparably market-based, while France is more state-dominated, and Germany traditionally follows the Humboldtian tradition of being state-financed while featuring a relatively strong academic self-governance. These differences allow for pertinent insights into how different higher education systems dealt with the disruptions.

 

Analytical approach of the study

The study involved 44 interviews with internationalisation experts from the three country contexts. These experts included heads of international offices of medium-sized to large universities and staff members from national education ministries and higher education internationalisation agencies (British Council, Campus France, DAAD). In addition, 234 documents were analysed, providing insights into events, debates, and changes related to Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic in the higher education sectors of England, Germany, and France. These documents included newspaper articles, parliamentary records, law changes, policy briefs, and statements from higher education stakeholders.

To assess whether and what kind of change occurred in higher education internationalisation, I developed indicators of the institutional dimensions of student mobility. According to Scott (2008), every institution consists of a regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive dimension.

In the regulative dimension of student mobility, country-specific immigration and university admission laws must be followed, as well as the statutes of mobility programmes (e.g., Erasmus). The normative dimension is reflected in the values and norms that internationalisation actors refer to in their daily practice. Of particular interest here is whether student mobility is pursued primarily for academic, political, economic, or cultural reasons (Knight, 2012). Furthermore, specific norms and activities in the higher education system are institutionalized through funding programs (e.g., by the EU or internationalisation agencies). The cultural-cognitive dimension includes fundamental perceptions and approaches that actors consider self-evident. Such taken-for-granted aspects include whether higher education is viewed as a fundamentally public or private good and, relatedly, whether a higher education system is predominantly market-based or state-led. These assumptions, in turn, influence whether higher education internationalisation is primarily conceived within a collaborative or competitive logic.

I coded both the expert interviews and documents according to the institutional dimensions and developed an analytical framework involving different types of overall institutional change. I classified no substantive change in all three institutional dimensions as overall institutional stability, change in one or two dimensions as partial change and change in all three dimensions as radical change.

 

Key findings

In all country-disruption combinations, I found partial change. That is, the regulative and/or the normative dimension of higher education internationalisation were altered in response to Brexit/the COVID-19 pandemic, but the cultural-cognitive frameworks underlying higher education internationalisation remained stable.

 

The regulative impact of Brexit on higher education internationalisation

Brexit was accompanied by substantive regulatory changes for student mobility. After years of protracted negotiations, the United Kingdom (UK) left the EU on February 1, 2020. Since January 1, 2021, EU students are required to apply for a paid visa for studying in the UK. Additionally, European students lost their right to reduced tuition fees. On December 24, 2020, the British government unexpectedly announced its withdrawal from Erasmus and the creation of its own mobility program. The non-reciprocal Turing Scheme, which solely provides scholarships for British outgoing students and not for incoming students, was presented as an optimized Erasmus program that would offer taxpayers “greater value for money” (Department for Education and The Rt Hon Sir Gavin Williamson CBE MP 2020).

For Germany and France, Brexit resulted in the UK being re-categorized as a third country. As a consequence, British students in France now need to apply for a visa, while in Germany, they require a residence permit.

 

Normative impact of Brexit

In terms of normative aspects, the British government, in the wake of Brexit, intensified its focus on exporting educational offerings to non-EU markets. In the second national internationalisation strategy, “Global potential, global growth,” adopted in 2019, Europe hardly finds mention. Leaving the EU is portrayed as an opportunity to reposition the UK as an educational provider in the European and especially global market. In student exchange, the focus is shifted to Commonwealth countries and the Anglosphere, which also play a central role as target regions in the Turing Scheme. While the British government distanced itself from the EU and non-economic internationalisation motives, the English higher education sector intensified its efforts towards European university partnerships and exchanges. English universities emphasized the shared European history and values, openly expressing criticism of the British government’s actions through position papers and symbolic protests, such as flying the EU flag on university buildings.

Both the French and German higher education sectors reacted with dismay to Brexit. However, this initial dismay quickly gave way to a defiant attitude regarding the importance of European cooperation. In both countries, Brexit led to an increased pursuit of partnership agreements with Northern and Eastern European countries. These countries’ offerings of English-language programs were seen as an attractive alternative to the lost British Erasmus partnerships. French President Emmanuel Macron’s 2017 speech at the Sorbonne University provided the impetus for the creation of the European Universities Initiative (EUI). The rapid implementation of this proposal, which by mid-2024 has resulted in over 60 university alliances involving more than 500 universities, is considered the most significant European internationalisation policy since the Bologna Process.

