European Union

On Tuesday, MEPs re-elected Roberta Metsola (EPP, MT) as President of the European Parliament until 2027, with 562 votes in the first round.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

The European Parliament was officially constituted on Tuesday in Strasbourg, following the European elections on 6-9 June.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

The European Parliament was officially constituted on Tuesday in Strasbourg, following the European elections on 6-9 June.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Address by the President of the European Parliament Roberta Metsola, following her re-election.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Address by the President of the European Parliament Roberta Metsola, following her re-election.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Following her re-election as President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola will hold a press briefing today at 13.00.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Following her re-election as President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola will hold a press briefing today at 13.00.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Tuesday, 16 July

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Tuesday, 16 July

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

The European Parliament’s spokesperson will hold a last-minute briefing on Parliament’s 16 - 19 July constitutive session at 9.00 on 16 July.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

The European Parliament’s spokesperson will hold a last-minute briefing on Parliament’s 16 - 19 July constitutive session at 9.00 on 16 July.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

The EU-Ukraine relations started with Ukraine’s independence in 1991, but they were not unproblematic. Ukrainian leaders wanted to get benefits both from the EU and Russia, at the same time not coming too close to either. Ukrainian citizens were divided on whether the country should integrate with East, West or stay on its own. The EU was not sure in its policy towards Ukraine and many EU members valued partnership with Russia more. Yet 24th February 2022 changed EU-Ukraine relations. Apart from freezing its cooperation with Russia and providing military help for Ukraine’s fight against Russian invasion, the EU made Ukraine an EU candidate country on 23rd June 2022. How and why did this rough change in the EU’s policy towards Ukraine happen?

 

EU-Russia & EU-Ukraine

Cooperation with Russia was important for the EU for many reasons and the fear to disturb it kept the EU from developing better ties with Ukraine. Beneficial EU-Russia partnership was a core reason of the EU’s weak response to Russian annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas in 2014. Russian full-scale invasion in 2022 made a difference. Already a day before the invasion the EU introduced its first sanctions’ package against Russia, a few days after the invasion Russian banks were switched off from SWIFT and by the time when Ukraine became an EU candidate country, there were already six EU’s packages of sanctions against Russia. This shows a substantial change in the EU’s policy towards Russia.

Not only EU countries understood Russia better in 2022, but Eastern EU member-states made an effort to convince countries like Germany, France and Italy to stop their trade with Russia. For instance, Germany supported embargo on Russian oil in mid-spring only after other European countries’ were able to push and shame Germany for trading with the aggressor. When ‘business as usual’ with Russia became not possible, closer EU-Ukraine relations was a possibility.

 

Ukraine chose the EU

Russian full-scale invasion destroyed also Ukrainians’ hopes for friendship with Russia. Ukrainian politicians finally applied for EU membership on 28th February 2022. The support of ordinary Ukrainians for joining the EU skyrocketed from 47% in 2013, 52% in 2021 to 82% in 2022. This, together with Ukraine’s successful resistance to Russia, was convincing EU’s decision-makers to support faster EU-Ukraine integration.

 

The need to protect Europe

The EU was always afraid to provoke Russia, but its caution did not prevent Russian unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The EU’s leaders’ awareness about the need to change the strategy was growing. Eastern EU-member states’ politicians had a real fear of Russian possible attack on their own countries and even Western Europeans felt Russian threat. It was the moment when European decision-makers agreed that the EU had to develop a stronger response to Russia and fostering relations with Ukraine was one of the new measures.

On the other hand, Russian brutality and war crimes created a huge wave of sympathy among EU citizens and politicians. The EU as a perceived promoter of human rights and security in Europe felt pressure to support Ukraine with all means. In spring 2022, the majority of Europeans (60-88% in different countries) condemned Russia, sympathized Ukraine (89%) and supported Ukraine’s integration into the EU. The EU politicians felt the moral need to help Ukraine to win this war and to become an EU member afterwards.

 

A new EU candidate

With all the above arguments in place, an EU candidate country status was still a symbolic gesture, which did not require final decisions from EU member-states. The threat to the EU and the moral obligation were crucial in the EU’s decision to make Ukraine an EU candidate country, but this status was a sign of a moral support for Ukraine with no big real impact.

