European Union

All eyes will be focused on Paris in December when leaders from almost 200 countries that are parties to the United Nations framework convention on climate change (UNFCCC) next meet. Their challenge is to agree a new phase of the climate change treaty that is ambitious enough to keep global temperatures below to 2ºC by the end of this century instead of the nearly 4ºC we are currently heading to.

The deal to be negotiated in Paris needs all countries to substantially reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases, a goal attempted unsuccessfully a few years ago in Copenhagen.

“The good news is that the basic negotiating text has been agreed, and all countries are putting forward their own emission reduction pledges”

Among the sticking points in these global negotiations is the famous phrase Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, or CBDR, which means that while all countries should do what they can, some, mostly rich ones, should bear a greater responsibility and should do more than the others. Developing countries are a single negotiating bloc called the “Group of 77 and China” (although there are now well over 130 countries in this group), which has a number of sub-groups like the Least Developed Countries (LDC) group, the Alliance of Small Island States, (AOSIS) and others.

When the UNFCCC process began over 20 years ago, this division between rich and poor countries made sense. But then things have changed dramatically. China is now the world’s biggest emitter of greenhouse gases, having overtaken the U.S., while countries like India, Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia are becoming bigger greenhouse gas emitters than many rich western countries.

The time has therefore come to de-emphasise the “Differentiated” and re-emphasise the “Common” in CBDR. This may require new alliances that will break the traditional rich versus poor dichotomy. Just such an alliance happened already at the UNFCCC meeting in Durban a few years ago when to break the deadlock between the rich countries and the G77 plus China the European Union allied itself with the LDC group. This led to agreement on the Durban Platform which set in train the negotiations now due to be finalised in Paris.

The good news as we head for Paris is that the basic negotiating text has been agreed, and all countries are putting forward their own emission reduction pledges. These are positive signs, but the trick will be to create alliances and coalitions of the willing. The hope must be that once again the LDCs and EU could form just such an alliance.

 

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – D B Young

The post The key is another EU alliance with the developing world appeared first on Europe’s World.

Climate change is posing unprecedented challenges in two ways. There is a growing body of knowledge on the consequences of climate change, and there is the imperative need to act on mitigation and adaptation due to related disasters.

The negotiations between parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) need to find of solutions to a series of issues. These include differentiation, which is closely related to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, the legal nature of the agreement, the political balance between mitigation and adaptation, and ways to finance loss and damage. In any negotiation, groups build alliances to find consensus that would be the basis of an agreement.

“The solution to the problem of climate change extends beyond the inter-governmental process”

Of course, the solution to the problem of climate change extends beyond the inter-governmental process. It affects the everyday life of people, their livelihoods and economic stability, for developed and developing countries alike. The impact of climate change will deeply affect our ways of life, but so too will the solutions. That’s why many stakeholders have recognised this challenge as an opportunity to tackle climate change outside the formal UNFCCC process.

The alliances between the different stakeholders at all levels, both state and non-state actors, can give inputs that complement the inter-governmental process. These alliances should be at the heart of the development process, with inputs from all stakeholders recognised. We should foster the creation of more spaces for policymakers and environmental experts to exchange their concerns, and hopefully this will lead to new practices and paradigm shifts.

Climate change is a two-sided problem that has to be addressed from both ends. For many years, the identification of mitigation measures has shown progress and countries around the world are working on them to a varying extent. On the adaptation side, the need for peoples, ecosystems and economies to respond to the adverse effects of climate change means we must improve our resilience at all levels.

There is a causal relationship between mitigation and adaptation; the more we mitigate, the less adaptation will be required. There is, of course, a gap in terms of the timing as the causality is not immediate, the alliances between mitigation and adaptation experts can be win-win ones.

We can expect to see more alliances, and Peru’s contribution to the engagement with state and non-state actors is being made through the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA). Launched by the governments of Peru and France representing COP20 and COP21 presidencies, the LPAA aims to stimulate new initiatives, showcase existing partnerships and engage with the public sector to scale up finance for climate mitigation and adaptation.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Gerard Van der Leun

The post And it’s alliances that bridge the climate talks divide appeared first on Europe’s World.

What will India’s position be at the Paris conference? The fact is India is a victim of climate change, with unseasonal rain and weird, erratic weather resulting in huge crop losses. Farmers have been taking their own lives because they cannot face the prospect of penury and debt. It is time we should accept this changing weather as part of the catastrophic future that awaits us all. It means, too, that India must take a proactive position so the world understands that it has become a victim of climate change while the world continues to do too little to reduce greenhouses gases.

This doesn’t mean that India will not be part of the effort to reduce emissions. India should present its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) to demonstrate its own seriousness, but it is also clear that this target for emission reduction has to be based on an equitable sharing of the burden.

“India must take a proactive position so the world understands that it has become a victim of climate change while the world continues to do too little to reduce greenhouses gases”

The U.S.-China agreement on climate change is highly unfair and not at all ambitious enough. It puts the world at risk, for China and the U.S. have agreed to “equalise” emissions by 2030. In other words, China will be allowed to increase carbon dioxide emissions until then so as to reach the same level as the U.S. In turn, the U.S. will by 2025 reduce its emissions by 26-28% from its 2005 levels – when they peaked.

The Chinese will thus go from roughly 8 tonnes per capita of carbon dioxide now to 12-13 tonnes in 2030. The U.S. comes down from 17 tonnes per capita of carbon dioxide to 12-13 tonnes in 2030. The cake is being carved up in such a manner that each country would occupy equal atmospheric space by 2030. The U.S.-China deal makes it clear that each of the two countries get 16% of the atmospheric space.

This will leave little for the rest of the world’s economic growth. At this rate of emissions, there is no way the world can stay below the guardrail of a 2°C rise in temperature that would keep us all safe.

So what should India do? Its current per capita emissions are roughly 1.8 tonnes of carbon dioxide. New Delhi must argue that all countries, including India, agree to cut emissions, based on their past contributions so that all can share the common atmospheric space. It is what the Narendra Modi government has promised to do, and it is what must be supported internationally so that the rich world is taught to walk the talk and not just talk the talk.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Tawheed Manzoor

The post Answering the key question of what India wants appeared first on Europe’s World.

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Place:        KIRCHBERG building (KCC), Luxembourg
Chair(s):    Anrijs Matīss, Minister for Transport of Latvia  

All times are approximate and subject to change  

+/- 09.35     Doorstep by Minister Matīss
10.00           Beginning of Transport Council meeting
+/- 10.10     Adoption of A items
+/- 10.15     Air passengers rights (in public session)
+/- 10.45     Inland waterway vessels (in public session)
+/- 11.25     Fourth Railway Package (in public session)
+/- 12.25     AOB
                     EU road safety
                     TEN-T & CEF
                     ASEM Transport Ministers meeting (poss. in public session)
                     Shift2Rail 
                     Work programme of the incoming Presidency

+/- 14.00     Press conference

On 10 June 2015, the Council's Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper) approved a compromise agreement on the reform of the European trade mark system.

The reform of the current system will improve the conditions for businesses to innovate and to benefit from more effective trade mark protection against counterfeits, including fake goods in transit through the EU's territory.

The new legal framework is also aimed at making trade mark registration systems throughout the European Union more accessible and efficient for businesses in terms of lower costs and complexity, increased speed, greater predictability and legal certainty.

Next steps

After endorsement of the compromise agreement by the Legal Affairs committee of the European Parliament, the legal texts will come back to the Council for  political agreement, followed by the usual legal-linguistic revision before the formal adoption of the Council's position at first reading.

Afterwards, the texts will be put for a vote in second reading at a plenary session of the European Parliament.

The 7-8 June 2015 Group of Seven (G7) summit in Schloss Elmau (Germany) marked the second meeting of seven leading industrialised nations without Russia since the disbanding of the Group of Eight (G8). The group's smaller configuration – a response to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea – appears here to stay. The summit provided an opportunity for G7 leaders to discuss a number of topics pertaining to foreign policy, economy, health, energy, climate and sustainable development. Ukraine and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) featured prominently on the meeting’s agenda, as did discussions on to the post-2015 development and climate agendas. The revival of the G7 has served to ensure its members' unity on key policy files, shape joint policy responses and influence EU policies and global governance, particularly through its nexus with the Group of 20 (G20), the United Nations and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The German presidency of G7 has been praised its inclusive approach ahead of the summit, with consultations conducted with non-governmental stakeholders.
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

The 7-8 June 2015 Group of Seven (G7) summit in Schloss Elmau (Germany) marked the second meeting of seven leading industrialised nations without Russia since the disbanding of the Group of Eight (G8). The group's smaller configuration – a response to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea – appears here to stay. The summit provided an opportunity for G7 leaders to discuss a number of topics pertaining to foreign policy, economy, health, energy, climate and sustainable development. Ukraine and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) featured prominently on the meeting’s agenda, as did discussions on to the post-2015 development and climate agendas. The revival of the G7 has served to ensure its members' unity on key policy files, shape joint policy responses and influence EU policies and global governance, particularly through its nexus with the Group of 20 (G20), the United Nations and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The German presidency of G7 has been praised its inclusive approach ahead of the summit, with consultations conducted with non-governmental stakeholders.
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

This study examines the state of 'Pooling and Sharing' (P&S) at EU and Member State (MS) level. Instead of the demanded change in mindset, we witness another episode in the traditional struggle to make classic defence cooperation work. The marginal results of P&S are not yet adequate to the size of problems. The cooperation initiative misses definitions of success, useful models of cooperation and a permanent monitoring of opportunities and capabilities. MS make progress at a snail’s pace: many projects kicked off in the first phase of P&S are still in their early stages and thus do not deliver capabilities. At the same time, Member States paralyse efforts of the EDA. NATO has not performed much better. This underlines that the core of the problem remains the sovereignty question within Member States. The developments have to be seen against the simultaneous evolution of the European defence landscape: budgets and capabilities have been cut further. Member States have lost time and money but most importantly, they have also lost many options to safeguard capabilities through pooling or sharing. The European Parliament should encourage first, a new politico-military flagship project around which defence can be organised, second, an efficiency perspective towards spending and procuring capabilities; third, the discussion on the future of sovereignty in defence; and fourth, a European Defence Review that offers a sober assessment of the current and future European defence landscape, including the opportunities for cooperation. This would enable a public debate on Europe with or without defence.
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Public hearing "The implementation of the Solidarity Clause"
Location : Altiero Spinelli, room 1E-2, European Parliament
Poster
Poster
Programme
Draft programme
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

The Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper) on 9 June 2015 approved, on behalf of the Council, a compromise agreement on a European fund for strategic investments (EFSI) aimed at stimulating the economy.

The compromise reached with the European Parliament on 28 May 2015 paves the way for new investments to begin in mid-2015.

"In the current economic context, there is a clear need to boost investment," said Jānis Reirs, minister for finance of Latvia and president of the Council. "With an enhanced risk-bearing capacity, this new fund will create the conditions needed for the private sector to become involved."

The EFSI is intended to stimulate participation by private investors in a broad range of new investment projects. By taking on part of the risk through a first-loss liability, it is expected to achieve an overall multiplier effect of 1:15 in real investment. Such leverage will eventually allow more than €300bn of additional investment to be mobilised during a three-year investment period.

The fund will be built on €16 billion in guarantees from the EU budget and €5 billion from the European Investment Bank. To facilitate the payment of potential guarantee calls, a guarantee fund will be established so as to gradually reach €8 billion (i.e. 50% of total EU guarantee obligations).

A broad range of projects

The EFSI will be established within the EIB by an agreement between the EIB and the Commission. It will operate for an initial investment period of four years.

The fund will support projects in a broad range of areas, including transport, energy and broadband infrastructure, education, health, research and risk finance for SMEs. It will target socially and economically viable projects without any sector-specific or regional pre-allocation, in particular to address market failures. The EFSI will complement and be additional to ongoing EU programmes and traditional EIB activities.

Lifetime of the fund

Before the end of the initial investment period, the Commission will submit an independent evaluation which will assess whether the EFSI has achieved the objectives of the regulation. Based on the conclusions of its report, the Commission will, as appropriate, present a proposal to either set a new investment period, restructure the fund, or terminate the EFSI.

Funding

EU funding will come from redeploying grants from the Connecting Europe facility (transport, energy and digital networks) and the Horizon 2020 programme (research and innovation), as well as unused margins in the EU's annual budget. As part of the deal, the Council and the Parliament agreed to increase the share of financing coming from unused margins, in comparison with what the Commission proposed, in order to reduce contributions from Horizon 2020 and the Connecting Europe facility (CEF).

The agreement reached on funding is as follows:

• Redeployment will amount to €5bn, of which €2.8bn from the CEF and €2.2bn from Horizon 2020;
• Funding from unused margins will amount to €3bn over the 2016-20 period. The source of this financing includes €543 million and €457 million specifically earmarked from the global margin for commitments for the 2014 and 2015 budgets respectively.
• Payments could be extended until 2023 to provision the EFSI guarantee fund.

Furthermore, it was agreed that €500 million of CEF-transport financial instruments will be redeployed for CEF-transport grants.

Governance of the fund

The EFSI regulation provides for a two-tier governance structure:

• A steering board will set the overall strategy, investment policy and risk profile of the fund. To ensure an impartial steering board and avoid political influence over the selection of projects, the board members will come from the Commission and the EIB only. Their numbers will reflect the institutions' size of contributions in the form of cash or guarantees. The steering board will take decisions by consensus. It will regularly consult stakeholders.
• An independent investment committee will select projects to receive EFSI support. Accountable to the steering board, it will consist of eight independent experts and a managing director. The managing director will be responsible for the day-to-day management of the EFSI and the preparation and chairing of meetings of the investment committee. The committee will take decisions by simple majority. Any project supported by the EFSI will require approval by the EIB.

Contributions to the fund

Member states can contribute to the EFSI in guarantees or cash, while third parties can contribute in cash. However, contributions will not entail any influence over the fund's governance.  

Third parties, including member states' national promotional banks, will be able to co-finance projects together with the EFSI, either on a project-by-project basis or through investment platforms.

Identifying new projects

The regulation will set up a "European investment advisory hub" to provide advisory support for the identification, preparation and development of projects across the EU. It will also establish a "European investment project portal" to improve investors' knowledge of existing and future projects. 

Adopting the regulation

The agreement with the Parliament was reached during a trilogue meeting in Brussels on 27 and 28 May, while the final trilogue endorsement took place on 4 June. Council and Parliament representatives met in nine trilogues since 23 April 2015, having agreed their respective negotiating stances in March and April.

The EFSI regulation will now be submitted to the European Parliament for a vote at first reading, expected on 24 June, and to the Council for final adoption. Signature of the regulation is foreseen before the end of June, which will allow it to enter into force at the beginning of July 2015. The first EFSI operations could be approved as early as mid-September.

Final compromise text of the EFSI regulation