 

Cultural-cognitive impact of Brexit

While Brexit-induced changes occurred on both the regulatory and normative levels in all three countries, the changes remained anchored in culturally-cognitive, institutionalized societal perceptions. The normative clash between the British government and the pro-European higher education sector represents a continuation of the divided post-war British politics and identity, characterized by British exceptionalism—representing idea of the UK’s special role within Europe and the world—while simultaneously being involved in European integration processes. While the British government used Brexit as an opportunity to institutionalize the departure from the EU through new regulations, English universities actively worked against this, for example, by joining the EUI.

Thus, the central cultural-cognitive conflict between British exceptionalism and competitive internationalisation on the one hand, and European integration and collaborative internationalisation on the other, continues to persist. In the case of France and Germany, the regulative and normative changes signal a continued commitment to a higher education internationalisation fundamentally oriented towards Europeanization and collaborative activities

 

The regulative impact of COVID-19 on higher education internationalisation

The COVID-19 pandemic posed very different regulatory challenges for the English higher education sector compared to the German and French higher education sectors. The key factor here is the market-based nature of the English higher education system. Since international students represent a vital source of income for English universities, the expected long-term decline in international student numbers at the beginning of the pandemic posed an existential threat to the financial stability of the sector.

In response, English universities began compensating for the anticipated loss of international students by gaming established admissions practices: they sent an unusually high number of study offers to domestic secondary school graduates to outcompete other universities. This approach threatened to throw the entire higher education sector into chaos, prompting the British government to temporarily reintroduce the student number cap, a limit on the number of students universities can admit. This cap had been abolished in 2015, thereby introducing full-on market conditions. However, when international student numbers unexpectedly increased rather than decreased during the pandemic, this regulatory change was abolished, and the sector returned to the previous conditions of a fully market-based system—despite the pandemic highlighting significant weaknesses in the system and triggering widespread calls for reform from within the sector.

In contrast, the state-funded higher education systems of Germany and France faced different regulatory challenges. Since—unlike in England—online teaching was not widely practiced in either country before the pandemic, their face-to-face-based regulations had to be expanded in a very short time. This included, for example, enabling the use of online platforms like Zoom, conducting online exams, and allowing online enrolment for students who would not initially be able to physically enter the host country. In Germany, this involved creating an enrolment status for students who participated exclusively in digital classes. In France, the pandemic accelerated the implementation of the digital visa process for international students, a measure that had already been decided under the Bienvenue en France strategy.

 

Normative impact of COVID-19

In the normative dimension, the COVID-19 pandemic in England reinforced the focus on profitable internationalisation activities, particularly the recruitment of international students, to ensure the survival of universities. In Germany and France, norms regarding the acceptance of digital teaching and administration changed. Virtual exchange and Collaborative Online International Learning (COIL) formats gained significant traction as ways to compensate for the loss of physical mobility. In Germany, the DAAD launched several funding lines shortly after the outbreak of the pandemic to systematically advance the digitalisation of internationalisation. It is noteworthy that the increasing digitalisation of internationalisation was already on the agendas of universities and the internationalisation agencies DAAD and Campus France before the pandemic. However, limited financial and personnel resources had previously hindered the rapid implementation of digitalisation reforms.

 

Cultural-cognitive impact of COVID-19

The observed developments in the three country contexts point to stability of the cultural-cognitive dimension in the three higher education systems. Although the pandemic exposed the risks of a market-based higher education system, England maintained its status quo. Demands for funding reforms demanded by higher education actors fell on deaf ears on the part of the British government.

In France, pandemic measures and the continuation of the Bienvenue en France strategy were largely directed by a crisis management team within the French government, pointing to a comparably strong state involvement. In Germany, coordination of pandemic measures occurred at both the state level and nationally through the DAAD, and there was a comparably strong focus on the pedagogical component of digital internationalisation. Both France and Germany continued to emphasize international collaboration during the pandemic through virtual exchange programmes with partner universities. Contrary to the expectations of some higher education actors, more market-oriented activities, like transnational online programs, did not become a part of France’s and Germany’s internationalisation portfolios during the pandemic.