Currently, Ukraine is already on the accession track and EU-Ukraine relations are deepening every day. It seems that the EU did not stop with its first step and the candidate status received a bigger meaning. The future will show if and when Ukraine will become a new EU member. However, it is relevant to understand how the first big step towards Ukraine’s membership in the EU happened after Russia invaded Ukraine and the EU felt the need to amend its relations with both Russia and Ukraine.

The post The renewed chance for the EU’s enlargement by Ukraine appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Unity is strength. These were the words of the German Chancellor Scholz as he met with President Macron and Prime Minister Tusk in Berlin. Similarly, in his Sorbonne speech, President Macron appealed to more unity in face of constant geopolitical changes, calling for a strong bloc who is capable of leaving its footprint in the international setting. Unity has then become a hot debate topic in everyday politics, as leaders often proclaim that a united EU is able to better assert itself in the international arena.

 

This link between unity and external action is reflected in the approval of EU sanctions against Russia in February 2022, as these passed with an unprecedent speed. Thus, as the EU displayed a united front, it emanated strength and influence. On the flip side of the coin, the EU might struggle to display a united front in certain geopolitical issues, as EU Member States (MS) demonstrate divergent domestic interests. In the Middle East, for instance, the EU has been facing difficulties in conveying a united message. Consequently, if the EU is not able to speak in a single voice, its credibility may be undermined vis-à-vis third parties.

 

So, could a lack of European unity lead to an undermined role for Europe? Though the answer to this question would entail delving into the various complexities of EU policy, it is possible to take a positive outlook to external action. In fact, despite being internally divided, the EU nonetheless concludes international agreements. Take trade policy as an example. Within the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) MS displayed polarised views, but the EU still reached an internal position and effectively concluded the negotiations. Therefore, the key question should not be whether there is a correlation between internal cohesiveness and effectiveness, but instead, how EU unity can be forged. Indeed, in the article I presented at the UACES Conference in Amsterdam, I argued that there is no strict correlation between EU internal cohesiveness and external effectiveness, as a disunited EU is capable of achieving its goals by forging unity during the negotiation process.

 

The contribution of the UACES Conference

 

Attending the UACES Conference in June was utterly beneficial for the development of valuable skills and new connections, as I had the opportunity to get to know interesting colleagues who work in a similar field. As a result, I enriched my perspective of EU studies, gaining new insights into the role of feminist and LGBTQ+ theories on the understanding of complex phenomena. Moreover, the establishment of these links, allowed me to reflect on different forms of evolving my research. Here, I highlight the perspective of international law – an area I am very captivated by.

 

In addition, the conference was marked by its welcoming atmosphere where great feedback was provided – though I focus on trade policy in my research, I had the opportunity to reflect on the importance of analyzing the link between cohesiveness and effectiveness in security negotiations. In fact, obtaining results in this field would be of remarkable societal relevance, as it could lead to a thorough understating of current geopolitical issues (e.g. military support for Ukraine), therefore paving the way for the understanding of collectively beneficial outcomes.

 

I would therefore like to thank UACES for the opportunity to present my research in such a dynamic and thought-provoking event.

The post A Reflection on EU Internal Unity through the UACES Conference appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In recent years, Europe has witnessed a notable surge in the popularity and influence of populist radical right parties. This trend has been particularly evident in the 2024 elections for the European Parliament, where this party-family has secured significant victories, reflecting a broader shift in the political landscape across the continent.

One of the most prominent figures in this phenomenon is Giorgia Meloni, leader of Italy’s Fratelli d’Italia (FdI). Meloni is the first female Prime Minister of the country and managed, in only a decade, to take FdI from being a smaller political to the first party in Italy. In Meloni’s agenda emerge many of the populist radical right ideological traits, particularly the return to conservative social values, such as, the traditional family, women appointed to their roles of mothers, as well as stances against immigration and the LGBTQ+ community. The success of FdI is mirrored in other European countries, suggesting a growing resonance with populist radical right ideologies.

For instance, Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) represents the complex dynamics of the populist radical right on the EU level. Although the AfD did not perform particularly well in the 2021 federal elections, losing parts of the votes obtained in the previous 2017 elections, it has consistently achieved stronger results in the recent European Parliament elections. This apparent discrepancy highlights the different dynamics at play in national versus European elections, suggesting that the AfD’s message resonates more with voters when framed within the broader context of European governance and identity politics.

