The Eurogroup endorses, in the context of its thematic discussions on growth and jobs, a set of common principles for strengthening the sustainability of pension systems in the euro area.
The Eurogroup considers that significant progress has been achieved in improving pension sustainability in the euro area. However, it also acknowledges that considerable risks remain in many Member States, especially over the medium term. In particular, pension expenditure projections are sensitive to the underlying macroeconomic and demographic assumptions. Against this background, further policy action is needed to strengthen the resilience of public pension systems to adverse demographic and macroeconomic developments and to guard against the risk of reform reversal.
The Eurogroup underlines that in times of high public debt, the importance of pension sustainability for the euro area from a financial, economic and social point of view renders developments in this field a matter of common concern in the euro area. In the context of interlinkages in the monetary union, adverse cross-border spill-overs may arise from unsustainable national pension systems. Developing common principles for pension reforms in the euro area is therefore beneficial, while recognising that country specificities influence the features of national pension systems.
Overall, the Eurogroup considers that the sustainability of pension systems, while safeguarding the adequacy of old-age incomes, is a clear policy priority for euro area Member States.
The Eurogroup thus endorses the following common principles, which should guide Member States when implementing reforms in this field:
Safeguard against demographic and macroeconomic risks: reforms should focus on systematically increasing the resilience of public pension systems against risks from demographic change or macroeconomic shocks. In particular, the introduction of automatic mechanisms appropriately designed at Member State level has been shown to be an effective tool for dealing with the effects of demographic change, specifically the slow-moving but significant increases in life expectancy.
Flanking policies: pension reform should be complemented by flanking policies so as to improve the sustainability of the pension system, while ensuring the adequacy of pensions. These policies should seek to extend working lives and thereby boost retirement incomes, through measures to increase older people's employability as well as restricting early pathways out of the labour force. The provision of complementary means of savings for retirement should also be explored.
Broader reforms to strengthen growth and employment: longer working lives should be accommodated without higher expenditure on non-pension benefits. Effective policies need to be enacted to ensure that the entire work force is put to the fullest possible use. Workplaces should adapt to maximise the productivity of a heterogeneous workforce, while policies to boost productivity and potential growth should support the impact of pension reforms on sustainability more broadly.
Anchoring political and societal support: the implementation of pension reforms has far-reaching consequences for individuals as well as the macro-economy and has implications for intergenerational equity. Societal and political support is essential for the lasting success of reforms. In this context, it is particularly important to establish a common understanding of the challenges pension systems face, as well as a constructive dialogue and involvement of the relevant stakeholders, and an appropriate phasing in of the reforms.
The Eurogroup also approves these common principles as a reference point for reviewing national reform efforts to strengthen the sustainability of pension systems for euro area Member States. The Eurogroup thus invites the Commission to assess developments in this field within its usual surveillance processes, with a view to allowing periodic monitoring by the Eurogroup. The Eurogroup also invites its preparatory committees and the Commission to explore the development of appropriate benchmarks based on these common principles, and report back to the Eurogroup in the first half of 2017.
European Council meeting will take place on 28-29 June 2016 in Justus Lipsius building in Brussels.
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On 27 May 2016, the Council adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/849[1] concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
The Council Decision adopted additional restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by prohibiting the supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK of further items, materials and equipment relating to dual-use goods and technology. In addition, it prohibits transfers of funds to and from DPRK unless specifically authorised in advance.
Furthermore, the Council Decision prohibits any aircraft operated by DPRK carriers or originating from DPRK from landing in, taking off from or overflying Member States' territory as well as any vessel that is owned, operated or crewed by DPRK from entering into Member States' ports. It introduces a prohibition on the import of luxury goods from DPRK, as well as prohibitions on all investment by the DPRK in the EU and the provision of financial support for trade with DPRK.
The Candidate Countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Montenegro* and Serbia*, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as the Republic of Moldova and Armenia align themselves with this Council Decision.
They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council Decision.
The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it.
[1] Published on 28.5.2016 in the Official Journal of the European Union no. L 141, p. 79.
* - The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.
Good afternoon, I am delighted to be here in Helsinki. Let me start by thanking Prime Minister Juha Sipilä for his great hospitality.
We have just ended a good and fruitful meeting, the first part of our meeting, during which we discussed some of the most pressing issues for both Finland and Europe as a whole.
These are truly testing times for the European Union with many existential threats and challenges confronting us: the massive influx of refugees and migrants, terrorism, an aggressive Russian foreign policy, the continuing global economic challenges, and last but not least, the risk of “brexit”. The European Union is not and cannot be a fair-weather project. It is also made for rainy days, like here today, which we are demonstrating through our concerted efforts to tackle our common problems, one by one, together.
On the migration and refugee crisis we have managed to close the Western Balkan route, by starting to re-apply our common Schengen rules and by cooperating with Turkey. We have moved from almost 7.000 daily arrivals from Turkey to the Greek islands in October last year, to less than 50 per day in the last month. It shows that our strategy delivers. The June European Council will focus on how to return the economic migrants coming from Africa to Europe via the Central Mediterranean. Let me in this context recognise Finland as a front-runner in terms of relocating people. You have already fulfilled around a third of your national commitment and deserve credit for that. Likewise, other Member States need to step up and honour their commitments and follow Finland's example.
On Russia's violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, we have stayed the course, keeping our unity despite systematic attempts to undermine it. Our principle political message has been heard throughout the neighbourhood and beyond. Sanctions on Russia continue to be linked to the complete implementation of the Minsk Agreements.
We are also working to broaden and deepen our security agenda with NATO. In the run-up to the NATO Warsaw summit, we are working to take our EU-NATO cooperation to a new level of ambition, in very practical ways. EU Member States and NATO Allies face the same challenges, and our responses need to be synchronised. I would like to thank Finland for being so forthcoming, even enthusiastic, in these discussions, including on stepped up action to tackle hybrid and cyber threats.
On the economic and financial crisis Europe has responded over the last years by supporting the efforts of the most affected countries to reform their economies. At the same time, institutional changes such as the banking union have made us more resilient. However we need to work harder to strengthen Europe's competitiveness and growth prospects and thank you for your support in this context . The Single Market, in particular the Digital Single Market, offer huge, still unexploited sources of durable growth. We need swift and determined progress on these issues. Therefore a strong message to this effect should be coming out of the June European Council. I know I have Juha's full support in this endeavour. I hope it will be effective.
And lastly on the question of the UK referendum. History has taught us that we were always defeated when divided. And that we always won when we stood united. Europe without the United Kingdom will be distinctly weaker. This is obvious. Equally obvious is that the UK outside the EU will be distinctly weaker too. Instead of seven years of political limbo and uncertainty in our relations, which will be the inevitable and direct result of “brexit”, we can have a fast and lasting less than one year implementation of the new settlement for the UK in the EU, negotiated by David Cameron. The UK has achieved a position of a key state in the EU, whose voice is respected. Today more than ever before. Many of the British ideas about the EU are gaining support all over Europe. There are so many things we can do together. Leaving now doesn't make any sense. Thank you.
The EU has agreed on a framework to stop the financing of armed groups through trade in conflict minerals, after negotiations between the Commission, Council and Parliament. It aims for EU companies to source tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold responsibly. These minerals are typically used in everyday products such as mobile phones, cars and jewellery.
"The EU is committed to preventing international trade in minerals from financing warlords, criminals and the human rights abusers", said Lilianne Ploumen, the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation of the Netherlands, on behalf of the Council of the European Union. Along with the Chairman of the European Parliament's INTA Committee, Bernd Lange, INTA Rapporteur Iuliu Winkler, and the EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström, a political understanding was reached on a framework for an EU Regulation to stop profits from trading minerals being used to fund armed conflicts.
"This political understanding on conflict minerals will help trade to work for peace and prosperity, in communities and areas around the globe affected by armed conflict," said EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström. Chairman Lange agrees "we need to step up to our responsibilities and finally break the vicious cycle between the trade in minerals and the financing of conflict". The EU approach will build upon the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for responsible mineral sourcing.
"This framework paves the way for an effective and workable EU Regulation that will make a real impact on the ground", said Rapporteur Iuliu Winkler. The agreed framework carries clear obligations for the critical 'upstream' part of the conflict minerals supply chain, including smelters and refiners, to source responsibly. The vast majority of metals and minerals imported to the EU will be covered, while exempting small volume importers from these obligations.
In addition, the Commission will carry out a number of other measures - including the development of reporting tools - to further boost supply chain due diligence by large and smaller EU 'downstream' companies, i.e. those companies that use these metals and minerals as components in goods.
Today's political understanding sets the Regulation on track for technical work and final adoption in the coming months.
With the referendum on UK EU membership fast approaching, both the Leave and Remain campaigns have put forward their views on the future of environmental policy in the UK and its relationship with the EU. This political debate raises a number of questions: how green is the European Union; how effective or in some cases cumbersome are its regulations; will the UK be more pro-environment, or more influential outside the block. These questions have informed academic debate on EU environmental politics and policies since the early 1990s.
Twenty-four years ago a special issue in the Journal of Environmental Politics brought together for the first time research studying the ‘green dimension’ of the European integration process: from the rise of green parties in national political systems to the role of key European institutions in ‘greening’ policies (making them more environmentally-friendly) and to key concepts such as environmental policy integration. Interestingly, this first stock-taking exercise took place in the shadow of what was then felt to be a great threat for EU environmental policies: British demands for repeal and repatriation of environmental legislation in the wake of the Danish ‘no’ to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.
Back then, environmental policies were at the heart of the British ‘hit list’ of policies to be repatriated. Now, environmental issues are struggling to be heard in the EU referendum debate. Over the past twenty-four years or so, researchers on EU environmental policy and politics have ploughed the furrows delineated in the 1992 special issue – investigating how green the European Parliament really is, how successful environmental policy integration has been, and the role of Green political parties and environmental groups across the EU – as well as developing new agendas for research. In the early 1990s, slow progress stimulated concerns over the implementation of EU environmental policy, while from the run-up to the Kyoto Protocol (in the mid-1990s) onward, the EU’s climate policies and its role as an environmental leader gained traction. Finally, the 2000s saw a surge in research on the effects of the EU on its member states, and the effect of the three waves of enlargement to Central and Eastern European Countries on the functioning of the EU and on its green credentials.
Interestingly, the EU UK referendum debate appears to focus more on what could happen to environmental policies were the UK to leave. But what about a Remain vote? Is the EU as ‘green’ or pro-environment as it used to be? This question was at the heart of an academic workshop (ECPR Joint-Sessions) in April 2016. Bringing together twenty-one EU environmental policy scholars, the workshop discussed emerging new dynamics and directions in EU environmental policy and politics.
The ECPR ‘Whither the Environment in Europe?’ workshop participants
Where next for the environment in Europe?
We discussed three central issues. First, the changing role of central EU institutions in environmental policy, such as the European Commission and the European Court of Justice. The Commission has conventionally been depicted as an institution churning out new legislation at great speed. By contrast, the cutting-edge research shows that the European Commission is profoundly changing, both in its inner structure and in the activities it carries out. In two of its traditionally strong sectors of activity (policy-making and enforcement) the Commission appears to be stepping back by reducing the amount of new policy proposals, and indeed, in some cases, pursuing policy dismantling. It is also actively developing concepts for environmental governance and reinforcing retrospective (ex-post) evaluation of its policies. Concomitantly, the Commission appears to allow civil society to take a more active role in checking the application of EU law, effectively outsourcing parts of its enforcement duties to environmental groups. This, in turn, links with the role of courts, where environmental groups have gained increasing legal standing, thus potentially shifting enforcement mechanisms in the EU. A recent example if this in the UK is the victory of the environmental law firm Client Earth against the Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs in the UK Supreme Court on the UK implementation of EU clean air rules in 2015.
A second set of papers considered activities in parts of the EU that have so far received less attention, such as policy implementation in the new member states, as well as the role of the EU in regional environmental regimes in the Baltic. Developing a much deeper understanding of policy dynamics at the EU’s periphery is thus one of the areas that will likely draw future attention, and it also interlinks with the broader questions on EU leadership in environmental governance and the role of its newer members, who have at times been much more reluctant to endorse ambitious policy proposals, particularly on climate change. A focus on the latter appears to be driving current environmental policy research.
Third, a number of papers picked up a return of politics and the increasing contestation of the European Union project. Linked to ideas on policy dismantling, but also the current public debates on the future of the EU, there was a real sense among workshop participants that more integration and more ambitious environmental policy isn’t necessarily the only direction of travel within the EU. This necessitates an engagement with the broader ideas of European (dis)integration, the developments at its core, the borders of the European Union, and increasingly differentiated, or regional, forms of collaboration.
Curiously, the fact that academics have increasingly focused on the minutiae of European policy making and filling gaps in knowledge about governance processes stands somewhat at odds with the ongoing societal and political debates about the future of the European integration project more generally. It appears that these ultimately political questions are forcing their way back into a field that has increasingly focused on lower-level dynamics. Much like the EU itself, the future of environmental policy in it (and its study) remain in flux.
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One of the most striking quotes ahead of Britain’s referendum was Michael Gove’s claim that “people in this country have had enough of experts”. As this polling data shows, the Brexit backing justice secretary was on to something, at least when it comes to Leave supporters.
The YouGov pollsters gauged public trust in the views of “experts” and politicians when they speak about the EU referendum. It is no surprise that both Leave and Remain supporters are wary of politicians – both at home and abroad – albeit by different margins.
When it comes to experts, though, there is an chasm. Remain supporters tend to believe academics, economists and people from the Bank of England. Leave backers mistrust them all, especially if they come from Threadneedle Street (net trust minus 45 per cent). You can add business leaders to that list too (plus 28 per cent trust among Remainers, and minus 28 for Leavers).
There is a paradox to this. As the FT’s Chris Giles notes today, there has rarely been such “expert” consensus on an issue. While economists argue over how harmful Brexit would be, there is near unity that it would be harmful to the economy. The dismal science is in speaking in concert for once and the public just don’t seem to be listening. As Tobias Buck found in a report from revolutionary Bracknell, middle England is in an iconoclastic mood.
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