 

Summary

The comparative study found that Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic did not lead to radical changes of existing internationalisation strategies in the three country contexts. Instead, both disruptions created windows of opportunities that accelerated ongoing gradual changes and reinforced existing internationalisation logics. This was particularly evident in the country-specific stances towards Europeanisation and the digitalisation of higher education.

 

 

Anna P. Lohse is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute for Education at Technical University Berlin, Germany. She received her PhD from the Hertie School – The University of Governance in Berlin and holds an MA in International Education from New York University.

 

References

Crăciun, D. (2019). Systematizing National Higher Education Internationalization Strategies: Reconceptualizing a Process. PhD thesis. Central European University. https://ris.utwente.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/222724257/craciundaniela.pdf

Department for Education & The Rt Hon Sir Gavin Williamson CBE MP. (2020). New Turing scheme to support thousands of students to study and work abroad. Retrieved March 14, 2023 from https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-turing-scheme-to-support-thousands-of-students-to-study-and-work-abroad

Ebbinghaus, B. (2005). Can path dependence explain institutional change? Two approaches applied to welfare state reform. Discussion Paper 05/2. Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

Knight, J. (2012). Concepts, rationales, and interpretive frameworks in the internationalization of higher education. In D. K. Deardorff, H. de Wit, J. Heyl & T. Adams (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of International Higher Education (pp. 27–42). SAGE Publications.

Lohse, A. P. (2024). Higher Education in an Age of Disruption. Comparing European Internationalisation Policies. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-57912-7

Mahoney, J. (2000). Path Dependence in Historical Sociology. Theory and Society, 29(4), 507–548.

Scott, W. R. (2008). Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests (3rd ed.). SAGE Publications.

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This blog draws on my paper presentation in the Digital Governance: Emerging Technologies and Evolving Accountability Settings in the European Union panel at the 54th UACES 2024 Annual Conference in Trento, Italy. I want to thank the UACES for the Microgrant funding that supported my participation in the conference.

 

My Experience at the UACES 54th Annual Conference:

In September, I had the privilege of attending the UACES Annual Conference in Trento, an enriching experience for any PhD candidate like myself. For doctoral researchers, attending academic conferences is crucial for professional growth and meeting degree requirements. These events offer opportunities to present research, receive feedback, and engage in vital scholarly discussions. However, limited financial resources often make participation in such gatherings challenging, potentially hindering students’ ability to acquire the experiences necessary for an academic career. This is why initiatives like the UACES Microgrant are invaluable—they help PhD students and early career researchers to reach essential milestones. The UACES funding support allowed me to attend this conference, share my research, and actively engage with the European studies community. It marked a major step toward completing my PhD and provided an exceptional platform to network, collaborate, and learn from experts in the field.

 

Presenting My Research:

During the conference, I presented the paper The EU Cybersecurity Strategy: Promise and Paradox of a Human-Centred Approach in the Digital Governance: Emerging Technologies and Evolving Accountability Settings in the European Union panel. The paper sought to explore the human-centred approach to cybersecurity within the EU, examining how the EU has framed these cybersecurity policies within a comprehensive and holistic digital governance framework by asking how the EU framed human-centred cybersecurity policies.

Cyberspace and cybersecurity governance have emerged as one of the most significant geopolitical challenges of the 21st century. The European Union (EU) has prioritised developing a comprehensive framework for cybersecurity governance, focusing on specific rules and institutions related to cybersecurity, the digital economy, and the protection of digital human rights. This approach comes at a time when cyberspace is increasingly seen as the merging of internet technologies with various human activities—such as communication, commerce, education, and even warfare—activities that were once confined to the physical world. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic compelled the migration of daily activities (such as education, healthcare, and work) to the online sphere, resulting in a proliferation of digital threats. This underscored the difficulty of safeguarding individuals and their security in the digital realm.