In France, the Rassemblement National (RN), led by Marine Le Pen, further underscores the persistence of the populist radical right in Europe. The RN has made significant inroads in French politics, despite challenges in securing Le Pen’s presidency in 2022 and the majority in the July 2024 legislative elections. The party has, nonetheless, been able to secure substantial representation over the years, highlighting its growing influence in the French political scene. This success reflects the RN’s dédiabolisation (de-demonisation) – the strategic rebranding to shed its extremist image and appeal to a broader – and possibly younger – electorate. This process, initiated by Marine Le Pen, involved softening the party’s rhetoric and distancing it from its more controversial and radical past.

Other parties in Europe have seen its share of influence, such as in the Netherlands with the Party for Freedom (PVV), led by Geert Wilders. Known for his outspoken stance against Islam and the European Union, Wilders has managed to maintain a significant following despite facing legal and political challenges. Similarly, under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Hungary has also become a stronghold of populist radical right politics, through the implementation of policies that emphasise national identity, and against the European Union, immigration and the LGBTQ+ community.

In this light, the success of these parties in various European countries points to a larger phenomenon that is unlikely to disappear anytime soon. The populist radical right’s ability to tap into the public’s fears and frustrations about immigration, cultural change, and globalisation has proven to be a powerful political strategy. This trend should not be overlooked and considered as just a passing phase, but it reflects deep-seated concerns among significant portions of the European electorate.

Moreover, the rise of the populist radical right has had profound implications for the European Union. These parties often challenge the very foundations of the EU, advocating for policies that prioritise national interests over collective European goals. This has led to increased tensions within the EU, as member states navigate the complex dynamics of sovereignty and integration.

The persistence of populist radical right parties in European politics indicates a fundamental shift in the political landscape. As long as issues like immigration, economic inequality, and cultural identity remain contentious, these parties will continue to find fertile ground for their messages. The challenge for Europe will be to address the underlying causes of this political shift while maintaining the principles of democracy and unity that have long defined the continent.

The post The Success of the Populist Radical Right – What does it mean for the European Union? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Let’s cut to the chase: What ARE the strongest arguments for the UK to rejoin the EU?

I asked Chat GPT 4.0 for the answer, which it gave in precisely 2 seconds.

Clearly, I’m now redundant. But the case to rejoin the EU certainly is not. If only we could rejoin the EU as fast as AI gave its reasons to do so.

Read the rational arguments configured by Artificial Intelligence.

• THE ANSWER BY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Rejoining the European Union (EU) is a complex and multifaceted issue, but there are several strong arguments that proponents put forward:

1. ECONOMIC BENEFITS

Trade and Market Access

• Single Market Access: Rejoining the EU would grant the UK seamless access to the Single Market, facilitating trade by eliminating tariffs, reducing non-tariff barriers, and simplifying regulations.
• Customs Union: Membership in the customs union would eliminate customs checks and tariffs on goods moving between the UK and EU, reducing costs and delays for businesses.

Investment and Growth

• Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): The UK could attract more FDI, as EU membership makes it a more attractive location for multinational companies seeking access to the European market.
• Economic Stability: Being part of a larger economic bloc can provide more stability and resilience against global economic fluctuations.

2. POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC INFLUENCE

International Influence

• Global Power: EU membership amplifies the UK’s voice on the global stage, allowing it to participate in shaping EU policies and decisions that have international implications.
• Collective Security: Collaboration on security, defense, and foreign policy within the EU can enhance the UK’s strategic capabilities and influence.

3. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ADVANTAGES

Freedom of Movement

• Work and Travel: Rejoining the EU would restore the right of UK citizens to live, work, and travel freely across EU member states, benefiting individuals and businesses alike.
• Cultural Exchange: Enhanced opportunities for cultural and educational exchanges can enrich the lives of UK citizens and foster greater understanding and cooperation.

Rights and Protections

• Worker and Consumer Rights: EU regulations often provide robust protections for workers and consumers, ensuring higher standards and benefits.

4. SCIENTIFIC AND EDUCATIONAL COLLABORATION

Research Funding and Collaboration

• EU Research Programs: Rejoining would provide access to EU research funding and collaborative projects, which are crucial for advancing scientific and technological innovation.
• Educational Opportunities: Participation in programs like Erasmus+ enhances educational opportunities and cross-border academic collaboration.

5. REGIONAL STABILITY AND COHESION

Northern Ireland Peace Process

• Good Friday Agreement: Rejoining the EU could help stabilize the situation in Northern Ireland by addressing issues related to the border with the Republic of Ireland, thus supporting the peace process.
• Regional Development: EU funding and policies aimed at regional development could benefit disadvantaged areas in the UK.

6. ENVIRONMENTAL AND REGULATORY STANDARDS

Climate Change and Environmental Policies

• Sustainability Goals: Collaborating with the EU on climate change initiatives can enhance the UK’s ability to meet its environmental targets and commitments.
• High Standards: EU environmental regulations ensure high standards for pollution control, biodiversity, and sustainable development.

7. PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL UNITY

Changing Sentiments

• Public Support: If public opinion shifts significantly in favor of rejoining, it would provide a democratic mandate to reconsider EU membership.
• National Unity: Rejoining the EU could help address divisions within the UK, particularly if Brexit has led to political and social fragmentation.

These arguments collectively present a strong case for the UK to consider rejoining the EU, emphasising economic prosperity, political influence, social benefits, scientific collaboration, regional stability, environmental sustainability, and the potential for enhanced national unity.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

• Watch this 9-minute video on why the UK joined the EU, and why we might join again for the same reasons

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The post Strongest arguments to rejoin the EU appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This blog post summarises the contribution I submitted for the UACES 2024 Graduate Forum held this June in Amsterdam. I want to thank UACES for having organised and provided funds for attending this event!

 

Human rights constitute the core values of the European Union, enforceable both internally and externally. Through the Amsterdam Treaty-consolidated acquis communautaire, they have become a cornerstone of the EU law. Yet, the EU’s journey towards human rights inclusion in the treaties has been lengthy. It has been largely shaped by significant case law, notably from the German Constitutional Court, which standardized human rights based on common constitutional traditions. Equally important is the role of the European Convention and Court on Human Rights as a source for EU human rights, despite the EU Court of Justice denying the possibility of an EU membership in the convention. Finally, the third source of human rights can be found in international human rights law, especially its constituent treaties. All relevant sources were subsequently enshrined in treaty provisions, thereby enriching the construction of EU legal instruments, and ultimately fostering an EU principled approach.

Recently, this principled approach has been further concretised in EU regulatory efforts, encompassing a growing array of policies, and spanning from environmental protection to supply chains.

 

Environmental Protection and Human Rights

The EU Green Deal (EGD) has been a central policy of the 2019-2024 Commission. At its core are the commitments to achieve a carbon-neutral EU by 2050, first outlined and subsequently consolidated in the 2021 Regulation amending the broader EU climate law. While the instrument itself does not explicitly mention human rights, many associated policies include provisions that address human rights considerations. This is particularly evident in due diligence-based instruments and other regulatory frameworks such as the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), which includes provisions addressing human rights considerations in international partnerships. Other instruments related to the EGD also include human rights provisions. The EU Battery Regulation mandates risk assessments and necessary actions linked to due diligence in cases where human rights abuses are at risk. The EU auditing regime has also been expanded to include assessments of sustainability and human rights impacts. Notably, the 2022 Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) extends human rights and sustainability requirements, previously established in non-financial reporting, to sustainability reporting, merging these concepts under a broader umbrella of sustainability.

These amendments underscore the EU’s commitment to a principled approach to human rights and its expanding influence in the business sector. Moreover, they demonstrate the inseparable nature of human rights and sustainability. Legislative developments, including recent case law from the European Court of Human Rights, support the integration of environmental rights within the realm of human rights. However, the intersection of environmental and human rights represents just one aspect of the broader EU human rights efforts. The imminent introduction of the due diligence directive presents an additional dimension to this unfolding debate.

 

Human Rights Through Supply Chains

The development of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CS3D) was some years ago but has only recently concluded. Developing a human rights due diligence policy for supply chains was not just an independent EU initiative; it followed existing instruments in several member states. Notably, three EU member states had already developed instruments covering supply chains. The French Loi de Vigilance (Law of Vigilance – 2017) and the German LkSG (Supply Chain Act – 2021) are broad-spectrum due diligence instruments, while the Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence Law (2019) is subject-specific. The CS3D aims to complement these national actions by establishing a unified EU framework for environmental and human rights due diligence applicable to large companies. The CS3D mandates the application of EU human rights standards through due diligence within the EU. It also extends these requirements to supply chains and large companies from third countries operating within the EU internal market. It also provides mechanisms for member states to enforce penalties in cases of non-compliance. The overarching goal is to hold businesses accountable for upholding human rights, prevent gross violations within and outside of the EU borders, and establish penalty regimes for violations.

The CS3D stands out as a pivotal instrument demonstrating the EU’s principled approach, not only for its intrinsic value but also for its establishment of a unified EU-wide system to enforce human rights standards in the business sector. This framework complements existing international frameworks established by the UN, OECD, and the ILO. The CS3D represents the next phase of EU human rights policy and aligns with a global trend toward holding large corporations accountable. This aspect reinforces the EU’s role as a prominent global advocate for human rights, showcasing its commitment to external enforcement beyond traditional conditionality measures. This instrument encapsulates the evolution of the EU’s principled approach, building on past efforts and paving the way for future developments in human rights protection.

The post Advancing a Principled Approach: Human Rights and Environmental Integration in the EU Business Sector appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The newly elected European Parliament will hold its constitutive session from 16 to 19 July in Strasbourg.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum Conference 2024 and is anticipated to be published in a journal article currently undergoing evaluation.

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has reignited interest in EU enlargement, presenting new opportunities for (pre-)accession candidates. While much attention is often given to the Council and the European Commission, the European Parliament’s role is frequently overlooked. Moreover, scholars mainly focused on the Parliament (EP’s) broader role in the domain of foreign policy, specifically its tools to potentially exert influence and the extent to which it does within CFSP/CSDP. In contrast, despite its clearly distinctive position within the institutional power balance of the Union, the capabilities of Parliament when it comes to enlargement policy are yet to be appropriately addressed in the literature.

This blog post explores how the EP can leverage both formal and informal sources of power to potentially influence EU enlargement policy, thereby identifying five key tools that stand out as most prominent in the literature: agenda-setting, the consent procedure, standing parliamentary delegations, budgetary authority, and parliamentary oversight. The findings reveal a notable disparity between the European Parliament’s formal powers and informal powers, thereby confirming its ‘self-empowerment’ strategy and simultaneously underscoring the consent procedure and the budget as the most powerful tools available for the Parliament.

By combining a document analysis (Treaties, Inter-Institutional Agreements and the EP’s Rules of Procedure) and an extensive literature review (using the iterative snowballing technique), the study provides a comprehensive understanding of the EP’s capabilities to potentially influence enlargement policy.

 

Unpacking the EP’s (Hidden) Powers

The findings highlight a significant disparity between the Parliament’s formal and informal capacities regarding enlargement. While the former are often sparse in this area (except its consent and budgetary powers), the Commission and the Council anticipate the EP’s position when making choices. Besides these politics of anticipation, the Parliament empowers itself through a maximalist interpretation of the Treaties and its engagement in IIAs and its own RoP. Among the five avenues of power, the consent procedure and the power of the purse stand out as the most prominent.

 

1.  Agenda-Setting

Although the EP’s formal role in setting the EU’s enlargement agenda is limited, it can informally shape the agenda through the adoption of reports and resolutions, debates about EU enlargement and speeches by its President, thereby raising the salience of an issue and foster public and/or elite support for EU enlargement.

 

2.  The Consent Procedure

The most clearcut avenue through which the Parliament can weigh on enlargement policy is the consent procedure. Art. 49 TEU grants the EP such veto power in the case of accession through the right to accept or block any application, since Council must consult the Commission and gain EP consent before taking action. In this way Parliament “de facto decides on enlargements”. However, when it comes to enlargement the power given to the EP through the consent procedure is a blunt tool as offers no room to bargain, let alone amend the final text.

Nevertheless, the EP’s threat of veto as well as increased awareness that the views of Parliament are directly legitimized by EU citizens has allowed it to also influence the specific contents of the agreements. By adopting resolutions that set so-called ‘conditions’ for consent and (threatening to) delay the approval of Association or Accession Agreements, the EP pressures the Commission and Council to consider its positions. This has allowed the EP to push for greater attention to political issues such as democracy and human rights in the candidate countries. A unified parliament (i.e., acting with a majority among the main political groups) is, however, essential for making this avenue of power an effective one.

 

3.  Standing Parliamentary Delegations

Parliament can also weigh on enlargement policy with its nine formal standing parliamentary delegations to the (potential) EU candidate countries, through which it can partake in ‘inter- parliamentary diplomacy.’ As such, the standing delegations tend to take on two main functions. Firstly, due to its (mostly) continuous nature, they could also act as ‘preparatory agents’ that offer foundational work for the eventual decisions by the executive as they have more space to maneuver as opposed to traditional diplomacy. Secondly, delegations also allow for potentially influencing the views of parliamentarians from candidate countries as ambassadors of the EU’s constitutional values, able to emphasize matters such as human rights and democracy. However, two caveats need to be made. First, their effectiveness relies on internal coherence between committees and delegations, which often have overlapping competences. And secondly, the unregulated appointment of delegation members can lead to biased representations, potentially undermining fair debate and transforming them into dialogues among the deaf.

 

4.  Budgetary Authority

The EP’s involvement in the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and the Annual Budget allows it to link funding to specific conditions related to enlargement. Concerning the MFF, the Treaties require

the EP to give consent by absolute majority before the Council can adopt the MFF. Additionally, sectoral regulations, which provide the basis for the funding of almost 40 EU spending programs over a seven- year period, are agreed upon under OLP, putting the EP on equal footing with the Council. This effectively makes the EP a co-legislator on the main external financing instruments regarding enlargement (i.e. IPA and NDICI) as the ceilings and overall amounts of these instruments are decided by the MFF, but not exactly how they are organized, i.e., their general and specific objectives and the size, form and rules of the funding.

Turning to the Annual Budget then, it is within the seven-year ceilings of the MFF that the Parliament’s power is most prominent, as it needs to agree with the Council following a special legislative procedure. The Annual Budget is often identified as a very important power-maximization tool that offers indirect leverage in the area of foreign policy and enlargement and allows for Parliament to steer the political direction of these policy domains. The EP often acts to defend the policies that the Council has under- funded, intervening to amend the sums that are being assigned to specific programs and projects. At the same time, shared concerns are also often promoted by acting together with the Council, as is the case with, for instance, pre-accession assistance. However, this power remains at all times constrained by the limited room for maneuver left by the MFF. Several authors therefore emphasize that one of the best strategy for the EP to still maximize its (potential for) influence, is aiming at a limited number of priorities in successive annual budgets (see f.e. 1999-2004 stabilisation programs in the Western Balkans). However, this strategy is once again dependent on internal cohesion, as conflict seems almost inevitable on a sensitive subject such as the budget, which basically covers all policy areas.

 

5.  Parliamentary Oversight

The European Parliament oversees the executive, primarily the Commission, and other EU institutions through several key functions. It consents to the appointment of the Commissioner for Enlargement, allowing it to influence portfolio allocation and even compel the withdrawal of a designated candidate. The EP also requires the Commissioner to participate in debates and respond to questions. Additionally, the EP must be fully informed at all stages of association and accession agreements, although the implementation of this requirement looks often different with the provisions unevenly implemented. Firstly, the provision of information relies on the quality of the relationship between the respective Commissioner or DG NEAR, and the AFET Committee (or its secretariat). Moreover, it seems that there exists currently no harmonized approach by the Commission’s services to provide information (concerning negotiations of international agreements) to Parliament in a coordinated manner. Finally, that the flow of information remains piecemeal and incomplete which in turn could have negative consequences for the Parliament’s consent and therefore increase the risk of tenuous relations between both institutions. Finally, apart from its role in establishing the budget, the European Parliament can also play a crucial role in assessing its implementation through the discharge procedure which is as much a power as a procedure.

 

Conclusion

The study identifies a significant disparity between the European Parliament’s formal and informal powers in the context of enlargement. While the former are often sparse in this area (except its consent and budgetary powers), the Commission and the Council anticipate the EP’s position when making choices. Besides these politics of anticipation, the Parliament empowers itself through a maximalist interpretation of the Treaties its engagement in IIAs and its own RoP. Among the five avenues of power, the consent procedure and the power of the purse stand out as the most prominent.

However, three caveats need to be made. Internal divisions and conflicting interests within the hemicycle can undermine its bargaining power, particularly during consent and budget procedures. Additionally, overlapping responsibilities among different committees and standing parliamentary delegations, along with voluntary delegation appointments, can hinder its strength. Streamlining roles and ensuring committed participation are necessary to enhance Parliament’s impact on enlargement policies. And finally, timely and complete access to information from the Commission and the Council is often challenging, hindering the EP’s ability to conduct thorough scrutiny and make informed decisions. Enhanced transparency and information-sharing are therefore vital for effective parliamentary oversight of enlargement policies.

The post The (hidden) powers of the European Parliament in EU enlargement policies appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Newsletter - 16-19 July 2024 - Strasbourg plenary session

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Spokespersons for Parliament and for the political groups will hold a briefing on Parliament’s 16-19 July constitutive session, this Friday 12th July at 11.00.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP