European Union

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The EU-CELAC Summit takes place on 10 & 11 June 2015, in Brussels. 33 states - forming the Community of Latin America and Caribbean - are coming to Brussels to meet the EU-28 at the level of Heads of State or government. They will discuss issues such as trade and development and common challenges such as fight against crime and climate change. 

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Why did the EU Commission take so long to launch investigations into member states’ tax rulings? Is its strategy to go only after small countries, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Ireland? Will the instruments available to it suffice? And if not, what would it take to do away with unfair tax competition? These questions were raised by MEPs in Tuesday’s Special Tax Rulings Committee debate with competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager.
Special Committee on Tax Rulings and Other Measures Similar in Nature or Effect

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Why did the EU Commission take so long to launch investigations into member states’ tax rulings? Is its strategy to go only after small countries, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Ireland? Will the instruments available to it suffice? And if not, what would it take to do away with unfair tax competition? These questions were raised by MEPs in Tuesday’s Special Tax Rulings Committee debate with competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager.
Special Committee on Tax Rulings and Other Measures Similar in Nature or Effect

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

The call is often from a worried teacher. They are noticing changes in students from immigrant backgrounds. Before, they defined themselves by nationality, as Kosovars, Bosnians or Turks, now they say they are Muslims. Before, they took part in art classes, now they insist their religion prohibits art. Then there’s a second change: these young men and women start to talk of a war against Islam that targets Muslims – targets them.

When I listen, I remember myself as a 16-year-old, the daughter of a diplomat from a secular family, coming back to my home country, Yemen, after four years in Morocco. It was 1982 – a period that saw the mushrooming of Islamist ideology in North Yemen. I was fascinated by a religious group led by a charismatic young woman of 17. The group met in the schoolyard. I would later learn it was part of a strong Islamist movement that saw Salafists work hand-in-hand with the Muslim Brotherhood.

“My father was not my father anymore; he was an enemy of Islam, I was told”

The sessions were fascinating. Our leader explained about the love of God. The moment we enter into Islam, she said, all our sins are washed away and we become equal. The fate of those who are not Muslims was never mentioned. She told us that we could be better people if only we embraced the message of Islam – the true Islam, not the corrupted form of our society. For a teenage girl, lacking direction, the message was mesmerising, and I embraced it wholeheartedly.

The changes in me were gradual. It started with language. Instead of greeting others with “good morning” or “good evening”, I used only the salute of Islam: “assalamu alaikum”, peace be upon you. Later I would learn that this salute is only reserved for Muslims. “Do not use it with non-Muslims”, I was told.

My days took on a rigid religious structure: prayer, Quran recital. It was strict, but simple and reassuring. “You have to wear the hijab”, I was told. “Hell will be filled with women hanged by their hair because of the way they seduced men by their beauty”. I was used to walking with my hair open. I covered up nevertheless. I did not like it. It suffocated me. But I did it – if this is the price for God’s love, how could I object?

“Militant radicalisation feeds on non-violent Islamism”

I was told all those around me including my practicing mother were living in Jahiliyya – “the state of ignorance and false belief that prevailed before the time of Islam”. I was told that painting, sculpture, art and music were all part of Jahiliyya and prohibited by Islam. I started to feel uncomfortable. I grew up surrounded by art and was fascinated reading about it in the encyclopaedia my father gave me when I reached 13. I was told that, like the companions of Mohammed, I had to renounce my parents and their society. I was told I belonged to a “chosen group” made supreme by adherence to the real Islam.

The more I embraced their message, the more I was drawn away from my father – an intellectual, a philosopher. He was a man of wisdom who taught me about life, philosophy and religion through poetry, books and critical thinking.  My father was not my father anymore; he was an enemy of Islam, I was told. He objected to my wearing of the hijab. He objected to what I started to tell him about Islam and the world. He was telling me this is fundamentalism, and I was starting to be angry with him. When I told my group about our fights, they repeated the message about the companions of Mohammed and how sometimes they had to fight their own fathers, brothers and uncles, even on the battlefield.

I started to be separated from my surroundings. Our meetings were no longer in the school, but in houses of young members of the movement. Older women were talking to us now.  They were telling me killing is OK. I was given a booklet about the life of Khaled Eslamboli, the army officer who planned the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981. Eslamboli was treated as a “hero of Islam”. Sadat was a Pharaoh who made peace with Israel, who worked with Jews intent on destroying Islam.

It was not just the militant dimension of their message that finally made me realise that something was fundamentally wrong with this group, it was the gender aspect. It was when I was told a saying of the Prophet about a woman who ignored her husband to visit her sick father. I was told the Prophet said, “the angels are cursing her, for she defied her husband’s order”. Later I came to understand that the Prophet might not have said this at all.

“Violence is often the last step of the radicalisation process”

I left our meeting that afternoon knowing I would never return. Who should be cursed here, I asked myself, the woman who wants to visit her sick father, or this husband who has no mercy in his heart?

It was with a sigh of relief that my father witnessed the end of my short flirtation with Islamism – taking off my headscarf was its first sign.

I was lucky. I was raised in a context that provided me with the tools to question everything I was told, not to take things at face value. Others are not so lucky and become entangled in a web of radicalism.

I am sharing this personal story with you because it connects with the phone calls I receive nowadays from Swiss teachers, overwhelmed with changes they are witnessing in their students. It connects with the questions raised by European and North American policymakers on how to tackle militant Islamism. Those policymakers often seem content with policies that address the security dimension of radicalisation, focusing on violent Islamism but ignoring its non-violent version. When they attempt to chart preventive or de-radicalisation policies, they conclude that working with “non-violent extremism” can be the best antidote to violent extremism.

I strongly disagree with this approach, because Al Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State are simply violent manifestations of that non-violent Islamism.

As a scholar, my research has always touched on Islamism. I researched the Arabian Peninsula’s social and political structures. I travelled the region for a book on authoritarian Arab states and women’s rights. I researched Sharia Councils in the UK. The more I learned about Islamism, the more one crucial message became evident: militant radicalisation feeds on non-violent Islamism – tackling the first requires confronting the second.

I tend to distinguish between two types of Islamism: societal and political.

Societal Islamism refers to those puritanical religious movements which concern themselves with changing social behaviours to conform to their rigid world view. They call for an Islamic mode of life, to separate its followers from wider society and often refrain from politics. The Salafi Islam of Saudi Arabia and Deobandi Islam of South Asia belong to these movements.

Political Islam, on the other hand, is a modern ideology that seeks political power as a means of transforming society. Its goal is revolutionary change compelled by a vision of a puritanical society governed by the law of God. In this state, identity and citizenship are defined by religious affiliation and observance.

There are different types of political Islam. Movements, such as the Islamic State, Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, seek to create this vision of society through outright violence. Others – such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami – use an incremental approach. Violence is still socially acceptable, but the strategy is gradual Islamisation through the education system, the mosque and the media. It is no coincidence that every time Islamists enter a government the first ministry they insist on having is education, and the first measure involves moulding the curriculum around their ideology.

Sometimes the two types of Islamism intertwine to become indistinguishable. Both embrace the ultimate objective of an Islamist state that implements what they consider the laws of God. Both call for a state run by a chosen supreme group of Muslims. Both actively promote concepts of military and missionary Jihad against enemies of Islam – the West included. Both emphasise control over women in their preaching of an ideal Islamist world.

I was drawn to both societal and political Islamism. The first paved the ground for the second. Societal Islamism sought to systematically separate me from my diverse Muslim North Yemeni society. It immersed me in a religious teaching that gradually turned political – the ultimate aspect of which was violence, that “it is OK to kill the enemies of Islam”.

My story took place in the ‘eighties, decades before the Iraq War and the War on Terror, which some point to today to explain the radicalisation of young migrants. It would be difficult to blame Western foreign policy for my fascination with Islamism. Nor did I come from a poor or marginalised background. I was upper-middle class, educated and privileged, but I was also young and searching for my identity.

Many of those radicalised in the West today are second, or third, generation migrants with Islamic heritage, or converts to Islam. They may face marginalisation and racism, identity crises, or the urge to rebel against family and society. However, the main driver of radicalisation is the ideological message of societal and political Islamism. It provides new recruits with direction, structure and identity. It empowers them with images of supremacy and domination.  Violence is often the last step of the radicalisation process.

Taking on militant Islamism requires policies that confront its societal and political messages in schools, mosques and religious classes. In charting these policies, it makes sense to avoid alliances with societal or political Islamist movements, however “non-violent” their message.

 

IMAGE CREDITS: CC / FLICKR – Brett Davies

The post Tackling militant Islamism means also confronting its non-violent forms appeared first on Europe’s World.

General : The EU's cohesion strategy helps poorer regions catch up with richer ones by stimulating growth and employment. When European governments started to cut back spending due to the crisis, the EU's cohesion funding helped to support critical investment, according to the European Commission's sixth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion. The Parliament's regional development voted on its position on 4 May. Check out our chart to learn how the funding helped to make a difference.

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

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In 2003, EU-China relations were upgraded to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Over ninety dialogues and working groups feed the work of annual EU-China Summit.

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If Russia does not apply the Minsk ceasefire deals in full and return Crimea to Ukraine, the EU should step up sanctions and consider the possibility of providing Ukraine with defensive arms, say Foreign Affairs Committee MEPs in a resolution voted on Monday. Returning Crimea is vital to the EU’s long-run cooperation with Russia and EU countries must also step up their own defence capabilities, says the text, which looks at Black Sea Basin military changes since Russia illegally annexed Crimea.
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

If Russia does not apply the Minsk ceasefire deals in full and return Crimea to Ukraine, the EU should step up sanctions and consider the possibility of providing Ukraine with defensive arms, say Foreign Affairs Committee MEPs in a resolution voted on Monday. Returning Crimea is vital to the EU’s long-run cooperation with Russia and EU countries must also step up their own defence capabilities, says the text, which looks at Black Sea Basin military changes since Russia illegally annexed Crimea.
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

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The negotiations on TTIP, trade aspects of the EU's Eastern Partnership, and preparations for the WTO's 10th ministerial conference in Nairobi are the main subjects of the Foreign Affairs Council on Trade, on 7 May 2015 in Brussels

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The EU-Republic of Korea relationship is based on the 2001 Framework Agreement for Trade and Cooperation. On 6 October, the Parties signed a Free Trade Agreement.

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Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Skype v OHMI - Sky and Sky IP International (skype)
Intellectual and industrial property
The General Court confirms that there exists a likelihood of confusion between the figurative and word sign SKYPE and the word mark SKY

Spain v Parliament and Council
CORE
The Court dismisses both of Spain’s actions against the regulations implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection

The ministerial meeting in Iqaluit, Nunavut (Canada), closed Canada's two-year Arctic Council (AC) chairmanship. Arctic cooperation seems relatively unaffected by the poor state of Russia's relations with the West. Canada invested much in its AC Chairmanship, but its deliverables have been less significant than those of previous chairs. Canada's two main achievements are the Arctic Economic Council and the framework for action on black carbon and methane. The framework is only a step in the right direction, not a full agreement. The programme of the new AC chair, the USA, has the potential to enhance practical cooperation between the EU and the AC. As Canada and the EU had resolved their differences, it seemed possible that the EU would at last receive formal observer status to the Council at the Iqaluit meeting, but Russia's geostrategic interests led Moscow to block the process. Given the growing number of observers, the US chair may propose that only one third of observers join high-level AC meetings under any one chair.
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Public hearing "The implementation of the security research programme for conflict prevention and peace building".
Location : Paul-Henri Spaak 5B001
Programme
Draft progarmme
Poster
Poster
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

With the UK’s general election on 7th May, it is looking highly likely that the Scottish National Party will displace the Lib-Dems as the UK’s third-biggest party, possibly winning almost all of Scotland’s 59 seats at Westminster (where today they hold only six seats, and Labour hold forty-one).

The SNP has campaigned not on independence but on an anti-austerity and ‘progressive’ ticket. In both Scotland and England, the debate has focused on domestic policy even though the Conservatives are committed to an EU referendum, if they win, that could lead to a potential ‘Brexit’.

With the SNP potentially holding the balance of power after 7th May – since neither the Tories nor Labour are expected to get anywhere near a majority – how might the SNP MPs impact on the UK’s approach to the EU?

Scotland and the EU

Humza Yousaf, Minister for Europe and International Development in the Scottish Government, says the campaign is going “phenomenally well in Scotland, as the polls and our own canvass results reflect”. He sees the “tectonic plates of Scottish politics shifting”.

Yousaf thinks that, in Scotland, “there is a more pro-European stance here”. There is much more outside interest in Scotland and its external policies, says Yousaf, with many more ambassadors and other visitors coming since the referendum, despite the ‘no’ vote.

Does Scotland at present have enough influence on British positions on key EU policies? “No, definitely not enough” says Yousaf. He explains there are quarterly joint ministerial meetings between the UK and Scotland on EU issues but “there isn’t enough discussion on policy formation…Smith [the Smith Commission Report which looked at further devolution post-referendum] left the door open a bit and said we would need to discuss more how to represent Scotland’s views on the global stage”. It’s a big issue that has been left hanging.

Yousaf complains strongly that even where Scotland has the most competent and experienced minister – for instance on fisheries – London will not let Scottish ministers speak for the UK in Brussels’ councils, pulling in unelected Lords or British diplomats instead when UK ministers are absent. Pressure for a more fair and rational approach for Scotland in the EU is likely to grow.

Scottish interests overlap with, but are not identical to, England’s. Scotland produces about 25% of the EU’s total wind energy, and has the most ambitious renewables targets in the EU. It has a greater focus on oil, food and drink, and fisheries amongst other areas, as well as its more anti-austerity and pro-EU attitudes, than England.

Asked about Greece’s struggles to escape austerity, Yousaf is sympathetic but cautious: “I don’t believe it is necessary for Greece to leave [the euro] for stability, any member leaving would be a disaster for the EU. I have faith they will find a manageable compromise’. He talks about Syriza having to “navigate” the promises they made to their voters to find a way to a compromise.

EU Referendum and ‘Brexit’ – only for England?

Humza Yousaf sees ‘Brexit’ as possible, if the Tories manage to put together an informal coalition after 7th May. Yousaf says “it [a referendum] is playing with fire, exit could have devastating consequences for the whole of the UK”.

But Yousaf is cautious about the impact of a possible ‘no’ vote on the push for Scottish independence if there is an EU in-out referendum: “This election is not about another [independence] referendum….If Scotland voted to stay in the EU and the rest of the UK to leave and we were about to be dragged out against our will that might be a trigger, and people would say we would rather be an independent country and in Europe.”

Yousaf refers to Irish anxieties about a possible Brexit (given shared borders and other common interests) and obviously sees similar concerns potentially for Scotland. He thinks it is better for the whole of the UK to stay in the EU. There is a conundrum here since while an EU referendum with an English ‘no’ vote might be a positive catalyst for Scottish independence, it would in many ways be better for an independent Scotland if England too remained in the EU.

Asked who might be the main allies of a one-day independent Scotland in the EU, Yousaf says “primarily the [rest of the] UK would be a natural ally in the EU and Ireland, first and foremost, we would work closely with them, and yes with some of the Nordics – Sweden, Finland and Denmark.”

Yousaf says he is sure if they had won the Scottish referendum, Scotland would have stayed in the EU: “Brussels would have found a way, there is no doubt in my mind. The EU is a pragmatic organisation as it was when East Germany joined. We have been in for 40 years and our laws reflect the acquis, we have €100,000 citizens here in Scotland, 25% of EU wind energy….so you could imagine the practical problems if we weren’t in the EU for a day, the disruption.”

Most attention on SNP foreign policies has been on their aim of getting rid of Trident. Trident, says Yousaf, has no moral, political or economic purpose. But he goes on to emphasise “we are not a party of pacifists” and attacks the current government for not investing enough in conventional forces.

Migration is another issue where the SNP has positioned itself in a progressive position compared to the UK’s main parties. Yousaf talks of needing a ‘tier and points’ system for migration and insists migration is positive and necessary for Scotland given its aging population. Such an outlook may be helpful in the debate around free movement of labour in the EU, one that is likely to continue even under a Labour government to some extent.

 

The SNP’s role at Westminster – plenty to discuss

David Cameron has been attacking Labour for much of the election over the possibility that it might end up as a minority government supported by the SNP, a party committed to independence from the UK.

This attack, effectively on the legitimacy of SNP MPs voting at Westminster has gone down very badly in Scotland. “The anger”, says Yousaf, “is tangible. From six or seven months ago”, he goes on, “when Cameron was saying ‘you should not leave the UK’ to saying ‘your voice is illegitimate and you should have no say in a future government’….people are apoplectic, very angry”.

Ed Miliband has also shocked some on the left in England, by not only ruling out a formal coalition with the SNP, but even a so-called ‘confidence and supply’ arrangement. This suggests he thinks he can govern as a minority government, with some votes in support on key policies from the SNP, but without negotiating with them – this seems implausible.

Both Scottish and British politics look like being interesting indeed after the results come in on 7th May. The SNP will certainly be a key voice in many areas, even without a formal agreement, if there is a minority Labour government. And a Conservative coalition or more informal agreement with the Lib-Dems, Democratic Ulster Unionists and UKIP may find itself fracturing over an EU referendum – something the SNP would not support – so in a more unstable governing context, watching the SNP is now going to be a key part of following Britain’s politics.

 

An earlier version of this article was published in Open Democracy.

 

IMAGE CREDITS: CC / FLICKR – the SNP

The post How the Scottish National Party’s likely triumph at the polls may impact on the UK’s EU policy appeared first on Europe’s World.

One of the more controversial actions taken by the Juncker Commission in its still-short life was January’s move to make the EU’s crisis-era budget rules more “flexible,” an announcement many took as a signal it was preparing to let both Italy and France off the hook for their recent fiscal transgressions. Which it ultimately did.

According to Commission officials, the so-called “flexibility communication” caused ructions among the 28 commissioners both because of its substance and the process by which it was agreed: the college was only allowed to see a hard copy of the highly-technical document for about a half hour before it was taken away, and then presented for adoption later in the day.

Among those who were angered by the way it was forced through the college over the complaints of some of the Commission’s budget hawks was Chancellor Angela Merkel who, according to our friends and rivals at the German weekly Der Spiegel (no relation), complained to Juncker that “her commissioner” – German Günther Oetttinger – had only received the document a few hours before it was to be approved. “Why ‘your’ commissioner?” Juncker reportedly replied coolly. “That’s my commissioner.”

Now it seems that Berlin is not the only place where objections are being raised about some of the decisions taken in the “flexibility communication”. According to a leaked opinion by the European Council’s legal service – which Brussels Blog got its hands on and has posted here – last month, lawyers on the other side of Rue de la Loi appear to have decided a central part of the new guidelines might be illegal.

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