Recognising the crucial importance of cyberspace and focusing on European values based on democracy, equality, the rule of law, and the promotion of human rights, the EU launched in 2020 the European Union Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade and subsequently, in March 2021, the Digital Compass 2030: the European Path to the Digital Decade, both with a vision focused on the digitalisation of the economy and society. The documents emphasise the EU’s commitment to a secure, protected, sustainable, and people-centric digital transformation in line with the EU’s values and fundamental rights. This strategy aims to strengthen European collective resilience against cyber threats, ensuring that all citizens and businesses benefit from secure and reliable digital services and tools. Nevertheless, this strategy presents the EU’s vision of reconciling market and societal digitalisation, promoting the industrial and technological resources necessary to benefit from its ambitious Digital Single Market.

The Paradox of a Human-Centred Approach

EU has adopted a cybersecurity strategy labelled a human-centred approach in the digital domain, aspiring to be a human-centric digital development model to create a digital environment that prioritises the well-being and rights of individuals. However, the strategy often emphasises frames such as strategic autonomy, geopolitical commission, digital sovereignty, and digital leadership. While crucial for the EU’s competitiveness and influence, these frames create a complex dynamic when positioned alongside a human-centred approach. My paper delved into this paradox, exploring how the EU faces a significant dilemma: maintaining its relevance as a global actor in the digital space while safeguarding its core values, including protecting individual rights and fostering an open, secure cyberspace. The challenge lies in reconciling the EU’s pursuit of digital sovereignty with its commitment to ensuring a safe and inclusive digital environment for all its citizens.

 

A Transformative Experience

Attending the UACES 54th Annual Conference was a transformative experience for me. It provided an opportunity not only to present my research but also to engage in meaningful discussions on the future of digital governance and cybersecurity in the EU. The exchange of ideas and the feedback I received were invaluable for my academic journey, and the connections I made will likely influence my work in the future.

I am deeply grateful to UACES for their financial support, which made this experience possible. As I progress with my research, I look forward to continuing my engagement with the broader European studies community.

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In September 2024, I was delighted to attend the UACES Annual Conference, held at the University of Trento, largely thanks to the financial support I received through a UACES Microgrant. PhD students frequently have issues obtaining funding for such activities, which greatly affects their capacity to participate in academic workshops, seminars, and conferences—key events for their professional growth and degree completion. Thus, opportunities such as those provided by the UACES Microgrant are not only critical for fulfilling graduation requirements but also essential for acquiring the certifications and qualifications needed to pursue an academic career after earning a PhD. UACES’ support allowed me to travel to Trento and witness in person the results of my work as co-convenor of the European Green Deal thematic track, as well as to present my work on Chinese green technology policy and its relevance for the EU in the wake of the myriad of anti-subsidy investigations that have recently been completed or are currently underway. 

The European Union (EU) and China are currently entangled in a critical debate over subsidies in the green energy sector, highlighting the complex intersection of trade, competition, and climate policy. As both sides vie for dominance in the burgeoning market for renewable energy and electric vehicles (EVs), investigations into state subsidies reveal deeper tensions about market fairness, economic competitiveness, and the future of the global green economy.

 

The Rising Tide of Chinese EVs in Europe 

China has rapidly emerged as a global leader in the electric vehicle industry, both in terms of production capacity and technological innovation. Chinese automakers such as BYD, NIO, and Geely have become household names in China and are now expanding aggressively into international markets, including Europe. In fact, Chinese EV brands have been growing their market share in the EU, partly due to their lower price points, which attract budget-conscious consumers. 

In contrast, European automakers, including companies like Volkswagen, BMW, and Stellantis, have faced challenges in scaling up their EV production, particularly due to higher labour costs, supply chain bottlenecks, and less direct state support compared to their Chinese counterparts. As the EU pushes toward its ambitious Green Deal, which includes plans to ban the sale of new internal combustion engine vehicles by 2035, European automakers are under pressure to scale up their EV production quickly to meet both consumer demand and regulatory requirements. 

However, the influx of cheaper Chinese EVs has raised alarms in the European automotive industry. For European automakers, the concern is that their higher production costs—driven by strict labour laws, environmental regulations, and less generous subsidies—are putting them at a competitive disadvantage. Many fear that without protective measures, the European EV market could soon be dominated by Chinese imports, much like what has happened in the solar panel sector, where Chinese manufacturers now control a significant share of the global market.

 

The EU’s Investigation into Chinese Electric Vehicle Subsidies 

In September 2023, the European Union announced a formal investigation into what it claims are unfair Chinese government subsidies for electric vehicle manufacturers. According to the EU, China’s financial support for its domestic EV producers allows them to sell vehicles in Europe at significantly lower prices than European counterparts, undermining the competitiveness of European automakers. 

