COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION

Brussels, 7 July 2006

11316/06

LIMITE

COSDP 569
PESC 660
COAFR 143
CIVCOM 304
ACP 107

NOTE

from:	General Secretariat of the Council and European Commission services
to:	Delegations
Subject:	European Union concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts

Delegations will find attached a proposed European Union concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.

This document has been prepared jointly by the General Secretariat and the Commission services.

Presidency's intention is to hold initial discussions before summer recess. PSC would be invited to task concerned working groups to consider the proposals contained in the concept, in particular with a view to making recommendations relating to their implementation.

PSC would then revert to the proposed concept on the basis of recommendations made by the working groups.

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EUROPEAN UNION CONCEPT[1] FOR STRENGTHENING AFRICAN CAPABILITIES FOR THE PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS

I.   INTRODUCTION

1.   The EU Strategy for Africa[2] agreed by the European Council in December 2005 is the foundation for closer cooperation between the EU and Africa. The cooperation is based on a strategic partnership between the EU and the regional organisations on the continent, and in particular the African Union (AU), covering the whole range of policy issues, including governance, migration, peace and security, agriculture, research, health, education and others. The cooperation is implemented through concrete joint projects in various fields and substantial financial support in the context of a well- established institutional framework[3].

2.   Key to the strengthening of the relationship is the provision of support to the capacity building of the AU Commission and the sub-regional organizations to enable them to implement their ambitious agenda. One of the main component of the support, which also needs to be addressed simultaneously with other aspects, is the development of sustainable capabilities[4] for conflict prevention, management and resolution (CPMR). Cooperation in this field is governed by three principles:

   –   a partnership involving mutually agreed objectives based on international law and human rights;

   –   equality and mutual accountability;

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[1]   This concept contains a number of suggestions which may have a significant financial impact. No decision or orientation can be taken on any of these suggestions until a financial statement has been examined by the appropriate Council body.
[2]   Doc. 15702/1/05 "The EU and Africa towards a Strategic Partnership" agreed by the European Council on 16 December 2005.
[3]   EU/Africa dialogue, including regular EU/Africa ministerial troika meetings as well as Commission-to-Commission meetings both on a College-to-College and on a technical level.
[4]   For easier reference, African capabilities will be used instead of "African CPMR capabilities".

–   and African ownership and responsibility, which implies working through African institutions[5] on the basis of needs identified by the African Union (AU) and sub-regional organisations (SROs[6]).

3.   The Strategy sets out the steps the EU will take between 2006 and 2015 to support African efforts to build a prosperous and democratic future. It recognises the encouraging progress made in developing African capabilities, and the need for African leadership to end conflicts and promote better security conditions throughout the continent. Under this Strategy, the EU and Member States acting bilaterally and with other partners will:

–   work with the AU, SROs and African countries to predict, prevent and mediate conflict, address its root causes and keep the peace;

–   help develop the African Standby Force (ASF) by providing training, building on existing activities by Member States, and advisory, technical, planning, financial and logistical support;

–   and continue implementing the ESDP Action Plan in support of peace and security in Africa.

The European Development Policy and the European Consensus on Development[7] identify conflict prevention as a priority for Community development cooperation. Both acknowledge the direct link between security and development: without peace and security, development and poverty eradication are not possible; and without development and poverty eradication no sustainable peace will occur. Achieving the Millennium Development Goals is in the interest of collective and individual long-term peace and security.

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[5]   This is in line with the CP on CPMR in Africa, the Cotonou Agreement, MEDA etc.
[6]   The notion of SRO is used because some of the existing 7 Regional Economic Communities have no or limited role in the APSA. Regional arrangements remain to be established for the Eastern and Northern brigades.
[7]   Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Development Policy: "the European Consensus on Development" of 20 December 2005 (OJ C 46, 24.2.2006, p. 1).

II. PURPOSE AND APPROACH OF THE CONCEPT

4. The EU must deliver on its commitments and decisions in the EU Strategy for Africa. This concept suggests an overall framework for doing so, combining EU and EC policies and instruments with those of Member States. It is designed to:

    – achieve a concerted EU response to African needs and requests for assistance in developing self-sustainable African capabilities;

    – be sufficiently flexible to take account of the Africa Standby Force workshop process and the long-term needs assessment being conducted under the capacity-building component of the Africa Peace Facility (APF);

    – outline a suggested EU policy position as a basis for further dialogue with the AU and relevant sub-regional organisations to assess AU and SROs' priorities for EU support and the extent to which these priorities can be matched with EU and Member States' instruments and resources;

    – and constitute a contribution to preparing the UN 10-year plan for strengthening African capabilities in cooperation with the African Union.

III. SCOPE

5. The concept builds on the existing ESDP Action Plan and expands it to reflect:

    – the emerging African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) defined by the AU in 2002,

    – African efforts to create the African Standby Force by 2010,

    – relevant Community instruments and policies, as well as African capabilities-related activities supported in the framework of the EDF National Indicative and Regional Indicative Programmes (NIPs and RIPs),

–   support available through the African Peace Facility,

–   support provided on bilateral basis by Member States

–   and the UN intention to play an increased role in enhancing African peacekeeping capacities.

6.   The concept is based on military and civilian elements, including police.

7.   The concept covers supporting activities at continental, sub-regional and country levels (in particular where there is a regional dimension). The concept also provides for better coordination of EU Member States' activities in support of individual African countries.

IV.   COORDINATION

8.   EU engagement should build on existing frameworks and instruments, and be taken forward by existing EU bodies. Community measures, Member States' bilateral actions and EU action under the CFSP must be more consistent.

9.   Better coordination between the Commission, the Council General Secretariat and Member States will enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of support to African capability development. This coordination should be stepped up from the planning stage onwards in a transparent way. Such a unified EU posture would enable a consolidated response to African needs. This is also important given the necessity to coordinate with important non-EU actors supporting Africa. A consolidated EU position would contribute to enhancing the coordination efforts of the Africa Clearing House.

10. All actions will be closely coordinated with other international initiatives and international organisations. The EU will work in accordance with the United Nations Charter and closely coordinate with parallel efforts of relevant UN bodies and agencies (Peace building Commission, DPKO…). This will help ensure that AU peacekeeping capacities can be coordinated and meshed with UN capacities. EU support will be long-term and closely aligned with the pace of the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture.[8]

V.   OBJECTIVES

11. This section sets out seven broad objectives for the EU in its dialogue with the AU and SROs, and indicates means available for realising them. Section VI of this document sets out concrete measures which could be taken by the EU to help achieve these objectives.

A.   Objective 1: Improve the effectiveness of African decision-making bodies

12. The AU is becoming the primary interlocutor of the international community for conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa. It has established a Peace and Security Council, and three of the SROs have developed peace and security structures. However, African capabilities to support their structures are inadequate. Strengthening the AU Peace and Security Council requires commensurate development of the rest of the AU Commission's institutional capacity. More broadly, peace and security structures need to be embedded in a broader and effective political and organisational environment.

13. The SROs are also gradually developing their own capacities and, although problems of coordination and coherence remain, initial efforts have been undertaken to strengthen the linkages with the AU, contributing to enhanced effectiveness under AU overall authority.

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[8]   According to current planning, operationalisation of the African Stand-by Force will take until 2010.

14. The EU should therefore:

  – develop a balanced approach to contributing to African capacity building through a unified EU response;

  – be willing to continue to finance the AU's structures;

  – and encourage and support harmonisation efforts, in particular to reduce overlapping responsibilities of SROs in the field of peace and security.

B. Objective 2: Improve the effectiveness of AU and SROs mediation capabilities

15. Improving the effectiveness of AU and SROs mediation capabilities is desirable because they are best placed to have an early impact in containing crises. The AU and the SROs indeed play an increasingly important role in conflict mediation. They appoint special envoys, open liaison offices, monitor elections and sponsor peace talks.

16. The establishment and functioning of the future AU Panel of the Wise should also be supported.

17. AU conflict prevention, mediation and facilitation efforts have already been extensively funded by the EDF programme in support of AU peace-building activities (2003) and, in cases of urgency, by the EC Rapid Reaction Mechanism. The future Stability Instrument could also contribute towards the same objective. Furthermore, Member States' efforts contribute separately to the funding of mediation capabilities notably through the AU peace fund.

C. Objective 3: Support the establishment of an effective Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)

18. The AU intends to establish a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). This system would enhance the AU's ability to anticipate and take informed decisions. The EU has already contributed to the design of the overall system. Some related EU assistance has already been granted to IGAD and ECOWAS. The Situation Centres of the EU and the UNDPKO have in close cooperation participated in the implementation of the related roadmap, mainly through direct assistance and practical advice to the AU Situation Room. The EU Situation Centre intends to continue offering advice on strengthening of the AU Situation room. It will notably assess the scope for helping the AU Situation room in its efforts to enhance its Open Source information systems. Further assistance can be made available through the provision of specialised software, expertise and funding.

D. **Objective 4: Adapt support for developing Peace Support Operations (PSOs) capabilities**

19. With AMIS in Darfur, the AU has demonstrated its determination to show leadership to end conflicts and promote better security conditions by conducting PSOs. The AU is fully aware that planning and conducting a given PSO requires infrastructures, qualified staff and related resources, including secure funding.

20. Both the AU and the SROs intend to further develop their capabilities for PSOs. Over time, Africans should be in a position to plan and conduct their PSOs autonomously. This requires structures, in particular Joint Operations Centres, related procedures and the hiring and training of qualified African personnel. Beyond a funding contribution, technical advice on identifying resources and expertise could also be made available by the EU, if requested.

21. Developing and maintaining such capabilities will require a long term effort. This could build in particular on experience available from Member States. The requirement for training support to the AU level and the different SROs at a satisfactory pace and scale will require mobilisation of substantial efforts from Member States.

22. <u>On training</u>, existing support programmes alone cannot meet the requirement. RECAMP programmes for instance have started to adjust to the emerging African Peace and Security architecture by associating the AU and active participation of sub-regions. However, such programmes will need to respond to African training and exercise policy under development in the ASF. The aim should be to build on this experience and to expand this kind of programme to cover the requirements deriving from the establishment of the African architecture.

23. <u>For the technical assistance</u>, the EU and Member States have already provided substantial support in the context of the nascent military capabilities established for the first AU PSOs. This assistance involved African staff working in the AU's Peace Support Operation Department. Planning expertise and technical assistance have been made available as part of the Darfur Integrated Task Force. Member States and the EU have thus gained experience in providing military expertise to assist the planning and conduct of African PSOs, particularly command and control, logistics, legal aspects and training. In parallel, Member States have contributed substantially to African PSOs by providing essential capabilities, including equipment and air lift. In the framework of the EU support for AMIS, the EU has also provided assistance to the establishment of a police unit within the AU Commission. More broadly, there is a vast area for cooperation since integration of civilian aspects in the development of the APSA has been recognized by the AU and the SROs. This could be financed under the APF capacity building component whilst some support could be financed under the CFSP budget line.

24. <u>Funding of African personnel, facilities and equipment</u> deployed in the AU and SROs structures can be covered by the APF capacity-building component and the RIPs. The EU has already made an important contribution to the costs of PSOs (*per diems* for African personnel, salaries of civilians, rations, fuel, personnel transport, medical supplies, insurance). However, training African military planners at AU, SROs and at country level is more complex, requiring longer term, comprehensive solutions. The APF may not be in a position to finance the entire spectrum of military training of Africans. Similarly, the financing of European planning expertise for the AU and the SROs currently has to rely on ad hoc arrangements. For instance, in the case of AMIS, recourse was made to ATHENA to finance a limited list of common costs. This raises the question of suitable funding.

E.   Objective 5: Support the establishment of an effective African Standby Force

25.   Establishment of the ASF is broadly on track and will eventually lead to a pan-African capability to respond autonomously to crises through the availability of five African stand-by brigades and civilian components. The EU is making a contribution to the conceptual phase of the ASF through APF funding of two of five workshops: Doctrine and Standing Operating Procedures. This support includes civilian and military expertise from the General Secretariat of the Council. The EUMS in particular has become increasingly involved in supporting the military aspects of those workshops. DG E IX has contributed to the development of civilian concepts for police, rule of law and civilian administration during and after the workshops. The EU has also held co-ordination meetings with international partners. Support will continue during as the work produced by all Workshops is harmonised.

26.   In addition to the financial support provided under the Capacity Building envelope of the African Peace Facility, some Member States contribute to this preparatory phase for training and logistics. Funding of two additional technical workshops for legal and financial issues and provision of related expertise from the General Secretariat of the Council has also been sought by the AU.

27.   However, the real challenge for Africans and their partners is to implement their commitments by 2010. Harmonization and validation of regional and sub regional decision making and planning processes, setting up and training of stand-by brigades and police elements, provision of rapidly deployable capacities are assessed as demanding long-term objectives in the framework of the ASF. Current instruments and policies may not be sufficiently suited to meeting the EU's objectives and expectations from African partners. Preparation for supporting and financing facilities, infrastructure, including equipment and training of African troops need to be part of a long-term commitment from the EU and its Member States, in conjunction with international partners.

28.   Existing instruments and resources from the APF and the RIPs will not be sufficient, either in quantity or in scope (military components). An EU coordination capacity for planning and implementing such support measures needs to be established.

F. **Objective 6: Support the development of effective African policies for post-conflict reconstruction and development**

29. The AU and SROs are committed to strengthening their role and capabilities in post-conflict situations to avoid resumption of conflicts. The EU could assist African organisations with developing their own policy, in particular by offering the EU's long-standing experience in reconstruction and development. Besides, the EU could provide support to the AU, the SROs and AU Member States in the Peace Building Commission.

30. In the field of Security Sector Reform (SSR), strategies building on existing EU efforts should include assistance in the strengthening of African capabilities in this area. The experience drawn from ESDP missions in the DRC should be made available to the AU, SROs and to other interested African partners. SSR activities are essential for strengthening African capabilities at country level. The European Community Support for SSR and ESDP support will also provide solid bases for taking these matters further.

31. Teams of experts for supporting the planning of Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) and SSR activities should be made available to the AU and SROs. The EU should then be ready to respond positively to African requests for assistance in mounting SSR missions.

G. **Objective 7: Promote an effective dialogue and interaction with the AU and SROs**

32. Efficient support for African capabilities requires regular dialogue between the EU, the AU and the SROs. Ministerial troika and senior officials meetings take place within the framework of the EU/Africa dialogue. Such meetings deliver only overall guidance and give political blessing to progress achieved.

33. In Addis Ababa, the local Presidency and the Commission Delegation have played an active role working with the AU on a broad EU-Africa agenda including peace and security matters. The Commission interacts with counterparts in the AU Commission in the field of African capability support primarily in the context of the APF, while Member States missions remain focused on national actions. The Commission Delegation also chairs the locally established AU Partners Group which aims at ensuring a co-ordinated interaction of the international donor community with the AU in Addis.

34. Since 2004, ESDP activities in Addis Ababa have been focussed on supporting the planning and conduct of AMIS by the African Union. In preparing its support to AMIS, the EU initially designated an EU Military Liaison officer, who is housed in the Commission Delegation and reports to the SG/HR. The reinforcement of EU engagement in Sudan last year has prompted that the role of the EU Military element in Addis was reoriented to capacity building. This reinforcement has offered, in parallel, the opportunity to extend EU's role to capacity building in the AU through the establishment of an EU police presence in Addis Ababa.

35. Nevertheless, beyond EU engagement to support AMIS, the African decision to establish the APSA requires a new level of EU support. Therefore, a more sustained and specialised dialogue is necessary to enable efficient implementation of the related supportive measures. CFSP and ESDP expertise need to be upgraded to allow such full cooperation on the broad range of African capabilities.

VI. ENHANCING THE EU RESPONSE

36. This section describes the measures and policies that have been identified to meet the above objectives. Overall, the EU will need to mobilise the necessary resources for such an enhanced EU response.

(a)   Measures for strengthened coherence, consistency and coordination at EU level

Ensuring coherence of support

37. Contributions from Member States for developing African capabilities should take fully into account EU objectives and policies and be planned and implemented so they reinforce the EU's overall response. This calls for coordination.

38. Coordination could be steered by the Political and Security Committee, on the basis of input and options from the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission to facilitate identification of projects the EU could undertake. It would aim to harmonise Member States' policies and activities in support of African capabilities.

39. The reinforcement of the mandated continental and regional peace and security structures is directly dependent on the availability of a sufficient number of competent African staff to fill key posts in the AU and SRO. EU Member States implementing bilateral cooperation programs with African states in the area of peace and security should encourage the recipient states to also make parts of their new resources available to the AU or SRO in order to fulfil the objectives outlined in the APSA.

40. *In order to ensure coherence and optimise the efficiency of supportive actions, including training, the General Secretariat and the Commission should whenever feasible table joint initiatives for concrete policies and supportive actions. This would not prevent the General Secretariat or the Commission to come forward with proposals falling within their respective roles.*

Developing the EU support and coordination structure

41. In order to plan, prepare, coordinate and implement various aspects of the EU response to African capacity needs, including political dialogue on African capabilities, the General Secretariat is putting in place a small support and coordination structure. This structure would be able to draw on all relevant resources in the Council Secretariat. In full respect of respective roles and whenever feasible, the Commission' services and the GCS structure would facilitate the following tasks:

   − coordinate capability building activities carried out by the EU and facilitate coordination and steer planning for voluntary support activities by Member States,

–   assist in developing initiatives and identify concrete actions to be implemented by Joint Action and guide priority setting,

–   participate in relevant activities conducted by the broader international community and coordinate with other relevant actors,

–   facilitate an active participation in the training programme planned and implemented by volunteering Member States in association with the EU,

–   manage an EU website on coordination of assistance and policies and manage a database on African senior or middle rank officials educated or trained by EU Member States,

–   and provide specific EU expertise and documentation to the AU and SROs upon request, as has already been agreed in accordance with EU security regulations.

42.   A structured exchange of information on the manifold activities of the EU and its Member States has yet to be achieved on support for African capabilities. Transparency and completeness of information are essential for identifying priorities and meeting the various requirements for assistance. This could be achieved by convening experts from Member States, the Council Secretariat and the Commission in an informal coordination body convened at the initiative of the CGS or the Commission depending on the agenda. It would be entrusted with monitoring Member States' contributions, helping coordination and receiving information on other actions taken in implementing relevant Council decisions.

43.   *To be able to plan, prepare, coordinate and implement the integral EU response to African capacity needs, the General Secretariat is putting in place a small support and coordination structure to reinforce coordination with the Commission and Member States. A coordination body should be set up to facilitate exchange of information and enhance overall coherence.*

Ensuring consistency of financial support

44. The APF cannot finance the full range of activities for strengthening African capabilities in the field of peace and security. Operations having military or defence implications cannot be covered by the CFSP budget line. These limitations were identified in 2004 in the "Guidelines for implementing ESDP support to Peace and Security in Africa". These guidelines were based on *ad hoc* decisions, bearing in mind the nature of the envisaged action. This approach is no longer compatible with EU long term policy planning for providing comprehensive support to African capabilities.

45. Financial resources from Member States need to be mobilised for African capabilities not eligible for APF, RIPs or CFSP funding, such as military training, EU military technical assistance and specific individual or collective equipment for the ASF.

46. *The Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council will, as a first step, identify more precisely situations and issues where the APF, the RIPs or the CFSP cannot intervene to fund legitimate requests from the AU and/or the SROs. The Council will then have to decide how Member States' financial contributions could be managed through a suitable mechanism.*

(b) **Measures for establishing a strong partnership with the African Union and the SROs**

Intensify dialogue and cooperation between the AU, SROs and the EU

47. Political dialogue on peace and security issues should become a key instrument for enhancing African capability support. It should be made more operational in existing EU-Africa mechanisms and structures, at continental and sub-regional levels. Contacts at high level and staff level should also contribute to this intensified dialogue.

48. Although already a possibility, there is no formal contact between the EU Political and Security Committee and the AU Peace and Security Council. Provided a clear interest exists on both sides and taking into account resource constraints, troika meetings convened on the basis of substantive agendas could contribute to the provision of strategic guidance for the continuation or reorientation of policies and ongoing supportive projects. This requires staff capabilities on both sides for preparing such meetings and ensuring efficient follow-up.

Locally, meetings of HoMs in the troika format would contribute to the exercise, provided that efficient EU internal coordination in Addis Ababa on issues relating to African capabilities can be organised.

49.   Extension of the existing political dialogue in the troika format with ECOWAS and SADC to other SROs should be considered to redress the current imbalance.

50.   *The General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission should together consult counterparts in the AU and SROs to explore options for intensified dialogue.*

Strengthen the capacity of the EU to interact with the AU in Addis Ababa and with SROs

51.   EU support for peace and security in Africa is rapidly evolving. The strategic partnership with the EU is developing and becoming central in EU/AU relations. The challenge for the EU is to present itself to the AU in a comprehensive and coherent way, combining CFSP/ESDP, capacity building in the peace and security field and broader assistance in the area of governance, development, migration and trade.

52.   There is a strong presence of Member States[9] and the European Commission in Addis Ababa. In addition, the EU has appointed a Special Representative for Sudan who has some staff in Addis Ababa, among which an EU police presence to support police capability building. An EU military liaison element to the AU is located in the Commission delegation.

53.   However, despite this considerable EU presence in Addis Ababa, there is no unified and effective representation of the EU to the African Union across the whole range of matters of mutual interest. This weakens the EU's ability to develop locally a true partnership with the AU. To strengthen the capacity of the EU to interact with the AU in Addis Ababa and SROs and to enhance the coherence of EU response, a more efficient and effective EU presence in Addis Ababa and at the headquarters of the SROs is needed.

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[9]   A majority of EU Member States are present in Addis Ababa and accredited to the African Union.

54. *The Commission and the CGS are ready to examine practical ways to enhance coherence and effectiveness of the EU presence in Addis.*

<u>Adapted and timely response to the AU's and SROs' requests for expertise</u>

55. At the request of the AU or SROs, the EU can provide civilian and military expertise, in particular for helping in the preparation and implementation of capacity-building programmes, and in planning and conducting a given PSO or post-conflict activities. The traditional *ad hoc* approach has shown its limitations.

56. Following consultations with African partners, the General Secretariat of the Council should analyse its needs in order to be prepared to give a swift response to expertise requirements from the AU and will put forward suggestions in this regard. In view of the new requirements deriving from the establishment of the African Standby Force, the CGS should be tasked to update the list of European experts, identified, prepared and trained for support to African capability building.

(c) **Policies for strengthening African capabilities**

<u>Support for the training of Africans</u>

57. Training is essential for reaching and maintaining a high standard of professional peace support capabilities. The African Union has undertaken to define its requirements in this area. Based on the AU's policies on training, the EU should develop its own policy regarding the support that can be mobilised from the Commission, Member States, the General Secretariat and other agencies such as the ESDC, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the European Police College (CEPOL).

58. This EU policy should foster common objectives based on African requirements, coordination in implementing Member States' programmes, and the gradual build-up of African training capabilities. Possibilities of synergy and pooling of Member States' and EU resources should be identified and carried out on the basis of voluntary proposals.

59.   Strengthening the network of African peacekeeping training centres[10] is part of the build-up of African training capabilities. This support, which takes place through voluntary contributions by Member States and the EU, should be examined as a matter of priority.

60.   This approach should be considered as providing the thrust of an EU policy on training support. This policy should enable a joint and concerted approach by the Council, Member States and the European Community. This would also help, in particular, to structure the provision of European support, including instructors for the various training courses taking place for instance in the national African schools with a regional dimension[11]. This policy could cover the provision of financial resources and technical assistance, including for a substantive civilian component.

61.   *Based on the AU's policies on training, the EU should help structure the support that can be mobilised from the Commission, Member States, the CGS and other agencies and provide a direct support to the strengthening of African peace keeping training centres.*

Opening of Member States' depots

62.   The ability of the AU or SROs to conduct PSOs depends on the timely availability of the necessary equipment including ammunition. This requirement is reflected in the draft policies for the establishment of the ASF.

63.   Existing depot facilities operated in Dakar, Libreville and Djibouti are accessible to countries willing to contribute to the stockpiling of material and equipment for the AU and SROs. This possibility should be exploited and an EU policy should be drawn up to facilitate Member States' engagement as already foreseen in the guidelines prepared by Group of External Relations Counsellors in the context of the ESDP Action Plan.

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[10]   APSTA: African Peace Support Trainers Association brings together the African peace training centers.

[11]   ENVR: Ecoles Nationales à Vocation Régionale.

64. However, this should take into account the outcome of the ASF workshops on Doctrine and Logistics and, possibly, the intentions of other partners. Duplication of effort and resources must in any case be avoided. Depending on African decisions, those depots could over time be part of the logistic base for the African Standby Force.

65. *An EU policy should be drawn on the use of existing depot facilities, taking into account the outcome of the ASF workshops on Doctrine and Logistics and, possibly, the intentions of other partners.*

Turning RECAMP and other Member States' programmes into means of delivering of EU policies

66. RECAMP and other Member States' programmes, if so offered, could become EU operators or means of delivering EU policies. In this case related activities would be placed under the political control and strategic direction of the EU. This could entail notably decisions relating to the selection of the targeted sub-regions and participation of third States. In this new framework, RECAMP and other Member States' programmes should evolve to meet the requirements stemming from the establishment of the ASF and to respond to African training and exercise policy as well as contribute to meet operational planning requirements for African-led operations.

67. The EU-AU partnership for the future RECAMP training cycles as well as other similar activities initiated by Member States could be turned into an EU arrangement.

68. The expenditures related to the participation of Africans to the civilian aspects of RECAMP might be eligible for funding through the APF if so requested by the AU or concerned SROs. Furthermore, solutions should be found for the financing of other aspects not eligible for APF funding, such as specifically military aspects of the African participation to the field exercise. The integration of RECAMP type exercises into the EU exercise policy will also need to be examined.

69. *The CGS should be tasked to propose modalities, based on the principle of framework nations and in close association with the African Union, for allowing RECAMP and, if so offered, other activities of Member States to become operators of EU policies.*

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**The pan-African level: the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)
and the current state of the African Peace and Security Agenda**

The Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000), the primary legal foundation of the African peace and security architecture provides for:

- the establishment of a common defence policy for the African continent;

- the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances;

- the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union to restore peace and security.

In the last few years, the APSA has grown exponentially. The milestone political documents are:

- the Protocol on the AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) (2002), which entered into force in 2004. The Protocol acknowledges that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security is bestowed upon the UN Security Council[12] and sets down the following elements of the APSA:
  - Panel of the Wise
  - Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)
  - African Stand-by-Force (ASF)
  - a Peace Fund
  - Sub-regional peace and security initiatives.

- the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (2004);

- AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact (2005).

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[12] The AU PSC Protocol and the Policy Framework refer to the African Union as a Chapter VIII Regional Organisation.

1.1. The African Stand-by-Force (ASF)

The ASF, when fully constituted, should be able to deploy civilian and military components in complex scenarios, such as open conflict and grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. The AU's political ambition is that the ASF be fully operational by July 2010. At the operational level, the main thinking on the ASF is contained in the "Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Stand-by-Force and the Military Committee" (2003) and the "Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the ASF" (2005). The main aspects concerning the operationalisation of the ASF are summarised in Annex I.

As regards civilian capabilities, the Policy Framework on the African Stand-by Force provides for the creation of:

- a standby roster of at least 240 police officers to be deployed in complex PSOs on a 14-day notice.
- two stand-by police units at "company level"[13] deployable in 90 days.
- rosters of mission administration and of civilian experts (human rights and humanitarian law, governance, DDR, reconstruction).

Whereas on the military side, the Policy Framework and the Roadmap states that each region will pledge troops for the creation of the African Stand-by-Force brigades, no indication is given as to how the regions will intervene in the composition of the rosters of police and civilian experts. The Policy Framework states that the AU will centrally manage the stand-by roster of 240 police officers, who should be trained nationally (or at the regional training centres) to UN standards. On the two rapidly deployable units, the Policy Framework states that the stand-by system will be centrally managed at AU level. Member states providing police units should be reimbursed under a system similar to that of the UN.

ASF General Concept: ASF Objectives at the Pan-African and Sub-Regional level

- For the AU Commission
    - 1 Continental Planning Element (PLANELM)
    - 1 Continental Military Logistic Depot (MLD)

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[13] A company is normally composed of approximately 150 personnel.

- For each Region
  - 1 Permanent Brigade Headquarters (HQ)
  - 1 Permanent PLANELM
  - 1 Stand-by-Brigade
  - 1 MLD
  - Training Facilities

ASF Scenarios for the Deployment of PSOs (Policy Framework, 2003)

1. AU/Regional Military Advice to political missions (deployment in 30 days).

2. AU/Regional observer missions co-deployed with UN Missions (deployment in 30 days).

3. Stand-alone AU/Regional Observer Missions (deployment in 30 days).

4. AU/Regional PK force under Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (30 days).

5. AU/Regional deployment for complex PSOs (military deployment in 30 days, non-mil.: 90 days).

6. AU intervention (grave cases, such as genocide) (deployment in 14 days).

Timelines

The Policy Framework foresees the operationalisation of the ASF in two Phases. The operationalisation is not taking place according to plan but the objectives are still valid.

	AU Level	**SRO level**
Phase I (up to 30 June 2005)	develop full-time capacity to manage Scenarios 1 and 2	establishment of SRO Brigades
Phase II (1 July 05 to 30 June 2010)	develop full-time capacity to manage up to Scenario 5	increase their rapid deployment capability

The ASF Workshops

As part of the Roadmap for the operationalisation of the ASF, five workshops took place in Spring 2006. The themes of the Workshops were: Doctrine, Command, Control and Communication and Information Systems (C3Is), Logistics, Training and Evaluation, SOPs. Although there was no specific workshop on civilian crisis management, this element was present in most of them.

Doctrine Workshop

- Produce a comprehensive and integrated document that will address the full spectrum of PSOs ranging from conflict prevention to humanitarian relief and peace building;

- Host African organisation: SADC;

- Leading partner: EU.

SOPs Workshop

- Elaboration of a consolidated draft ASF SOPs to be submitted to the AU PSC for adoption.

- The following areas were considered to require harmonisation:
    - Rotation of Command;
    - Military and Civilian Components (including CIVPOL) in mission structures;
    - ROE;
    - Standardisation of all support systems;
    - Information sharing.

- Host African Organisation: ECOWAS.

- Leading partner: EU.

C3 IS Workshop.

- Assess existing capabilities and how to address shortfalls.

- Leading partner: USA.

- Host African organisation: NASBRIG (Cairo).

Logistics

- Produce an ASF Logistic Concept Paper and an ASF Logistic Manual.

- Leading partner: UK.

- Host organisation: EASBRIG.

Training and Evaluation Workshop

- To develop an ASF PSO training policy and a common ASF PSO training system based on the UN Standard Training Methods.

- A readiness evaluation system for ASF PSO individuals, contingents and headquarters. This includes the determination of the training currently carried out at the existing training centres, the identification of capacity building needs and of partners, funding, and a possible contribution process. So far, the determination of training needs is still pending.

- Leading partners: France/Canada.

- Host African organisation: ECCAS.

1.2. AU's Involvement in Peace Support Operations (PSOs)

As OUA: Rwanda (1993), Burundi (1993), Comoros (1998), DRC (1999), Ethiopia-Eritrea (2000). After the Constitutive Act of the AU: Burundi (2003), Sudan (2004-present).

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The Sub-Regional Components of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the development of their capabilities

2.1. The Importance of the Regions' Participation in the APSA

Sub-regional organisations are a key component of the APSA, as acknowledged by the Constitutive Act of the AU and the Protocol on the AU Peace and Security Council. The Protocol on the AU PSC states that "the Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the AU Commission will work closely with Regional Mechanisms, to ensure effective partnership between them and the Peace and Security Council in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability."[14] The criteria to define the modalities of such partnership are quite loose: the comparative advantage of each and the prevailing circumstances. The Protocol further establishes that periodic meetings with SROs will be convened regularly, at least once a year, by the Chairman of the AU Commission.[15]

Fundamental to the success of the ASF is the close involvement of SROs and a smooth integration of all the components of the architecture (SROs decision-making bodies, the regional training centres and member states' capabilities). An essential asset for the development of the ASF is the actual or planned existence of training centres at a regional level. Currently, these centres exist in Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Kenya. The opening of new centres in Angola, Kenya and Egypt is envisaged in the near future. These centres are oriented towards the military although they offer some courses on the civilian aspects of crisis management, such as the police courses offered at the Kofi Annan International Peace-keeping Training Centre in Accra.

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[14]   Art. 16.1
[15]   Art. 16.4

2.2. The Development of Sub-regional Capabilities

The development of capacities at the regional level is patchy. Some organisations have actively participated in peace-keeping operations and have developed most of the elements for the creation of their regional brigade (e.g. ECOWAS), others are have been largely dormant (e.g. Arab Maghreb Union).

The underdevelopment of civilian crisis management capabilities in the regions mirrors that of the African Union. Although there is general political acknowledgement of the complex nature of crises and of the need to develop the civilian components of the regional brigades, so far, few practical steps have been taken in this regard.

The development of the civilian aspects is still very incipient, even in the most advanced organisations. ECOWAS is currently starting work on the development of a Police Unit within its Peace and Security Department and on the creation of an "Emergency Response Team", which would be composed of a civilian core of experts from member states (in human rights, refugee/IDP management, health, gender, education, DDR, psychologists, political mediators, protection, community service search and rescue) ready to response to complex emergencies.

Regional security protocols refer to the deployment of civilian and military missions. Some regional organisations (SADC, EASBRIG) refer to the police component as a priority. In practice, however, the civilian crisis management capability of the regional brigades remains underdeveloped at the conceptual and operational level.

Development of SADC's peace and security capacities has been hampered by the lack of funding, understaffing and the lack of institutional memory (due to constant rotation and to the short nature of the contracts). The recent appointment of a new Executive Secretary and his efforts to secure political support from SADC's member states may facilitate the clarification of SADC's priorities for action.

The Regional Components of the African Stand-by-Force are the following:

SADCBRIG (Southern African Development Community)

SADC took its current name and organisational regime in 1992 (previously, there existed a much looser organisational grouping, created in 1980).

Peace and Security Agreements

- SADC Organ in 1996 (an attempt by Heads of State to stabilise a volatile region).
- Protocol on Politics Defence and Security (2001).
- Mutual Defence Pact (2004).
- Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) (implementation roadmap).

Participation in Peace-keeping Operations

- Most member states have contributed to peace operations in the region and elsewhere (South Africa having been particularly active) but there have not been operations under the SADC umbrella.

Provisions Relevant to Civilian Crisis Management

- SIPO: contains many provisions referring to cooperation on the sector of law enforcement (including fight against organised crime, small arms). More specifically, it refers to the Joint Training of Civil Police for peace support missions and the establishment of a regional database of trained personnel.

Progress in the Operationalisation of the Brigade

- HQ and PLANELM (Botswana), SADCBRIG MoU, Policy Framework, Host Nation Agreement, Pledges (between 4000 and 6000 troops), Stand-by Arrangement.
- Other positive points include the restructuring of the SADC Organ at the Secretariat, and the planned revitalisation of the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare, Zimbabwe.

Organisational constraints

- Lack of clarity about the role of the Secretariat, general understaffing in important areas, insecurity among staff due to short term nature of contracts (adequate advisory and monitoring capability is missing).

- Until recently, lack of adequate budgetary resources to implement regional policies.

Relevant political constraints:

- Need for more in-depth dialogue with the EU on peace and security matters (see reports by HOMs in Gaborone, LON/0775/05, VIE/209/06). The divergences on Zimbabwe do not facilitate political dialogue. HOMs recommend to include SADC issues in the dialogue with individual SADC member states.

- HIV/AIDS needs to be taken into account in the region's peace and security policy. Although there are no reliable statistics relating to the impact of HIV/AIDS in the security sector its impact has been calculated to be exceptionally high (up to 20% of infected population in some states).

ECOBRIG

ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) was created in 1975. In the words of its own Executive Secretary, Dr. Chambas, ECOWAS is an economic integration organisation that was forced to assume a responsibility in peace and security to stop the wars that ravaged the sub-region.

Peace and Security Agreements

- Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) (1998);

- Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security Protocol on Conflict Resolution (1999);

- Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001).

Participation in Peace-keeping Operations

- Peace-keeping missions: Sierra Leone (1994), Guinea-Bissau (1998), Liberia (1990 and 2003), Côte d'Ivoire (2002). Former ECOWAS operations in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire were subsequently blue-hatted and are still deployed. The UN Operation in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) terminated its mandate on 31 December 2005.

- Other missions: ECOWAS has often sent swiftly high level mediating teams to political crises (e.g. Togo and Guinea-Bissau in 2005). ECOWAS has also been able to send "rule of law" experts on an ad hoc basis, such as the secondment of judges and customs experts from member states to support the peace process in Liberia.

Provisions Relevant to Civilian Crisis Management

- Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security. One of its Objectives is to constitute and deploy a civilian and military force to maintain or restore peace within the sub-region.
- Member States agree to make available to ECOWAS units adequate resources for the army, air force, navy, gendarmerie, police and all other military, paramilitary or civil formations necessary for the accomplishment of the mission.
- The Executive Secretary, through the departments concerned and, in consultation with Member States, shall contribute to the training of civilian and military personnel (particularly in international humanitarian law and human rights).

Progress in the Operationalisation of the Brigade

- HQ and PLANELM (Abuja), Policy Framework, Pledges (6,500 troops), Host Nation Agreement, and Regional MLDs (Sierra Leone and Mali).
- The Mission Planning and Management Cell (MPMC) has also been established and 10 Military Officers from ECOWAS Member States recruited to work in the MPMC.
- ECOWAS has also established a division of labour among the regional training schools: Tactical level training (Bamako, Mali)[16], Operational Training (KAIPTC, Accra Ghana), Strategic Training (National War College in Nigeria).
- Although the police and civilian aspect has so far been underdeveloped, there is awareness of this subject at the ECOWAS HQ. ECOWAS is currently working on the creation of an Emergency Response Team, which would be composed of a civilian core of experts ready to respond to complex emergencies. The roster (75 people; 5 from each of the 15 ECOWAS member states on a flexible basis) would be managed by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs in Abuja.

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[16] New school facilities (situated in Koulikoro) are currently under construction.

In its current form, the project aims to focus on the following types of expertise: human rights, refugee/IDP management health, gender, education, DDR, psychologists, political mediators, protection, community service search and rescue.

Organisational constraints

- Need for a long-term strategy, lack of capacity and member states' will to implement the ambitious regional integration agenda;
- ECOWAS' growth has been donor driven.

Relevant political constraints

- The extreme poverty and the cross-border nature of the regional problems (child soldiers, mercenaries, small arms, refugees and illegal exploitation of natural resources, human trafficking and immigration);
- On the operational side, since the police plays a central role in enforcing the Moratorium on SALW, there is an urgent need to develop strong links among the police services in the sub-region.

Eastern Africa Brigade (EASBRIG): IGAD, COMESA and EAC

In April 2005, the Heads of State of 13 African countries meet and adopted the Policy Framework, and MoU and a Budget. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was mandated on an interim basis to coordinate the efforts of the region towards the establishment of Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). This decision brings some simplicity to the overlapping of regional integration grouping in the region.[17]

Relevant organisations

- IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development.
- EAC: East African Community.
- COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa.

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[17] Yet, some issues remain unresolved, since Tanzania is committed to both EASBRIG and SADC and Angola belongs simultaneously to SADC and ECCAS.

Peace and Security Agreements

- IGAD: Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) (2002).
- EAC: MoU on Co-peration in Defence (1998).
- COMESA: Creation of a Peace and Security Committee (2000).

Participation in Peace-keeping Operations

- While IGAD has sponsored mediation processes for Sudan (1994, 2002) and Somalia (2002), COMESA and EAC have been less active on the peace and security side.

Provisions Relevant to Civilian Crisis Management

- Policy Framework: The priority in the first stages of the development of the EASBRIG should be the development of the military and police aspects.

Progress in the Operationalisation of the Brigade

- HQ (Ethiopia), PLANELM (Kenya), Policy Framework, EASBRIG MoU, Host Nation Agreement, Stand-by Agreement, Regional MLD (Ethiopia). The Brigade should attain 5,500 troops. Troop pledges are still pending.

Organisational constraints

- Overlapping membership in different regional organisations (see Chart in Annex IV);
- Mandate of IGAD as a co-ordinator has been questioned by some non-country members.

Relevant political constraints

- Political situation in Sudan and Somalia, Border Dispute in Ethiopia/Eritrea

FOMAC Brigade (Central Africa)

Relevant Organisations

- ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States)
- CEMAC (Communauté Economique et Monetaire de l'Afrique Centrale).

Peace and Security Agreements

- ECCAS: Protocol on the Peace and Security Council for Central Africa (COPAX); also creates the Force Multinationale de l'Afrique Centrale (FOMAC) and the Mécanisme d'alerte l'Afrique Centrale (MARAC) (1999). The Protocol is completed by Standing Orders for the COPAX, FOMAC and MARAC, respectively, adopted in 2002. A Mutual Assistance Pact was adopted in February 2000.

Participation in Peace-keeping Operations

- FOMUC I (2004), II (2005) and III (2006) in the Central African Republic, mandated by CEMAC, with Peace Facility support.

Provisions Relevant to Civilian Crisis Management

- COPAX can deploy civilian and military missions.
- FOMAC is entrusted with peace-keeping and policing missions, including the control of fraud and organised crime. The national contingents of the FOMAC may include gendarmerie, police and civilian units.

Progress in the Operationalisation of the Brigade

- HQ (Gabon), MoU, Policy Framework, Host Nation Agreement, Stand-by Arrangement. Pending: PLANELM, pledges (Brigade should have 2,000-3,000 troops) and regional MLD.

Organisational constraints

- Operational progress has not matched political commitments.

Relevant political constraints

- Transition processes: Angola, DRC, Burundi, CAR.

Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)

Peace and Security Agreements
- Treaty establishing the AMU states that one of the objectives is common defence and non-interference.

Participation in Peace-keeping Operations: N/A

Progress in the Operationalisation of the Brigade
- HQ (Egypt, PLANELM (Tripoli), Policy Framework. Pending: MoU, Host Nation Agreement, Pledges, Stand-by Arrangement, Regional MLD.

Organisational and Political Constraints
- Egypt is not a member of the AMU.
- The AMU has not met at the level of Heads of State since April 1994, and has effectively been paralysed by the dispute over the status of Western Sahara.

AU-SRO Relations

At this stage, a number of crucial political legal and practical issues in the relations between the AU and the SROs still need to be resolved:

Command and Control
- determining the degree of control to be exercised by the AU PSC over the different ASF deployment options;
- determining the responsibility of other decision-making bodies, such as the Commissioner for Peace and Security and the Peace Support Operations Department (PSOD).

Distribution of Roles between the AU and the SROs. The signature of the Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities which is expected to be a single document, is still pending.

Geographical participation and coverage. When an SRO deploys a force within the framework of the ASF, will participation be open to states outside the region? Can an AU PSC-mandated SRO be called to deploy a force outside its area? This is independent of individual country participation in blue helmet contingents, which is usual practice in the framework of peace-keeping operations.

The problem of overlapping regional integration structures. An issue that complicates the picture is what the AU Commission itself refers to as the 'cacophony' of overlapping regional integration structures (see Annex IV for a Chart of African organisations). For the establishment of the ASF, there is a clear tendency to create brigades on a geographical basis, i.e. North, West, Centre, East and Southern Africa. Whereas in some cases, there is a perfect coincidence between the region and the organisation (e.g. ECOWAS), certain countries belong simultaneously to different regional blocks.[18]

The impact of ASF on AU Structures and procedures. The existing AU PSC and Commission structures will need to adapt to meet the increased responsibilities deriving from the existence of the ASF. Adequate command and control structures and support still need to be put in place.

At the pan-african level, the efforts towards the creation of military managerial and strategic capacities have absorbed most of the attention of the AU. There is progress but there are doubts about whether actual developments will match the ambitious timetable (for example, all the Planning Elements (PLANELMs) at continental and regional level need to be in place by July 2006 and all the troops in place and deployable by the end of the year). The Panel of the Wise will be in place soon, work on a Continental Early Warning System is starting. Yet there are a number of issues to be solved: the production of a long-term needs assessment, existing duplication problems between the Peace Support Operations Department and the Conflict Management Division and the development of a Police Unit (so far, there is not enough personnel working on the matter).

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[18] The Protocol regulating the relations between the OAU and the RECs (1998) referred to six regional blocks: ECOWAS, SADC, COMESA, IGAD, ECCAS and UMA. However, the Protocol was not signed by ECCAS and AMU. Subsequently, the East African Community (EAC) was acknowledged as a pillar of the AU, further complicating an already complex system. The EAC is made up of COMESA and IGAD members Kenya and Uganda and SADC member Tanzania. In Central Africa, the members of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) and the virtually dormant Economic Community of the Great Lakes States (CEPGL) are all also ECCAS Member States. In the North, Egypt, a member of the Northern Brigade (NASBRIG) is not a member of the Arab Maghreb Union.

Funding and budgeting issues. The AU PSC Protocol provides for the creation of a Peace Fund. Yet the question of the key for distributing the costs of operations, i.e. will the fund pay for the overall cost of the operation or just the common costs (the rest being paid by the states contributing with forces as they incur them). When an SRO runs an operation, the Policy Framework and MoU of that organisation will apply.

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EC/AU ongoing projects

3.1. General Overview of the Peace Facility

Operations financed prior to the PF from the relevant national B-envelopes of the NIPs:

Liberia (€8 million to ECOWAS),

Burundi (€25 million to the AU),

Côte d'Ivoire (€12.5 million to ECOWAS) later reduced to €3.8 M.

Objectives:

support the emerging new African peace and security structures,

promote African ownership and solidarity.

Current state of the PF

- Initial amount of €250 million (€200 million for PSOs, €35 million for capacity building and the remaining €15 million to cover audits, evaluations and contingencies) to be complemented by €50M replenishment in 2006

- Expenditure in PSOs:

Sudan: €12 million to AMIS I and €150 million to AMIS II and additional €50 Million for AMIS transition;

CAR: €3.38 million to FOMUC I; €8 million to FOMUC II and €7.5 million for FOMUC III.

Comoros: €5 Million to finance the AU's deployment of observers during the electoral period.

- Capacity building: AU (€6million) (areas: enhancing the institutional capacity of the Peace Support Department of the AU, direct support to PSC, Strengthening the AU Planning Cell, establishing of a Continental Early Warning System). After the €8M transfer from CB to the PSOs envelope is completed, an amount of €21M remains in the capacity building envelope of the Peace Facility.

As regards he long -term future of the Peace Facility, the Council decided, in line with commitments of the EU Strategy for Africa, to strengthen the APF with substantial, long-term, flexible and sustainable funding**,** and **to provide for the Facility an amount of €300M under the 10th EDF** for an initial three-year period (2008-2010).

3.2. Support to AU's peace and security agenda and to transition activities

Amount: €10m + €2m, paid €4.9m + €1.05m.
Modality: Contribution Agreement.
Objective: *The project specifically aims facilitate carrying out the most important of the transition measures from OAU to AU by providing institutional support, as well as some immediate short term technical support, if appropriate; increase the effectiveness and operational capacity of AU involvement in peace-building in Sub-Saharan Africa.*

Support to the AU liaison mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea

Amount: € 850,000, paid € 825,000.
Modality: Cost Estimate Agreement.
Objective: *Following the signing of a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea on 18th June 2000, the UN Security Council mandated the deployment of a peacekeeping force in the border zone, through Resolutions 1312 and 1320 (2000). Although the UN is taking the lead in this operation, OAU will need to remain closely involved, as OAU and the UN are joint guarantors of the Agreement. The purpose of the agreement is to allow the OAU to deploy observers with the military headquarters of Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as with the Command of the UN Forces, so that the continental organisation may play its agreed role in Ethiopia-Eritrea peace process.*

Support for AU's governance, human rights agenda

Amount: € 2m, paid € 930,000.
Modality: Grant**.**

Objective: *The project specifically aims at enhancing the institutional capacity of the AU to engage effectively in strengthening democratic processes, governance and HR in Africa; improving the capacity of the AU to monitor and evaluate compliance of MS with adopted decisions; enhancing civil society participation in all relevant institutions, policies and programmes of the AU; promoting cooperation and partnerships with African and Int. Org., with particular focus on relevant national institutions.*

Support to Governance and Public Administration Programme

Amount: € 4 million (€2m + €2m).
Modality: Contribution Agreement.
Objective: The overall objective is to enhance African states governance and public administration capabilities to more effectively meet their development challenges.

Support to military observers mission in Burundi

Amount: € 1.2 million, paid € 740,000.
Modality: Grant Agreement *(this action was financed from the EC budget and managed by RELEX).*
Objective: *The overall objective of the Project is to consolidate the Cease-fire Agreements between the transitory Government of Burundi and the signatory rebel groups. The specific objective is the establishment of an African Union Observer Mission to monitor implementation of the Cease-fire Agreements of 7 October and 2 December 2002.*
This action is being finished. It is appropriate to close its financing as soon as possible, and this being done through the delegation in Ethiopia.

Support for the Special Envoy to the Central African Republic

Amount: €400,000, paid €300,000, recovered €280,000
Modality: Grant Agreement -RRM

Objective: *The overall objective is to avoid further aggravation of the conflict and to facilitate, through the regional efforts, a peaceful solution and the promotion of peace and stability in the region. The specific objective is to provide support for the sending of an AU Special Representative (a senior African political figure) and the setting-up of an AU liaison office in Bangui. It is foreseen that the Special Envoy will travel on a regular basis to neighbouring countries as well as to the AU's headquarters in Addis Ababa. He will receive administrative support.*

Support to the AU-led peace negotiations for Darfur -Abuja talks

Amount: €850,000.

Modality: Contribution Agreement **-** RRM.

Objective: *The project specifically aims at complementing the efforts being undertaken by the AU, through its enhanced Mission in Sudan (AMIS), in order to facilitate the implementation of the N'djamena Ceasefire Agreement of 08/04/2004, the Protocols on the Improvements of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur and on the Enhancement of the Security Situation in Darfur, in accordance with the N'djamena Agreement and all such future agreements.*

Support to African Mission in Burundi

Amount: €25m, paid €20m, for closure.

Modality: Contribution Agreement *(this action is also managed by the delegation in Ethiopia).*

Objective: *The overall objective is to help promote long-term peace, security and governance in Burundi. The aim is to create the conditions for peace and stability in Burundi that will allow the restoration of a normal living standards and process of national reconciliation. The project purpose is to support the AU peace-keeping efforts to ensure the implementation of the Arusha Agreement and various cease-fire agreements between the transitional government of Burundi and the armed rebel groups. Rwanda and Burundi shall join the EAC in November, which will have a considerable impact, amongst others, from a geostrategic point of view.*

The totality of the €20 m was not spent; it is advisable to enclose this project as fast as possible and to transfer the amounts available (not paid, paid and not used) to Burundi.

Support to African Mission in Sudan (AMIS I)

Amount: €12m, paid €9.2m.

Modality: Contribution Agreement.

Objective: *The overall objective is to promote long-term peace, security and governance in Sudan. The project specifically aims to create an environment to enable in the first instance the delivery of humanitarian aid. The support should also create an environment of mutual trust as a start of the return of peace and stability in the region that will allow the restoration of normal living standards and contribute to the process of national reconciliation. The operation purpose is to support the AU efforts through the Cease fire Commission (CFC) to monitor a cease fire between the conflicting parties in the Darfur region in Sudan.*

Support to African Mission in Sudan (AMIS II)

Amount: €150M, additional €50M for AMIS transition.

Modality: Contribution Agreement (CA).

Objective: *The overall objective is to promote long-term peace, security and governance in Sudan. The project specifically aims to create an environment to enable in the first instance the delivery of humanitarian aid. The support should also create an environment of mutual trust as a start of the return of peace and stability in the region that will allow the restoration of normal living standards and contribute to the process of national reconciliation. The second CA continues to support the AU efforts through the Cease fire Commission (CFC) to monitor a cease fire between the conflicting parties in the Darfur region in Sudan.*

Support for the FOMUC III – Multinational force from CEMAC to the Central African Republic

Amount: €7.5 million.

Modality: African Peace Facility – 9 ACP RPR 22.

Objective: *The objective of the FOMUC III operation is to reinforce the operational capacities of the force in order to increase the security of the provinces in the RCA, while creating the conditions necessary for a transfer of responsibility to the Central African defense and safety forces as from June 2007. The European contribution in support to the FOMUC will be carried out on the basis of a contribution convention with the CEMAC, and it will be managed by the Administrative and Financial Cell (CIF) of the FOMUC, which acts under mandate and control express of the Executive Secretary of the CEMAC.*

The total (estimated) cost of the operation amounts to €16.46 M for a strength of 380 soldiers over a 12 months period. The EC contribution rises to €7.5 M to cover the following expenditure:

- *Individual allowances and food of the troops: €1.91 M.*
- *Costs for transportation of the troops (deployment of the troops and fuel for the vehicles): €3.55M.*
- *Projection and logistical support (equipment for lodging, the maintainance of the power generating units, transmission resources, medical support, the hiring of aircraft, and the costs of integration of the FACA in the devices of the 3 sites): €2.1 M.*
- *Civil-Military Actions: €40.01M.*
- *Indirect costs (7 %, operating expenses): €0.48M.*
- *Unforeseen (1.39 %): €0.10M.*

Support the Capacity Building of the AU

Amount: €6 m.

Modality: Contribution Agreement.

Objective: *The overall objective is to strengthen the role and leadership of the AU in promoting peace, stability and security in Africa. The project specifically aims at enhancing the institutional capacity of the Peace and Security Department (PSD) of the AUC. This include the establishment of a Secretariat to support the functioning of AU Peace and Security Council (PSC); Formation of a pool of Regional desk Officers at the AU HQ to facilitate interaction with the regional mechanisms in the field of peace and security and to follow up relevant developments within the various regions; establishment of a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) at the AU HQ to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts in the African continent; setting up a Panel of the Wise -*

composed of 5 highly respected African personalities - to support the efforts of the PSC and those of the Chairperson of the Commission, namely in the area of conflict prevention; provision of technical assistance for the PSC to implement the Common African Defence and Security Policy; strengthening of the AU Planning Cell responsible for strategic and military planning of peace support operations; strengthening of the capacity of the AUC Administration and Human Resources departments.

Support to trade agenda

Amount: €380,000, paid €300,000.

Modality: Contribution Agreement.

Objective: *The general aim of this operation is to help with speeding up the process of African economic integration as foreseen under the AEC Treaty and further described in the AU Strategic Plan.*

3.3. EC/AU Future Projects

Support to the African Union/NEPAD

Amount: €55m.

Modality: To be identified.

Objective (draft): *The overall objective is to accelerate the continental integration and to support the promotion of governance and socio-economic well-being in Sub Saharan Africa through support to the institutions of the African Union. This would be a major contribution to poverty alleviation across the continent.*

Support to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)

Amount: €2M.

Modality: To be identified, ideally support to the UNDP-managed Trust Fund.

Objective (draft): *The overall objective is to support the governance reforms agenda of African countries.*

Support to Centre Africain d'Études et de Recherche sur le Terrorisme (Algeria budget line? MEDA or Stability Instrument)

Amount: €1M.

Modality: To be identified, ideally a contribution agreement with the Centre.

Objective: *The overall objective is to strengthen the capacity of the African Union in the fight against terrorism. The project specifically aims at supporting the 'Centre Africain d'Études et de Recherche sur le Terrorisme' in (i) enhancing its capacity to analyse and exchange information; (ii) creating a documentation centre; (iii) providing training to the competent national authorities of the AU Member States in relevant areas of the fight against terrorism.*

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