The investigation, spearheaded by the European Commission, focused on the allegation that Chinese EV manufacturers are able to flood the European market with artificially low-priced vehicles due to the massive state support they receive at home. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, in her annual State of the Union address, framed the issue as one of fairness, asserting that the EU must defend itself against a flood of cheap Chinese products that benefit from state-backed financial advantages. She warned that this practice puts European companies at risk, particularly those working in an already competitive and capital-intensive industry like EV production. 

As a result of the investigation, the EU has proposed provisional countervailing duties on Chinese EV imports, ranging from 17% to 36%. The investigation process allows Chinese automakers and other interested parties to submit evidence, as the Commission seeks a balanced approach that complies with both EU and World Trade Organization rules. Chinese companies, meanwhile, argue that such measures could harm consumers by raising EV prices in Europe and slowing down the region’s green transition. The final determination is expected by the end of October 2024, with any duties likely to remain in force for five years. The EU’s decision will have far-reaching implications for its relationship with China and its ability to protect key green industries from external competition​.

 

China’s Response and Retaliatory Threats 

China has reacted sharply to the EU’s investigation, describing it as a form of protectionism that could damage the otherwise strong economic relationship between China and the European Union. The Chinese government has long maintained that its green energy sector, particularly its electric vehicle industry, has grown largely through technological advancements, economies of scale, and operational efficiency, not solely because of state subsidies. Chinese officials argue that European consumers benefit from the lower prices of Chinese-made EVs, which help accelerate the transition to cleaner energy. 

Beijing has also signaled that it may retaliate if the EU investigation leads to punitive measures such as tariffs or restrictions on Chinese imports. The potential for a tit-for-tat trade conflict looms, which could affect not only the automotive sector but also other areas of economic cooperation between the EU and China, including renewable energy technologies, where both sides are key players. 

China’s Ministry of Commerce warned that the investigation could have a negative impact on EU-China relations and undermine global efforts to combat climate change. China views itself as a critical partner in the global green energy transition and contends that international cooperation, not trade barriers, is essential for meeting global climate goals.

 

The EU’s Broader Concerns About Chinese State Subsidies 

The investigation into electric vehicle subsidies is part of a broader European concern about China’s growing economic influence in key sectors, particularly those related to green technology. Over the past decade, China has made substantial strides in industries like solar power, wind energy, and battery production, often supported by state-backed subsidies and low-interest loans. Chinese companies, benefiting from government policies aimed at fostering innovation and expansion, have gained significant market shares globally, in some cases overwhelming European and U.S. competitors. 

The solar panel industry provides a clear example of this dynamic. In the early 2010s, Chinese manufacturers rapidly scaled up production of photovoltaic panels, quickly becoming the world’s largest producers and exporters. European solar panel manufacturers struggled to compete with the low prices of Chinese products, which many argued were made possible by state subsidies and cheap labor. The result was a wave of bankruptcies among European solar companies, and today China controls the majority of the global solar panel supply chain. 

European policymakers fear that a similar pattern could emerge in the electric vehicle sector. The EU, through its Green Deal, has ambitious plans to lead the world in green technologies and achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. However, this vision is complicated by the reality of China’s competitive edge in industries like EVs and renewable energy infrastructure, where European companies face stiff competition from their Chinese rivals.

 

Conclusion 

The EU’s investigation into China’s green energy subsidies, particularly in the electric vehicle sector, represents a critical moment in the evolving relationship between two of the world’s largest economic powers. While both sides are committed to addressing climate change and advancing the green energy transition, their economic competition in key industries like electric vehicles and solar energy is becoming harder to ignore. 

For Europe, the challenge lies in finding a balance between protecting its domestic industries and remaining open to the benefits of international trade and competition. For China, the investigation is a test of how its growing economic influence will be managed on the global stage, particularly in areas where state subsidies have played a key role. 

As the world shifts toward a more sustainable future, the outcomes of these investigations will not only shape EU-China relations but also set important precedents for how green technology markets will evolve globally.

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Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Author: Pramiti Parwani.

Pramiti Parwani is a PhD Fellow at AIGHD, and is also based at the Amsterdam Law School at the University of Amsterdam (in the Law Centre for Health and Life and the Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance (ACELG)). Her PhD examines how the legal and institutional frameworks in the European Union and India influence the ‘capabilities’ of least developed countries to access pandemic vaccines for their populations. She combines third world approaches to international law (TWAIL) with the Capabilites Approach in her work, to examine barriers at different stages of the vaccine supply chain- from research and development, to manufacturing capacity to regulatory approval.

This blog draws from my PhD thesis, and is based on my presentation in a EUHealthGov panel at the UACES 2024 conference. My thanks to the EUHealthGov network for funding to support my participation at the UACES conference, and to the participants for the insightful discussions during the panels. Any mistakes remain my own.

Following the export restrictions and vaccine hoarding during the COVID-19 pandemic, concerns about global vaccine inequity still remain during the mpox outbreak. These health crises have clearly demonstrated the risks of over-reliance on foreign sources for pandemic health supplies, including vaccines, and underscore the urgent need to strengthen local vaccine manufacturing capacity—especially in regions where local production has been minimal or non-existent. While calls to expand local pharmaceutical production, including vaccine manufacturing, have long been prevalent, these efforts have received a significant boost during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. In Africa, while local vaccine production collectively only meets 1% of the total demand of the continent, a new plan for regional vaccine manufacturing intends to scale up vaccine production to be able to supply 60% of the total demand in the continent by 2040.

Consistent with the stated objective in the EU Global Health Strategy to strengthen its leadership as a global health actor, the EU invests in health-related infrastructure projects around the world. In order to mitigate fragmentation of overseas development cooperation from different Member States, the EU has introduced Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs) to develop a streamlined approach to its external financing. Team Europe Initiatives form a crucial part of the Neighborhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe (Regulation (EU) 2021/947). By pooling resources from both EU institutions and Member States, TEIs enhance coordination amongst them, enabling more cohesive and structured overseas development assistance. This approach strengthens the EU’s image as a unified actor in its external actions and reinforces its influence on the global stage.

One of the most politically high-profile TEIs is the Manufacturing and Access to Vaccines, Medicines and Health Technologies (MAV+) programme. With the aim of facilitating equitable access to safe, effective, and affordable medicines in Africa, the MAV+ initiative seeks to provide support for scaling-up vaccine production capacity on the continent. The project was announced in 2021, and  brings together the EU, 16 EU Member States, and the European Investment Bank, to provide financial, technical, and policy support across three components –supply aspect, demand aspect, and a broader facilitating environment for pharmaceuticals production.

The supply side focuses on industrial growth by involving the private sector, maintaining quality assurance systems, and supply chain management. The demand side includes trust-building activities and health promotion to overcome vaccine hesitancy. It also tackles the issue of fragmented market demand, which can impede the expansion of manufacturing capabilities across the continent. Lastly, the initiative also aims to improve pharmaceutical development by improving the underlying enabling environment – by facilitating access to finance in order to foster private investment, strengthening regulatory systems to accelerate pharmaceutical approvals, and intellectual property management. The MAV+ project was launched with a €1 billion financial commitment – an amount that has been the subject of some confusion. While this amount was initially understood by African partners as new funding, in reality, the amount mainly consists of previously allocated funds.

It was further understood that the initiative would be complemented by private funds and efforts, although further details are scarce. The most notable private component comes from  BioNTech, a German company, which in 2021 announced its plans to establish mobile vaccine production units – called ‘BioNTainers’ – in Africa. The BioNTainers are shipping containers repurposed for vaccine manufacturing, and were promoted as a “modular system, scalable and turnkey solution for local manufacturing” to provide a fast-track solution to expanding vaccine manufacturing capacity in Africa. The press release announcing the BioNTainers mentioned that BioNTech staff would initially run the BioNTainers, before providing training to local personnel to take over.

In 2023, the first BioNTainer facility was inaugurated in Rwanda. Although the funding for the facility comes from BioNTech, the MAV+ project provides indirect support by strengthening the business and regulatory ecosystem in Rwanda. In 2022, Team Europe actors launched a twinning project with the Rwandan National Regulatory Authority as part of the MAV+ program, with the aim of enhancing the the regulatory environment for the approval of health products. Around the time of the inauguration of the BioNTainer facility in Rwanda, Team Europe also pledged an additional €40 million through the MAV+ project to support vocational and technical education to cultivate a workforce for pharmaceutical manufacturing in Rwanda, in addition to fostering a start-up ecosystem within the country. Further, the launch of the BioNTainer facility in Rwanda was attended by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and a Vice President of the European Investment Bank, another partner in the MAV+ initiative. In her speech at the inaugration, President von der Leyen highlighted the Team Europe approach.

Such support, even where indirect, to private manufacturers from public funds, should include associated requirements for technology transfer and increased access to affordable medicines. Currently, however, there are no binding obligations for BioNTech to share its technology with other manufacturers. Many observers argue that BioNTech could have more effectively facilitated timely access to safe and effective vaccines in Africa by collaborating with existing African manufacturers through the WHO mRNA technology transfer hub and independent licensing agreements. In contrast, the BioNTainer “cut-and-paste model” of exporting portable, modular vaccine production units does not  support technology transfer, and has been criticized for being little more than a “neo-colonial stunt”. Human Rights Watch had previously identified at least seven manufacturing facilities in Africa, and an additional 100 facilities in other low-and-middle-income countries, which had capacity to establish or expand vaccine production at a short notice, provided that existing vaccine manufacturers would be willing to share their technology.

In light of the concerns mentioned above, and given the EU’s considerable external impact through the Team Europe Initiative, some key points need attention as the MAV+ project progresses. First, to ensure the success of the project, it is essential that African partners, such as the African Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (AfricaCDC) and Partnerships for African Vaccine Manufacturing (PAVM), maintain ownership and control over important decision-making processes, considering the unique local circumstances and needs. This approach is crucial for fostering a sustainable production and knowledge ecosystem on the continent while minimizing excessive reliance on external support.

Second, the importance of this ownership becomes even more pronounced when EU support – directly or indirectly – helps establish a favorable business and regulatory environment for EU companies abroad. Further study is necessary to better investigate the indirect market-making effects of overseas development cooperation by the EU.

Third, when EU support indirectly serves the interests of EU private entities, this should be leveraged to better regulate their activities. As discussed above, while BioNTech gains access to new markets in Africa and benefits from an improved drug regulatory authority in Rwanda through the MAV+ project, the BioNTainer model is not best suited for strengthening Rwandan local production capabilities. Therefore, there should be a greater emphasis on technology transfer, which is currently only addressed in a limited and ad-hoc manner in the MAV+ project.

The EU’s commitment to emerging as a global health leader comes with a responsibility to ensure that it oversees development cooperation efforts through the Team Europe Approach to enhance health sovereignty in partner countries. There is a need to optimise efforts under the MAV+ project in a manner that prioritizes local ownership and technology transfer to help foster sustainable health systems.

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Author: Ricardo Pereira, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University. Ricardo Pereira is a PhD candidate in Politics and International Relations at Dublin City University. He serves as a data coder for the project ”EXCEPTIUS Exceptional Powers in Times of Sars-CoV-2 Crisis.”. His research has primarily revolved around topics, such as Private Security Companies, EU Health Security, and Securitization studies.

During the 54th UACES annual conference in Trento, the paper about the collective securitisation process of COVID-19 carried out by the European Union (EU) was discussed under the panel The EU as a Global Health Actor – Between Securitisation and Cooperation organised by the EUHealthGov network. The paper aimed to understand how the Union in March 2020 became empowered by the member states to assume the role of coordinator of the EU response against the pandemic and its consequences across social, economic, and health sectors by asking How the EU discourse, particularly the Commission, did reflect the collective securitisation of COVID-19, between 2020 and September 2021. As argued by the literature in EU Health law and policy, the shared competence of the EU on health was bumbling at the time the pandemic emerged. The pandemic instigated the debate about the competence of the EU on health as stated by the president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen as well as by the Commissioner for Health and Food Safety Stella Kyriakides.

The ongoing research has already looked at 52 speeches from the Commission between 2020 and 2021 under discourse analysis. It is possible to identify three paths of securitisation: threat construction; security construction; and announcement of measures. The first relates the EU discourse regarding COVID-19 as a threat to referent objects such as EU citizens, EU values, and EU institutions, while the second describes the call of the Union for a unified front against the pandemic. The third path refers to the implementation of measures. These three paths should be seen as interdependent and overlapped, once the analysed speeches presented the EU’s position as a security actor facing a multidimensional threat such as the COVID-19 pandemic through (extra)ordinary measures.

The present analysis took the work of Bengtsson and Rhinard (2019) about the collective securitisation of health in the EU as the initial status quo to analyse the evolution of the Union’s response to the pandemic. Following the model of collective securitisation of Sperling and Webber (2019), the research aims to analyse how the organisation constructed COVID-19 as a threat; how the Union developed its role as a health security actor capable of responding in a coordinated and cooperative approach to such a threat; and understand the recursive interaction between EU institutions that led to the implementation and possible routinisation of measures into new practices, agendas, and vocabulary.

In this vein, the research has tracked four periods of securitisation carried out by the EU already. The first comprehends the period between February and March 2020. During this time, COVID-19 was described as a test of EU core values of cooperation and solidarity. The Commission discourse constructed COVID-19 as a brutal threat by defining the pandemic as a global health crisis, following the international community discourse of main organisations such as WHO and NATO. Furthermore, the EU called for attention to pandemic consequences for the EU as an institution and its values by highlighting the impact that a sanitary nationalist approach could have. At the same time, the Commission called for a central response to the pandemic by appealing to a European memoir of cooperation and coordination. Historical memories such as the reconstruction of Europe after World War II were used to develop a sentiment of unity across member states. Consequently, this move would result in the beginning of the EU’s empowerment to respond to the pandemic in one voice, despite existing punctual divergences across time such as in the cases of Poland and Hungary. The joint procurement of personal protective equipment based on a stockpile under rescEU, as well as the development of financial mechanisms such as green lanes, and the activation of the general escape clause, are some examples of this move.

The second period between April and September 2020 could be named as the Marshall Plan for the post-COVID-19. Although the decrease in infections and deaths, the concern regarding the damages caused in the economic and financial sectors, led the Commission to describe the pandemic event as “the largest recession in 100 years”. The COVID-19 pandemic should be seen this way as a multidimensional event. It has not just impacted people’s health, but also the social and economic spheres around the globe. The Commission’s construction of COVID-19 as a multidimensional threat, relying on the interdependence between health, economic, social, and environmental sectors, would create a space for the discussion about the competence of the EU on health. In the summer of 2020 mechanisms such as SURE aimed to support jobs across the Union, also, during this time the draft for a European BARDA started. During the third period, the number of infections and deaths rose and the brutal threat discourse was back in the daily EU vocabulary. The role of the EU as an actor in the fight against the pandemic was established and its agenda was focused on strengthening the public health structure of the Union by empowering institutions such as ECDC and EMA, as well as implementing a strategy for vaccination across the EU territory at the end of the year.

During 2021, the fourth and last period of analysis, the Commission framed COVID-19 variants as the new exceptionality of the pandemic. The international role of the EU was coined by the Commission as “the pharmacy of the world” due to its move from scarcity at the beginning of the crisis to one of the main exporters of protective equipment and vaccines in the world. In this regard, the EU’s role in the African continent should be also underlined with the construction of vaccine factories, although critique can be addressed to the process of how it was designed. There has not been effective investment in logistical processes to deliver these vaccines to remote populations, and the know-how has not been shared with the communities where these factories are located. At the EU level, extraordinary measures of surveillance were implemented through the use of the digital certificate or the creation of Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA).

To conclude, preliminary conclusions can be highlighted. Regarding the threat construction, the characterisation suis generis by the EU of COVID-19 as a brutal threat through the classification of a global health crisis. As a securitising actor, the EU showed a more stable process of conducting the process. In the words of Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen, the EU member states during the pandemic agreed to empower the Union to respond to the pandemic under three keywords: coordination, cooperation, and solidarity. Moreover, the pandemic represents a window of opportunity to discuss the competence of health in the EU as well as new approaches to public health in the Union. To conclude, the next steps of this research will contemplate, empirically, the analysis of the following years of the EU4Health programme. The research aims to assess if measures developed to respond to COVID-19 were routinised on the Union structure. Furthermore, theoretically, the present research pretends to look for representations of security integration in the health domain, arguing this way for the utility of collective securitisation for security and integration studies.

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Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP