



# IMPETUS

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## DIRECTOR GENERAL INTERVIEW

**CME 09**  
**EU Military Concepts**



THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

# Interview with DGEUMS – Lt Gen Leakey

*Lt Gen David Leakey, Director General EU Military Staff (28 Feb 07- 27 May 10), conducts an interview with IMPETUS prior to his departure from office...*



**Q. Your appointment as DGEUMS finishes in May. The Chairman of the EU Military Committee describes operations as part of “the oxygen of CSDP which will keep CSDP alive”. What have been the operational successes and lessons in your view?**

**Lt Gen Leakey:** “When General Perruche handed over to me as DGEUMS just over three years ago, he remarked that I would have

nothing to do; the operation in Bosnia was running down, we were in the late stages of recovering the last administrative elements from the operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo; there was no likely operation on the horizon!

Since then we have sustained and developed the operation in Bosnia. While it may not be a demanding or dangerous operation, it has satisfied an important political need, and it is now developing and implementing a new training line of activity. It has been a success.

We have been to Chad and back! Those who had little or no contact with this deployment have little real knowledge of its value. There are two elements to highlight:

First, the force of some 3,500 achieved what it was tasked to do. Its presence, operational profile and its patrolling delivered exactly the impact required: a moderation of the violence in the area (on both the government and rebel sides); improved access and safety for the civilian NGO and International Organisations; and a handover to the UN of both the administrative bases and an excellent running operation.

Second, although France played a major framework role which enabled the deployment, a number of smaller member states and third states who had far less, if any, experience of operations in such an austere African environment proved to themselves and to the EU that they were operationally effective. The extraordinary logistic demands in extreme weather conditions were taken in

their stride. EUFOR Tchad/RCA has given Europeans a new capability and a confidence for future operations.

Let us not exaggerate this operation. The EU was not tested in combat operations. Sure, there were some casualties. Sgt Gilles Paulin (FR) was the first EU operational casualty on a CSDP military operation. And I saw for myself the readiness of the contingents on the ground to fight if necessary - they would have had little alternative! The real test would have been both a political and media challenge within Member States were it to have happened.

**Q: What about EUNAVFOR - Operation ATALANTA? A success or is the jury still out?**

**Lt Gen Leakey:** We know that the scourge of pirates off the east coast of Africa will not be solved by EUNAVFOR or its companion flotillas in the Indian Ocean. But there is a long list of visible improvements which are the direct result of the EU’s leading role in counter-piracy. I would single out the imaginative way in which the EU Operation HQ (Northwood, UK) has embraced the civilian merchant shipping and fishing industry. EUNAVFOR is a truly civ/mil operation, more so than any other undertaken by the EU. The OHQ’s Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) initiative has had a major impact. The link between capturing pirates and being able to bring them to states in the region for prosecution has been a vital element in multiplying the operation’s effect.

**EUNAVFOR is a truly  
civ/mil operation**

We can measure what we have done; a huge number of attacks frustrated, pirates detained, skiffs and equipment destroyed. What we can’t know is how the pirate industry might have expanded without the deterrence and intervention of the EU’s ships and aircraft alongside the other naval actors. What we do know is that the disruption of some 15 pirate action groups in the first few weeks after the recent Monsoon season may have saved 15 commercial vessels from being hijacked. I would also highlight the very close collaboration in this counter-piracy effort with NATO, the USA, Russian, Chinese, Indians, Japanese and many others. This has been almost unique.

So far so good, the operational success of OP ATALANTA will depend on Member States contributing the ships and aircraft. The endstate success of OP ATALANTA will depend on progress ashore!



**Q: What about the EU Battlegroups?**

**Lt Gen Leakey:** We should argue against those who say “use them or lose them”. We must not deploy on an operation uniquely or even primarily to justify a particular capability. The BGs are like an insurance policy. How often have you claimed on your own house insurance policy? Seldom if ever, I suspect; but you still pay the premium, just in case! If Member States say it is too expensive to maintain the BGs at readiness, should it fall to the very few Member States who have available high readiness forces to supply the insurance every time it is needed? Is this a fair European burden sharing?

Not only are the BGs a useful instrument of capability transformation in a number of Member States, but they are also an instrument for EU burden sharing and multinational cooperation.

I have no doubt but that the day after we [EU] might take the decision to scrap them, we would need them for some short notice operation - Murphy’s law!

**Q: Is the EU doing enough in other areas of capability development?**

**Lt Gen Leakey:** Between, the EUMS, the EDA and the Member States there have been a huge number of small steps, all of which have made a difference. For example, we have proved on operations or exercises that some of our concepts actually work or, like the C2 Concept for Maritime Operations, they need to be adapted in light of lessons. And, by the way, don’t rubbish the EUMS’ lessons process. It is more user friendly and gets used more than many systems I have seen in the past. The EDA, too, has some excellent projects which are paying dividends.

Some of the capability challenges out there are understandably scary for Member States at a time when the economic crisis is eating into Defence Budgets. There are big questions. What is the nature of future conflict? Which of these should we cover? Which can we afford to cover? Can we really do this by Member States sharing, pooling or ‘nicheing’ capabilities? These tend to be political issues more than pure military ones.

Some of our work is moving very slowly. Take the issue of Information Exchange Requirements and Network

Enhanced Capability. In three years it has made small steps. Why? Because the scope of the subject and its utility is hard to define and it threatens to be expensive. Moreover many of the projects, such as NEC and IER, do not have a unique military boundary around them; they are inextricably civ/mil by nature.

**Q: Talking of civ/mil, has the EU made progress on this?**

**Lt Gen Leakey:** Yes and No! Look briefly at the EUMS itself in this area. What is working better and better is the close collaboration between the EUMS Intel Directorate and the Civilian Intelligence machine in the SITCEN. Even Member States push this. It is a developing success story. Then take the so-called EUMS Civ/Mil Cell, established as the result of a compromise agreement between Member States. It was a step, but largely failed to deliver the big civ/mil ideal, in part frustrated by Member States and by the EU Institutions themselves. Disappointing. Let’s hope the next big idea, that of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) fares better. We all need to get behind it, not fire exocets at it!

No ministerial meeting, no seminar on the NATO Strategic Concept, no EU discussion of the merits of the Lisbon Treaty and no discussion of the character of future conflict can take place without talking up the Comprehensive Approach. Yet, despite all this talk, so little has been achieved by so many over such a long time. Why? There are many reasons. Time for just a couple.

Except in the most unreconstructed military forces, military operations are invariably conducted jointly. Put

**Battlegroups  
are like an  
insurance policy**



*EUFOR Tchad/RCA has given Europeans a new capability and a confidence for future operations.*

crudely, that means Army, Navy and Airforce, Special Forces, Logistics etc all working together to bring their different capabilities simultaneously to bear on the objective, normally under a unified operational command. It is unthinkable today, even criminal, for land, air, sea and special forces components to carry out their operations independently and, therefore, incoherently.

It would be unrealistic and utopian to imagine a sudden revolution in civ/civ and civ/mil practice so that unity of effect could be delivered. But the evidence of such need in Haiti, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans and elsewhere is undeniable!

**Q: How long will it take? What is the opposition to applying such principles? What are the fixes?**

**Lt Gen Leakey:** Some militaries have yet to reform, but, for most of those who have achieved some jointness, it has often taken a long time, as a consequence of bitter lessons and not without an unpopular revolution in military culture. It will take no less to achieve the same in the civ/civ and civ/mil world.

We need to acknowledge the cause of frictions between military and civilians.

These are often caused by jealousies or inferiority complexes over such matters as the military's clear hierarchy, rank structures, uniforms, (planning) method, training, discipline, resources etc.

These are compounded by the sometimes adversarial positions of the military and civilians in MoDs and IO staffs: the civilians as the prudent or parsimonious custodians of the treasury's cash, the military as the wasteful spender; the civilians insisting on legal and political restraint, and the military wanting to be let off the leash; civilians being more permanent in their posts and, therefore, the institutional experts or corporate memory, the military transient and therefore ignorant.



*The endstate success of OP ATALANTA will depend on progress ashore!*

## We need to acknowledge the cause of frictions between military and civilians

In the field, there is the traditional insistence by many NGOs (especially humanitarian) on keeping their distance from the military in order to maintain inviolate local perceptions of their neutrality or impartiality. The military want to get close to the NGOs or to undertake, for example, their own humanitarian operations either for lack of anyone else available to do it or for 'hearts and minds' reasons.

There is often a macho or 'warrior' culture which constrains the military from allowing itself to become part of the 'soft instruments'.

This list is not exhaustive. However, it is not hard to see why civ/mil collaboration can be difficult.

**Q: Against these odds, what hope for the comprehensive approach within an organisation such as the EU with all its opportunities, more so since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty?**

**Lt Gen Leakey:** Great hope! We need to get behind the CMPD and ensure that the EUMS is alongside it without a barrier between. We need to capitalise on the creation of the High Representative and the chance to bring greater coherence between the different EU instruments and pillars in Brussels.

However, Member States themselves will need to show some enthusiasm and a willingness to work across government departments and agencies more collaboratively than they do now. And a revolution, because that is what it is, will not come about without leadership. Here Ministers and the High Representative will have to do more than talk up the Comprehensive Approach. What will be required is real leadership, vision and probably some injudicious 'handbagging' of a few people if they want delivery...not just talk.

**Q: Finally, General Leakey, what about the EUMS itself?**

**Lt Gen Leakey:** I apologise for characterising the EUMS as consisting of 'swimmers, floaters and sinkers' in my first months here. People were pretty cross and demanded to know which category they were in! Member States weren't too happy either when I explained that they should not treat the EUMS as a language school and a staff college by sending unqualified people to work here. Things are better. Now, people tell me which category they are in, and there aren't too many sinkers! But what a great bunch. I will miss them when I leave.

A great spirit of multinational friendship exists, and professionally I think the EUMS has developed too.

We have had a major structural reorganisation of the EUMS in each of my three years, and they have taken it in their stride. They have been very loyal and committed. I could not have wished for greater support. 🇪🇺

EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY STAFF (EUMS) 01 May 2010



EUMS

\* Lt Gen Ton Van Osch (NL) will take over as DGEUMS from Lt Gen David Leakey (UK) on 27 May 2010



# OP ATALANTA – the role of the MMT

*By Lt Col Tim Cook (UK), Crisis Response Planning/Current Operations Branch, EUMS Directorate of Operations.*



Lt Col Tim Cook

On joining the EUMS in November 2007 one of my first tasks from the Director General (DGEUMS) was to write a paper on piracy in the Horn of Africa. This was at the time when certain EU Member States were independently preparing to escort the World Food Programme shipments from Mombassa to Mogadishu in order to alleviate some of the effects of the humanitarian crisis within Somalia. Now over two years on, as the leader of the Mission Monitoring Team (MMT) in the EUMS for the EU’s first maritime operation EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA, I thought it would be useful to try to articulate the role of an MMT.

The main role of the MMT is to provide impartial advice at the strategic level to an operation specifically on the management and staffing of issues through Brussels.

The management of issues through and from Brussels is ‘wherein lies the rub’. An empowered Liaison Officer from the OHQ can greatly facilitate this process. The

**Impartial advice  
and guidance at  
the strategic level**

**Political Will**

LO will invariably be an integral part of the MMT. The MMT will constantly receive and staff issues through the EUMS, ensuring situational awareness and informing the Chairman’s<sup>1</sup> office. Most issues, delicate or not, will require a pan Brussels approach and view. One of the first ports of call will be the operations unit in the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) for Political/Military guidance. This is either followed by or simultaneous with interaction, inter alia, with other parts of the Secretariat, the Commission as well as direct consultation with the Permanent Delegations of Member States themselves.

The MMT Piracy is a task organised grouping from all EUMS directorates which concentrates the main naval and amphibious expertise and subject matter experts such as information, psychological ops and media as well as the legal advisor and CMPD. It numbers around 15 individuals (when there is a good wind blowing!) 3 of whom are dedicated to the mission from the EUMS Ops Branch forming a core to the MMT (most of the routine work!).

A key benefit in the support provided by the MMT has been the continual involvement of the self same EUMS individuals since the early stages of the operation. Many of my fellow MMT members will spend all of their appointments, usually three years, in the EUMS directly associated with the operation, which is especially pertinent when some key areas in the OHQ have had a complete turn around every three to four months. Personally, I find that there is great synergy and effectiveness in having been involved in Op ATALANTA from before the outset, writing the initial paper on which the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) was based.

<sup>1</sup> Chairman EU Military Committee



Julius Caesar (100 - 44 BC)

One of the hardest things to define in the paper back in 2007, yet one of the most frequently used and cited phrase in Brussels, was and continues to be that of, purely and simply, 'political will'. There has been clear understanding from the outset that piracy is the symptom caused by 20 years

of instability within Somalia. EU Member States have demonstrated strong political will in their provision of support for Op ATALANTA. The multi stranded dynamic shape and nature of the operation along with its effective coordination with other international organisations and actors are some of its key successes. However, Op ATALANTA has often been referred to as merely being the sea flank to a non existing land operation.

Julius Caesar's 'modus operandi' for dealing with pirates who had kidnapped him, crucifixion, albeit draconian did not solve the problem. As Clarlotte Higgings<sup>2</sup> writes

### Address the root causes of instability

in the UK newspaper 'The Guardian' *"It took Pompey the Great, with a vast fleet of 500 ships, to eradicate the problem of Mediterranean piracy in 67BC. Uncharacteristically for a Roman general, instead of meting out the death sentence to the criminals, he bought them plots of land and helped set them up as farmers. As Tom Holland's brilliant book Rubicon about the problem of pirates in the Mediterranean in the late Republic., "Brigandage, he had clearly recognised, was bred of rootlessness and social upheaval."*

A couple of millennia later we face the same problem with thankfully political will being more on the side of the Pompey the Great than Julius Caesar. EU political will is now beginning to address the root causes of instability in Somalia with the training of Somali soldiers in Uganda in concert with the long term development work of the Commission and Member States. Political will meanwhile appears to be strong in maintaining Op ATALANTA to contain the 'symptoms' which is piracy while these other lines of development begin to take effect. The MMT continues to try to be a 'weathervane' of political will for the operation while supporting and staffing issues through the machinery which is Brussels. 🇪🇺

<sup>2</sup> 'Kidnapped by pirates: the Julius Caesar approach' by Charlotte Higgins in 'guardian .co.uk' culture blog dated Tuesday 27 October 2009 14.29 GMT.



OpCdr EUNAVFOR, Rear Admiral Peter Hudson, welcomes the President of Somalia, His Excellency Sharif Sheikh Ahmed to EUNAVFOR HQ

# EU Military Concepts

*By Col Alistair Sheppard(UK) Concepts Branch Chief, EUMS Directorate of Concepts and Capabilities.*

It is wonderful to live in a parallel universe! No, we don't mean the EU, and no, we don't mean the Military. We live in an ideal world, where everything works, all our expectations come true, all the plans fall neatly into place and the world's problems are easily solved. Where is this wonderful world you ask? Of course, it is in the Concepts Branch of the EUMS!

However .... not all of our good ideas are simple, not all of our concepts survive and not all of our papers are read (except by us). But we believe they are the foundation of the EU's Military Capability, and I would like to tell you why.

Within the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), to get all 27 Member States to focus their resources, training and preparation; to get their dedication to an idea, and to get them to adapt that idea to the real world and apply it, requires commitment. That commitment often starts with an agreement, a

contract, a document outlining the essential ingredients to make that commitment real. We like to think that the commitment starts with a **'concept'**.

## Range of EU Military Concepts

The EU has a range of different military concepts; some old, some old but revised based on experience, some new ones and many more in the pipeline. They range from the highest level political military documents to some quite detailed tactical publications. But each is the illustration of what needs to be done and each is usually the foundation for a lot of follow-on work. If we were to imagine an ideal world in the future where the EU has a concept for each of its military activities, then we are probably only a fraction into completing the full list. That list is expanding and will never be complete because we must always update our concepts, based on experience.

**We like to think  
commitment starts  
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For two reasons, we cannot simply invent new military ideas that apply only to the EU; first, it is the Member States which provide the assets for EU operations and therefore there must be commonality and conformity between Member States and second, those same assets are also available to other International Organisations and so we must make our concepts compatible and complementary. It used to be that the EU adapted other, existing concepts. Now, it is increasingly likely that the EU military concepts are original and founded in a more EU specific setting. As the EU requirement becomes more identifiable, perhaps other organisations may consider the EU as the inspiration for their work?

**We cannot simply invent new military ideas that apply only to the EU**

### Influences and 'drivers'

Which military concepts the EU requires is driven by a range of different influences. We like to call them "drivers", and they help us analyse the merits and priorities of our work. Current drivers include the experiences from on-going and recent operations and exercises, the implications from the Lisbon Treaty, the result of previous analysis such as the Capability Development Plan (CDP), the EU Military Committee's Interoperability Study, plus the analysis or consequences of previous work. For example, seldom do we draft a document without it becoming apparent that it will require other complementary work. There are also other initiatives that are brought forward by Member States or the work of other organisations. All of this can result in long shopping lists with a variety of concepts required.

**we intend that our concepts are relevant, useful and dynamic**

To bring order to these lists we have a programme which identifies the sequence and anticipated duration of the work - the EU Military Concept Development Implementation Programme (CDIP). This helps our team (and other members of the EUMS) plan their work and also helps Member States plan their support to each topic and prepare their responses at the right time.

### Approval (or not!)

When all the hard work is done, it is time for the author of a concept to take his work to the EU Military Committee for approval by the Member States. This

can be a painful process for the author! He or she will have invested enormous amounts of time and effort in choosing the right words to explain, illustrate or describe the details involved. They will have been subjected to countless corrections, re-writes, structural changes and the near-impossible task of accommodating all the Member States inputs and requirements. They will have tortured themselves over spelling, syntax, taxonomy and many other words people do not understand. They will have nurtured their infant concept and, at the end, have to throw it to the mercy of the EU Military Committee, usually through its Working Group. From then on, the concept is the property of the Member States; for them to treat with reverence or dismiss, to be used as a seminal work or filed and forgotten. Thereafter, the author learns and returns to their next concept - always much bigger and better than the last.

You might think that would be end of the concept story. We hope not. We intend that our concepts are relevant, useful and dynamic. We want to share them with our civilian colleagues. We hope others, across the EU, will use some of our ideas, if not the whole concept. We hope there will be convergence with civilian ideas and, in future, we can produce concepts that have a comprehensive use and draw upon the full range of EU capabilities. We hope that we can influence these changes through our ideas, debates, analysis, experience and writing. We are already having greater engagement with other institutions and organisations both within the EU and beyond and we intend this should continue.

### Offer of feedback

We intend our work to reflect real needs, yet we recognise we are only describing simple actions, uninterrupted by the real world. Therefore, we know we must test and validate the concepts and the elements that make up the whole idea. We need feedback and, hard though it is, we must face criticism and be prepared to revise our work, especially in the light of real operations and real constraints. Please, see if you can find a concept that interests you and give us your thoughts - make sure we are not living in a world of our own, a parallel universe! 🇪🇺

# The European External Action Service and the EU Military Staff

*Wing Commander Tim Payne RAF, Executive Office, EU Military Staff.*

## Introduction

We all know that the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009 and that two new political figures have come on the scene: a fixed full-time President of the European Council and a High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. But what does this mean to the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and what changes are we likely see over the next six months as we become part of the new European External Action Service (EEAS)? One thing for sure is that the way the EU deals with Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is changing. New structures are taking shape which should take us towards a more flexible and comprehensive approach to crisis management. This article examines the Lisbon Treaty and some of the changes it has brought about, however these changes will not happen overnight and everyone's cooperation will be necessary to make the transition work.

## Full-time President

The Treaty of Lisbon creates more efficient institutional structures and aims to meet future challenges and adapt the European Union to an increasingly globalised world. The European Council elected Mr Van Rompuy as its first full-time President. His main task is to ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council - which becomes an institution in its own right - and to facilitate consensus. He represents the EU, at his level, on issues which include its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).



*Mr. Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council.*



*Baroness Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.*

## High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

The EU Heads of State or Government agreed on the appointment of Baroness Catherine Ashton as the HR of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. She exercises, in foreign affairs and security, the functions which were previously exercised by Mr Javier Solana, the six-monthly rotating Presidency and the Commissioner for External Relations. The HR therefore combines three different functions: she is the Union's representative for the CFSP, the President of the Foreign Affairs Council and a Vice-President of the Commission. She is responsible for steering foreign policy and common security and defence policy and represents the Union on the international stage.

## Political and Security Committee

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) will remain the main preparatory and management body for CSDP missions/operations in the EU framework. The PSC monitors the international situation in the areas covered by the CFSP and contributes to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or of the HR or of its own initiative. It monitors the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the powers of the HR. The PSC exercises, under the responsibilities of the Council and of the HR, the political control and

strategic direction of the crisis management operations. The Lisbon Treaty does not introduce many changes to the main role of the PSC but the relationship with the HR will evolve because it will now be chaired by a representative of the HR<sup>1</sup>.

### European External Action Service

A major new entity, the European External Action Service, has been created as a result of the Lisbon Treaty. This single service, under the authority of the HR will help her coordinate the Union's external action (foreign affairs) as well as prepare policy proposals and implement them after their approval by Council. It will also assist President Van Rompuy and the Members of the Commission in their respective functions in the area of external relations and will ensure close cooperation with the Member States. The EEAS will be composed of single geographical (covering all regions and countries) and thematic desks, which will continue to perform under the authority of the HR the tasks currently executed by the relevant parts of the Commission and the Council Secretariat. The EEAS will be a service separate from the Commission and the Council Secretariat. It will have autonomy in terms of its administrative budget and management of staff. The EEAS is currently in an embryonic stage and Baroness Ashton has presented a proposal for its organisation and functioning with a view to its adoption by the Council<sup>2</sup>.

### Crisis Management Structures

To enable the HR to conduct CSDP, current EU crisis management organisations will work within the structure of the EEAS. Thus the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the EUMS will become part of the EEAS while taking full account of the specificities of their structures and preserving their particular functions, procedures and staffing conditions. The Situation Centre will also come under the EEAS umbrella, although it will continue to provide other relevant services to the European Council, Council and the Commission. These structures will form an entity placed under the direct authority and responsibility of the HR in her capacity of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy<sup>3</sup>.

### Crisis Management and Planning Directorate

One of the first changes we have seen, which is indirectly linked to the EEAS, has been the transfer of EUMS planners to the newly created CMPD. The CMPD was created to improve strategic planning at the political-strategic level. It was agreed that the Director of the EUMS Civilian/Military Cell would become the



WgCdr Tim Payne


Deputy Director of the CMPD and, together with six military planners, three civilian Action Officers, two assistants and two Commission posts, would transfer to the new Directorate. Following the transfer of personnel the EUMS Civilian/Military Cell was disbanded and the Military Assessment and Planning Branch was moved to the Operations Directorate. The new structure of the EUMS is shown on page 5.

### Way Ahead

The HR's proposal on the shaping of the EEAS has been forwarded to the Council for approval. From the start, as well as having the immediate support of the external relations structures of the Commission and of the GSC, the HR is supported by a small preparatory team which is composed of representatives of Member States, Commission and GSC. The Commission will prepare amendments to existing rules, such as the Staff and Financial Regulations to facilitate the organisation and functioning of the EEAS. Consultation with the European Parliament will also be continued during this stage.

The second stage for setting up the EEAS will be from the adoption of the Council decision to it reaching its full speed. A first status report is due in 2012. Subsequently, the Council, acting on a proposal by the HR, will review the Decision establishing the EEAS no later than the beginning of 2014.

### Conclusion

The creation of the EEAS provides an opportunity to increase coherence of the EU's external relations. It will bring together the EU's crisis management bodies under one umbrella and will support the HR in her CFSP activities. The EUMS will play a pivotal role in the new structure and will enable the EU to carry out its responsibilities for the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks. 

<sup>1</sup> Council Decision OJL 322 dated 9 Dec 09


<sup>2</sup> By the time of publication, this stage should be complete

<sup>3</sup> This arrangement will fully respect Declaration n° 14 annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon



# EU Missions and Operation



**S**ince 2003, the EU has conducted, or is conducting, 24 missions and operations under CSDP. Seven of these are military operations. The rest are civilian missions, although in many cases, a high proportion of personnel are also military. Currently, the EU is undertaking 13 missions and operations under CSDP (3 military, 10 civilian) 

Missions/Operations	EUROPE	AFRICA	MIDDLE EAST	ASIA
<b>Military</b>	<p><i>CONCORDIA (FYROM) Mar-Dec 03</i></p> <p><b>EUFOR ALTHEA</b> (Bosnia i Herzegovina) Dec 04 –</p>	<p><i>ARTEMIS (Ituri province, Congo RDC) Jun-Sep 03</i></p> <p><i>EUFOR RD Congo (Congo RDC) June 06 – Nov 06</i></p> <p><i>EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (Chad-Central African Republic) Jan 08 – March 09</i></p> <p><b>EU NAVFOR ATALANTA</b> (Coast of Somalia) Dec 08 –</p> <p><b>EUTM Somalia</b> (Training Mission - Uganda) Apr 10 –</p>		
<b>Civilian</b>	<p><i>EUPOL Proxima (FYROM) Dec 03 – Dec 05</i></p> <p><i>EUPAT (FYROM) Followed EUPOL Proxima Dec 05 – June 06</i></p> <p><b>EUPM BiH</b> (Bosnia i Herzegovina) 01 Jan 2003 31 Dec 2009</p> <p><i>EUJUST Themis (Georgia) Jul 04-Jul 05</i></p> <p><b>EUPT Kosovo</b> Apr 06 – 08</p> <p><b>EULEX Kosovo</b> 16 Feb 2008 –</p> <p><b>EUMM Georgia</b> 01 Oct 2008 –</p>	<p><b>EUSEC RD Congo</b> (Congo RDC) June 05 –</p> <p><i>EUPOL Kinshasa (Congo RDC) April 05 - June 07</i></p> <p><b>EUPOL RD Congo</b> (Congo RDC) July 07 – June 10</p> <p><b>EU SSR Guinea-Bissau</b> Feb 08 –</p> <p><i>AMIS II Support (Darfur province, Sudan) Jul 05 – Dec 07</i></p>	<p><b>EUPOL COPPS</b> (Palestinian Territories) Jan 06 –</p> <p><b>EUJUST LEX</b> (Iraq) Jul 05 –</p> <p><b>EUBAM Rafah</b> (Palestinian Territories) 30 Nov 05 –</p>	<p><i>AMM (Aceh province, Indonesia) Sept 05 - Dec 06</i></p> <p><b>EUPOL Afghanistan</b> 15 June 07 –</p>


Note: Missions/Operations in **bold blue** are ongoing.

# EUROPE

CIVILIAN MISSIONS

MILITARY MISSIONS

**BOSNIA**



**EUPM**

**Type:** **Police mission.** EUPM was the first CSDP operation launched by the EU on 1st January 2003.

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**Objectives:** EUPM seeks to establish effective policing arrangements **under BiH ownership** in accordance with best European and international practice. EUPM aims through mentoring, monitoring, and inspecting to establish a sustainable, professional and multiethnic police service in BiH. Provides support in the fight against organised crime and corruption.

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**Mandate:** Initiated in January 2003. EUPM I extended into EUPM II (Jan 2006-31 Dec 2007) with a refocused mandate on the above mentioned objectives. EUPM II has been extended into EUPM III from 1 Jan 2008 until 31 Dec 2009. EUPM has now been extended until 31 December 2011.

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**Commitment:** Authorized strength : 197 international staff. Current strength : 123 international and 155 local staff. 20 EU MS and 4 Third States are contributing to the Mission. The budget is €14,1 M.

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**Head of Mission:** **Brig. Gen. Stefan Feller** (De) is the Head of Mission. **(Valentin Inzko** (AT) is the EUSR\* in BiH.)

**GEORGIA**



**EUMM**

**Type:** **EU Monitoring Mission** under CSDP framework.

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**Objectives:** EUMM Georgia is monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire agreements of 12 August and 8 September 2008, brokered by the EU following the August 2008 War between Russian and Georgia. The Mission was launched on 1 October 2008, with four mandated tasks:  
**Stabilisation:** monitoring, analysing and informing about the situation pertaining to the stabilisation process, centred on full compliance of the agreements of 12 August and 8 September.  
**Normalisation:** monitoring, analysing and informing about governance, rule of law, security, public order and the return of internally displaced persons.  
**Confidence building:** contributing to the reduction of tensions through liaison and facilitation of contacts between parties.  
**Information:** providing objective information on what is happening on the ground in Georgia.

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**Mandate:** The mission was launched on 1 October 2008. Mandate has been extended **until 14 September 2010**.

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**Commitment:** Authorized strength : 323 international staff. Current strength : 311 international staff, 3 Brussels Support Element and 77 local staff. 26 EU MS are contributing to the Mission. The budget is €49.6 M. The Mission is headquartered in Tbilisi with 3 Regional Field Offices and 3 Forward Operating Bases.

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**Head of Mission:** **Hansjörg Haber** (DE) is the Head of Mission. **(Pierre Morel** (F) is the EUSR\* for the crisis in Georgia and **Peter Semneby** (SW) is the EUSR\* for the South Caucasus).

**BOSNIA**



**EUFOR ALTHEA**

**Type:** **Military EU-led operation.**

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**Objectives:** Ensure compliance with the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. Contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH. to support the High Representative/EUSpecial Representative for BiH and the local authorities. To provide capacity building and training to Armed Forces of BiH. Within means and capabilities to provide support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and relevant authorities, including the detention of Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWCs), and provide the security environment in which the police can act against the organised criminal network.

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**Mandate:** In December 2004, EUFOR took over responsibility to maintain a safe and secure environment in the BiH from NATO-led mission SFOR, under chapter 7 of charter of the United Nations.

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**Commitment:** In 2007 the force was reconfigured. The force now stands at approximately 2000 personnel from 20 EU member states and 5 Third contributing countries. The common costs (€23 M) are paid through contributions by MS to the financial mechanism Athena.

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**Command:** Operation ALTHEA is being conducted option under the Berlin+ arrangements. The EU has recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, with an EU OHQ at SHAPE. DSACEUR is the Op Cdr. Within this framework, **General McColl** (UK), was appointed Operation Commander for Operation ALTHEA in Oct 2007. **Major General Bernhard Bair** (AT) is the COM EUFOR. **Valentin Inzko** (AT) is the EUSR\* in BiH.

**KOSOVO**



**EULEX KOSOVO**

**Type:** The **EU Rule of Law Mission** in Kosovo (EULEX) is the **largest civilian mission** ever launched under the CSDP.

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**Objectives:** EULEX Kosovo's mandate is to monitor, mentor and advise local authorities with regard to police, justice and customs, while retaining executive responsibilities in specific areas of competence (organized crime, war crimes, inter-ethnic crime, public order as second security responder, etc.).

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**Commitment:** Authorised strength: 1950 internationals. Currently 1689 international, 5 Brussels Support Element and 1092 local staff. 26 EU MS and 6 Third States (Croatia, Norway, Switzerland, Canada, Turkey and USA) are contributing to the Mission. Budget: €265 MEUROS (until 14 June 2010). The HQs is located in Pristina.

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**Mandate:** EULEX KOSOVO was launched on 04 February 2008. Mandate runs until 14 June 2010, but is expected to be extended.

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**Head of Mission:** **Yves de Kermabon** (FR) is the EULEX Head of Mission. **Roy Reeve** (UK) is the Deputy Head of EULEX KOSOVO and former Head of EUPT (established in April 2006 to prepare EULEX Kosovo and is now in the liquidation phase). **(Pieter Feith** (NL) is the EUSR\* in Kosovo).

# AFRICA

CIVILIAN MISSIONS

MILITARY MISSIONS

## GUINEA BISSAU



### EU SSR Guinea-Bissau

**Type:** Support to **Security Sector Reform (SSR)**.

**Objectives:** Provide local authorities with advice and assistance on SSR in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, in order to contribute to creating the conditions for implementation of the National SSR Strategy, in close cooperation with other EU, international and bilateral actors, and with a view to facilitating subsequent donor engagement.

**Commitment:** Authorised strength : 27 internationals. Current Mission strength is 16 internationals (military and civilian advisers) and 17 local staff. 6 EU MS are contributing. The mission budget is €1.5 M (Dec 09 - May 10).

**Mandate:** Launched in June 2008. The mandate runs until 31 May 2010. Mission is expected to be extended.

**Command:** **General Juan Esteban Verástegui (ES)** is the Head of Mission.

## DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO



### EUPOL RD CONGO (ex- EUPOL Kinshasa)

**Type:** **Police mission** with a justice interface.

**Objectives:** Support SSR in the field of policing and its interface with the justice system.

**Commitment:** Authorized strength : 59 international staff. Current strength : 44 international and 16 local staff. 8 EU MS and 2 Third States (CAN, ANG) are contributing to the Mission. Expertises include police, judiciary, rule of law, human rights and gender balance. The budget is €5.1 M (Nov 09 - June 10).

**Mandate:** EUPOL RD Congo builds on EUPOL Kinshasa (2005-2007, the first EU mission in Africa). Launched 1 July 2007 initially for a year, it was extended twice, up to 31 **June 2010**. Mandate is expected to be extended. HQ is located in **Kinshasa** and an 'East antenna' was established in 2008 with Mission deployment in Goma (North Kivu) and Bukavu (South Kivu).

**Head of Mission:** **Superintendent Adilio Ruivo Custodio (PT)** is the Head of Mission. **Roeland van de Geer (NL)** is the EUSR\* for the Great Lakes Region and **Koen Vervaeke (B)** is the EUSR\* to the African Union).

## DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO



### EUSEC RD Congo

**Type:** Support mission in the field of **Security Sector Reform**.

**Objectives:** Provide advice and assistance for the reform of the Congolese Armed forces (FARDC). Focus on **restructuring** and **reconstructing the armed forces**.

**Commitment:** The authorized mission strength is **60**. Civilian and military expertises include defence, police, security, human resources, administrative and financial regulations. The HQ is located in **Kinshasa** with 4 detachments deployed in the four eastern military regions. The mission budget is €16 M since June 2005 plus a further €10.7 M for 2009-2010.

**Mandate:** EUSEC RD Congo was launched in June 2005. The mandate of the mission has been extended yearly until 30 September 2010.

**Head of Mission:** **Jean-Paul Michel (FR)** is the Head of Mission. **(Roeland Van de Geer (NL))** is the EUSR\* for the African Great Lakes Region

## SOMALIA



### EU NAVFOR Somalia (Operation "Atalanta")

**Type:** **Anti-piracy** maritime operation. First EU maritime operation, conducted in the framework of the CSDP.

**Objectives:** In support of 3 UN Security Council Resolutions adopted in 2008, the area of intervention is the Somali Coast and Somalia's territorial waters. The mission includes:

- **Protection** of vessels of the World Food Programme and vulnerable vessels;
- **Deterrence, prevention and repression;**
- Capacity to arrest, detain and transfer persons who have committed, or are suspected of having committed, acts of piracy or armed robbery.
- **All necessary measures**, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene.

**Commitment:** Initial Operational Capability was reached on 13 December 2008. EU NAVFOR I includes up to 20 vessels and maritime patrol aircrafts and up to **1 700** military personnel. The estimated financial reference amount for the common costs of the operation is €8.3 M. The EU Operational Headquarters is located at **Northwood (UK)**.

**Mandate:** Launched on 8 December 2008 and planned for a period of 12 months. Extended **until December 2010**. The area of operation is comparable to that of the Mediterranean.

**Command:** **Rear Admiral (Lower half) Jan Tornqvist (SW)** is the fifth Force Commander of EUNAVFOR. **Rear Admiral Peter Hudson (UK)** is the EU Operation Commander.

## SOMALIA



### EUTM Somalia

**Type:** **Military mission** to contribute to the training of Somali Security Forces.

**Objectives:** EUTM Somalia is to work with the Ugandan authorities to expand the training capacity of Bihanga Camp (Uganda) to 1,000 trainees every 6 months, conduct specialist modular training, including basic NCO and junior officer training up to platoon level, as agreed with the Ugandans/AMISOM/AU to complement the existing training programmes, in order to contribute to the strengthening of the Somali Security Forces.

**Commitment:** Full Operational Capability (FOC) was reached on 01 May 2010. EUTM comprises of up to 170 personnel. The estimated financial reference amount for the common costs of the operation is €4.8 M. The Mission Headquarters is located in Kampala, Uganda.

**Mandate:** Launched on 07 April 2010 and planned for two 6 month training periods after FOC. The training will be conducted mainly in Uganda.

**Command:** **Col Ricardo Gonzalez Elul (ES)** is the appointed EU Mission Commander. The mission commander exercises the functions of EU Operation Commander and EU Force Commander.



# MIDDLE-EAST ASIA

MILITARY MISSIONS

CIVILIAN MISSIONS

## PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES EUPOLC PPS

EU Police-Coordinating Office for Palestinian-Peace Support

### EUPOL COPPS

**Type:** Police and **Rule-of-Law** mission.

**Objectives:** To contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership in accordance with best international standards, in cooperation with the Community's institution building programmes as well as other international efforts in the wider context of Security Sector including Criminal Justice Reform.

**Commitment:** Authorized strength : 59 international staff. Current strength : 52 international (most of them police experts, judges and prosecutors) and 25 local staff. **16 EU MS and 2 Third States (NO,CAN)** are contributing to the Mission. The budget is **€6,6 M**. The Mission's HQ is in **Ramallah**.

**Mandate:** Launched on 1 January 2006 for an initial duration of **3 years**. Mandate runs **until 31 Dec 2010**.

**Senior Officer:** **Chief Constable Malmquist (SE)** is the Head of Mission. **(Marc Otte (BE))** is the EUSR\* for the Middle East Peace Process).

## PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES



### EU BAM RAFAH


**Type:** **Border Control** Assistance and Monitoring mission.

**Objectives:** Provide a third Party presence monitoring the Palestinian running of the International border crossing point with Egypt at Rafah (Rafah Crossing Point - RCP).

**Commitment:** Authorized strength: 84 internationals. Current strength : 16 international and 11 local staff. 7 EU MS are contributing to the Mission. HQ is located in Ashkelon, Israel The budget is €1,1 M (Nov 09 - May 10).

**Mandate:** Operational phase began on 25 November 2005 with duration of 12 months. **Extended three times**, mandate runs until 24 May 2010. Since the closing of the crossing point in June 2007, **operations are suspended** and the Mission has maintained its full operational capability and remained on standby, **ready to re-engage** and awaiting a political solution.

**Senior Officer:** **Alain Faugeras (F)** is Head of Mission. **(Marc Otte (BE))** is the EUSR\* for the Middle East Peace Process).



## IRAQ



### EUJUST LEX

**Type:** **Integrated Rule of Law** Mission. EUJUST LEX is the first EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission.

**Objectives:** Address the needs in the Iraqi criminal justice system through providing training for high and mid level officials in senior management and criminal investigation. This training shall aim to improve the capacity, coordination and collaboration of the different components of the Iraqi criminal justice system. The training activities are taking place in the EU (111 courses and 21 Work Experience Secondments) and in Iraq (11 courses so far) with ethnic and geographical balance or in the region (3 regional courses), with a total of 2975 Iraqi participants.

**Commitment:** **Authorized strength : 53 international staff** in Brussels and Baghdad. Current strength : 37 international in Brussels, 7 in Baghdad and 1 in Amman. 13 EU MS are contributing to the Mission. The budget is **€10,8 M**.

**Mandate:** Launched in March 2005 for an initial period of 12 months. Extended three times **until 30 June 2010**. **Chief Constable Francisco Alcantud (ES)** is Head of Mission.

## AFGHANISTAN



### EUPOL Afghanistan

**Type:** **Police Mission** with linkages into wider **Rule of Law**.

**Objectives:** Support to Government of Afghanistan in reforming the police system of the country through advising, mentoring, monitoring and training mainly in **criminal investigation, intelligence-led policing, police chain of command, control and communication, anti-corruption, police-prosecutors' linkages** and mainstreaming **human rights and gender** within the Ministry of Interior.

**Commitment:** Authorized strength : **400 international staff** (mainly police, law enforcement and justice experts). Current strength : 286 international, 4 Brussels Support Elements and 165 local staff. **21 EU MS and 4 Third States (Canada, Croatia, New Zealand and Norway)** are contributing to the Mission. Staff is deployed in Kabul (HQ) and in 16 provinces (located in Provincial Reconstruction Teams - PRTs). The Mission has a budget of **€81,4 M**.

**Mandate:** Launched in June 2007 and established for a period of at least 3 years, **until 15 June 2010**. Mandate is expected to be extended.

**Senior Officer:** **Kai Vittrup (DK)** is Head of Mission. **Vygaudas Ušackas (LT)** is the EUSR\* for Afghanistan).

NOTE: EUSRs\* and Personal Representatives\* are mentioned for info only: they are not in any chain of command. **Kees Klompenhouwer (NL, FR)** is the Civilian Operations Commander for all civilian CSDP missions. Heads of mission exercise command at operational level.

# Evolution of EUMS Intelligence Directorate and a way ahead

*By Brig Gen Gintaras Bagdonas (LT), EUMS Director of Intelligence, March 2007-2010.*

Over the last three years tremendous changes have been taking place in the EUMS Intelligence Directorate (Int Dir). The first of these changes came 'post' Wiesbaden, when the Council agreed on four measures towards the improvement of planning and support of operations, including the intelligence measure to enhance Member States (MS) intelligence support to EUMS. Because of the "Post-Wiesbaden" requirements, the Int Dir mission was extended beyond providing intelligence to early warning and situation assessment; Int Dir was now formally tasked with contributing to advance planning, crisis response planning, operations and exercises. This contribution was mainly embodied through the involvement and participation of Int Dir experts in EUMS planning and mission monitoring teams and the provision of intelligence analysis and inputs to planning and operation requirements. Towards supporting operations, a series of measures were implemented:

- the establishment of Community of Interest within the EUMS, which improves horizontal coordination between the military customers (planners) and Int Dir;
- a welcome package with necessary information ready to issue to an OHQ CJ2;
- a Military Intelligence System Support (MISS) project has been launched, which will embrace a database and a network between EU intelligence related bodies and Member States Defence Intelligence Organisations (DIO), and some others.

Irrespective of these measures taken by Int Dir, the main Intelligence support responsibility still resides with the Member States.

## Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity

The initiation of Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) at the beginning of 2007 had another significant impact on Int Dir. Under SIAC, the EU Situation Centre (SITCEN) and Int Dir issue joint intelligence products. The SIAC working arrangement is unique for several reasons. Firstly, because it sets the ground for joint intellectual efforts for analysts from the two main EU intelligence entities and prevents duplication; secondly, it has created conditions to implement the new intelligence sharing policy, whereby intelligence contributions provided by MS intelligence organisations are available for both SITCEN and Int Dir analysts; and finally, these arrangements have been conducted towards achieving the best quality intelligence products corresponding to the EU CSDP requirements.

## CSDP developments

Finally, CSDP developments and an evolution of the relevant EU intelligence bodies requires more institutionalised co-ordination amongst these bodies. Institutionalisation will be made possible by the development of an overarching EU Intelligence Support Concept that takes into account all actors, their responsibilities, tasks and procedures as well as defining the main principles of the Intelligence systems support architecture.

A lot of work has been done both on the civilian and military side to improve Intelligence support for the activities within the EU. Essential projects to promote and facilitate the cooperation between all relevant EU Intelligence actors have been launched. The development of an overarching EU Intelligence Support Concept will require major intellectual toil, exceptional professional skills and perseverance as well as collaborative effort of all EU Intelligence personnel. 🇪🇺



# CIS - Looking forward

*By Rear Admiral António Cabral(PT), Director CIS, EU Military Staff.*



**M**y forthcoming departure from EUMS this summer has prompted me to review the past 3 years and project the future, looking at whether the Communications and Information Systems (CIS) provision for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has lived up to its expectations and what one can expect in the coming years.

## CIS achievements

The CIS architecture is informed by the EU Concept for CIS for EU-led Military Operations. Since 2007, operational experience has grown and with it so has the development of the CIS. Most notably the EU Operations Centre (OPSCEN) has been declared operational and with it the supporting CIS infrastructure. Brussels has been interconnected with OHQs, FHQs and the EU Satellite Centre. The EU Command and Control Information System reached an initial operating capability last year. Also, the OPSCEN CIS Deployable Package (DP) has matured well since it was delivered to EUMS during the spring of 2007. The DP was deployed for first time during MILEX 07 and subsequently deployed and tested at each MILEX. The DP capabilities, including the manning, are being improved.

Our CIS responsibilities at the strategic level have largely been met with the obvious example of the EU Operations Wide Area Network (EOW) and associated collaborative applications. This year we will see secure voice, video and data services coming together on one

resilient infrastructure. There are also plans to extend the network to 12 additional member states over the next 3 years to further improve information exchange at this level. The Secretariat of the Council (GSC) CIS provider DGA 5, together with the INFOSEC Office and the Security Accreditation Authority, have been key to the establishment of the required GSC information technology infrastructure.

The CIS Concept was revised and approved in mid-2008 and we have contributed to a variety of other studies. For example the network enabled capability (NEC) concept and implementation study and information exchange requirement (IER) work sponsored by the European Defence Agency and the GSC, respectively. This takes time and is difficult but the operational dividends that are drivers behind these studies are worth the effort. The work leading the requirements process for computer network operations will be equally testing.

## CIS Challenges

It has not all been good news of course - it never is in the CIS world! Some projects here in GSC have proceeded at a less than desirable speed. Also, we have been set CIS challenges as the operational focus has developed into the maritime environment and as we move towards a more comprehensive approach. The required comprehensive, secure CIS architecture is still some way off. For example, work to improve the secure CIS support for Operation ATALANTA has highlighted some difficulties, even though the benefits of using the Internet have been seen. Mission-specific network is seen as a new CIS paradigm for harmonising operational security and interoperability.

## Vision

Looking towards the future, I believe there is a need to influence CIS governance arrangements within the process of the European External Action Service (EEAS) foundation to enable the benefits derived from NEC, IER, the comprehensive approach and associated projects to be fully exploited. An information management concept for CSDP would be a suitable formal vehicle to take this conclusion forward, perhaps resulting in the establishment of a Chief Information Officer for the EEAS.

In any event, we have an opportunity to put in place a revised governance structure to provide the strategic leadership not just for CIS, but the wider exploitation of information to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of CSDP. 🇪🇺



# Focused on Coordinated Strategic Planning - Crisis Management

## Exercise 09 (CME 09)

*Capt(N) Michael AARÖE (SE) CME 09 –ACOS J5 OPSCEN and Col Hans FOLMER (NL) CME 09–COS OPSCEN, provide IMPETUS with a detailed account of CME 09...*

### Preamble

The imperative to make the EU a well functioning institution is an overarching responsibility for all involved in EU Crisis Management. The ability to handle a global crisis in a coherent, flexible manner and with an enhanced capability is therefore highly desirable.

Every one involved is content with the need to have a more comprehensive view on EU global activities. Leadership, planning and coordination are all needed for an effective comprehensive approach to crisis management. There is a common interest, amongst the actors involved, to align the planning of civilian and military operations. Civilian operations are lead by the Civilian Operations Commander with support of the CPCC. For military operations one instrument is the EU Operations Centre (OPSCEN) located in Brussels and meant to be activated upon a decision by Council when no OHQ is available and a civilian - military response is required.

One step to achieve the common view is to exercise the coordination between these two HQs, civilian and military, in planning a civilian mission and a military operation in the same area of operations.

This article discusses the theme and challenges of coordinated military and civilian planning in an EU crisis management context and draws upon the experience gained by the military and civilian Operational headquarters during CME 09.

### Background and Aim of the Exercise CME 09

The aim was to exercise and evaluate a range of EU crisis management structures, procedures and consultation arrangements in the context of a crisis management operation requiring a rapid response without recourse to NATO common assets and capabilities, with a view to improving EU capacity, including the EU decision-making process, to manage crises with civilian and military instruments, including their co-ordination within the EU.

Furthermore the activation and functioning of the EU OPSCEN was to be exercised. Dedicated civilian and military planning took place during the period 23 November - 4 December 2009. The exercise effectively

started on the release of the Initiating Military Directive (IMD) and finished with the presentation of the military and civilian Concept of Operations (CONOPS) to the Political and Security Committee (PSC).

For the exercise the fictitious ALISIA scenario was used.

### Activation of the OPSCEN

The activation process of the OPSCEN starts with the adoption of the Council Decision. Firstly, designated 'double hatted' personnel from the EUMS move to the OPSCEN and start planning. Within a few days after activation the OPCDR and the primary augmentees from Member States arrive. Within five days after activation the OPSCEN reaches IOC and is able to commence strategic planning at the operational level. Subsequently the remaining double hatted and augmentees arrive in order to achieve FOC after 20 days. This allows the OpCdr to execute an operation of the size of the former operation 'Artemis' (i.e. approx 2000 personnel).

### Scenario

Against a background of structural crisis in an African country in transition and experiencing ethnic conflicts, the situation in ALISIA remains unstable. The IO's as well as EU's presence in the crisis area is multi-faceted. Upon request of the UN, the EU is considering to deploy an additional military force and to strengthen its already deployed EU Police Mission on the ground in support of the planned elections. Co-ordination of EU action in the field, and cooperation with other actors of the international community as well as ALISIA authorities is also ongoing.

The scenario required the military to plan a CONOPS for an operation and the civilians to update the CONOPS of the existing police mission. Of particular note, the scenario excluded the use of a Battlegroup.

### Stage of planning at the start

The CMC (approved by the Council) is agreed. The CMC, together with the MSO, the Council Decision and the approved IMD were part of the exercise documentation and formed the basis for further planning. During the first day of the exercise, the

augmentees arrived from the various member states and started their formal induction training -WUST. In the mean time the double hatted from the EUMS already started with stage 1 of the CONOPS development, the Military Assessment. Upon arrival of the Military OpCdr, the CJ5 presented the Military Assessment to all staff, seeking OpCdr's guidance. Normally the double hatted personnel from within the EUMS have already taken part in the development of the higher papers (CMC - IMD) and are well informed about the situation. This is also the first step in the Operational Planning Process; the Situation Assessment.

**Civilian and Military planning procedures**

As outlined in figure 1 below, civilian and military operational planning procedures move at a different pace. Both CONOPSs are developed by OpCdr (Mil and Civ) with support from higher command/Pol Strat level (CMPD, EUMS). During the exercise this was achieved in parallel between the Civ OpCdr and the Mil OpCdr.

The military OPLAN is developed by the Mil OpCdr while the civilian OPLAN is developed by HoM. As a consequence, the civilian CONOPS addresses details which on the military side are addressed in the OPLAN.

This creates difficulties in the decision making process especially when one has to coordinate using different timelines.

There are also some other differences in procedures e.g. Council Decision, budget and financing, and the use of Strategic Options or not.

A Civilian Rapid Response is a response within 30 days.

The EU Military and Civilian Crisis Response Planning process is depicted schematically in Figure 2.

**OHQ Multi National Core Planning Team**

The Multi National Core Planning Team (MNCPT) is a multi-divisional planning team within the OHQ, led by CJ5. It consists of representatives from all J- functional areas (J1-J9). It uses the EU Operational Planning Process (OPP), including the Estimate Process, as a tool for its work. Under the OpCdr's direction it is responsible for operational planning activities, including the drafting of the CONOPS, OPLAN and other planning products in the field of crisis response and contingency planning.

**Operational Planning Process (OPP)**


The OPP consists of 5 Stages with development of the Military Estimate Process within the first 3 stages: Initiation, Orientation and Concept Development. The Plan Development Process comprises the remaining two stages: Plan development and Plan review. It follows the NATO GOP (Generic Operational Planning Process) with the "snake" described in Figure 3.

**Coordinated planning measures**

The OpCdr's (OpsCen and CPCC) jointly considered before exercise start the coordination measures required during the CME 09. Among those were daily meetings between COSs and J5, exchange of Liaison officers and joint briefings of OpCdrs to the PSC.

Furthermore, during Committee work (EUMC and CIVCOM) both staffs were represented in order to follow the development and decisions affecting the respective CONOPSs. Staffs were also encouraged to take direct functional contacts during the daily work. This was highly facilitated by the collocation of the two staffs. However this synergy was not replicated in the Information Technology arena since both headquarters were obliged to work on separate networks.

**Figure 1. Civilian and Military planning documents and their approval**



**Outset of planning**

**Rapid Response Civ & Mil**

A Military Rapid Response is a period from 5 to 30 days and in emergency situations, it may be necessary to respond in less than 5 days (In the Headline Goal 2010, MS agreed on the more challenging timeline, primarily for EU Battlegroups).

Direct responsibility for coordination was achieved at the Planning Branch level of each headquarters staff (J5) and reinforced by the presence of exchange Liaison officers from both headquarters who were suitably empowered to take part in the respective planning and report back to their own OpCdrs and headquarters.

The early decision to align the civilian and military CONOPS templates enhanced the overall coordination

Figure 2. EU Crisis Response Planning Process at the Political and Strategic level





Figure 3. Military operational planning process (OPP)





effort. This was reinforced by an agreement at the OpCdr level, that both CONOPS would have the same common introductory sections (i.e. the situation in theatre, threat assessment, and the higher decisions taken by the PSC and the Council). This harmonisation allowed both headquarters to devote greater planning effort to the main body of their individual CONOPS and ensured that planning coordination issues were properly addressed.

As the exercise was based on a Rapid Response scenario, there was a deliberately limited planning timeline available for the two headquarters. Accordingly it was necessary for both staffs to adapt their standard planning procedures and conduct parallel planning to align the coordinated production of both CONOPSs with the necessary briefing requirements to higher authority. The development of the two CONOPSs was done in an iterative process involving both own iterative process as well as the coordination between the two CONOPSs at each planning stage of the OPP.

The presence of both the civilian and military OpCdrs at key decision-making committees (EUMC, CIVCOM, EUMCWG) was a prerequisite to enhance coordinated planning.

### Analysis of coordination requirements during CME 09

At the **Strategic level** The CMC is the overarching coordinating document which should give further guidance to the development of strategic options and directives to commanders. It gives the framework for how coordination should be performed at the civilian strategic and military strategic levels as well as the operational level. If coordinating directives are given in the CMC it will lubricate the relations between the two staffs and also gives, at the same time, a solid ground for further coordination.

At the **Operational level** the work with the development of CONOPS emphasised the need for coordination in certain areas. It is essential to avoid duplication of effort and to ensure a concerted and coherent EU commitment. At that state of planning, the following topics were identified that require further coordination between the military operation and the civilian mission and should be specified in the civilian and military OPLANs at HoM and FHQ level and in separate arrangements:

- Phasing and timelines in order to allow for coherence of effort.
- Assistance arrangements before IOC, including force protection and extraction and evacuation.
- Arrangements and delineation of tasks as well as complementarities regarding the respective actions must be established.
- Patrolling and Information gathering in theatre. Mutual procedures must be established to achieve coherence and to exploit synergies as much as possible.
- Co-location of HoM HQ with the FHQ to explore synergies, facilitate information exchange and to provide mutual assistance wherever feasible.
- Cohesion of Use of Force (UoF) policy and ROE.
- Arrangements for information exchange involving all actors in theatre must be established (for example a Joint Theatre Analysis Capability -JTACC)
- Set up of appropriate coordination mechanisms between HoM and FCdr, operational procedures about exchanging intelligence information and response in case of civil disturbance situations, police and military mutual support and force protection and evacuation support.
- Civilian information activities to be closely coordinated with military information activities in theatre in order to explore synergies and to ensure coherent delivered messages.
- Both missions will use independent strategic communication links but will allow redundant use in support of each other. Furthermore, interoperability between the 2 secure mail services must be granted to permit timely exchange of secure data between theatre and Brussels bodies.
- Arrangements must be established on the use of Medical Role 2 as well as forward and tactical MEDEVAC capabilities.
- Due to limited APOD capacity, coordination on all airport movements is required between civilian and military forces to optimize movement procedures under the given circumstances.
- There is an intention to establish a financial arrangement between civilian and military to compensate for the costs of coordinated actions.

### Conclusions

The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has given us a momentum and potential opportunity to enhance our collective ability to handle crises. Our decision-making processes and command structures must be flexible.

The coordination between military and civilian headquarters is essential and can only work if managed appropriately from the top. But this requires leadership, willingness, transparency and flexibility on all levels and within both the civilian and military community. This should be clearly articulated in the overarching Crisis Management Concept. It will be the basis for further coordinating work when developing CONOPSs and during the subsequent planning on the theatre level.

The successful outcome of the exercise CME 09 clearly shows the EU capability to coordinate in a flexible way between military operations and civilian missions. The next step in this area of capability development is to align the procedures in planning, to coordinate the work in the committees and to understand the differences between civilian missions and military operations amongst all those involved in crisis management. 🇪🇺

# Financing of CSDP military operations

*Lt Col Jiří ŠTIRBA (CZ) & Cdr Ramón GODÍNEZ MARÍN DE ESPINOSA (ES), Administration Branch, EUMS Logistics Directorate provide Impetus with an overview on funding of CSDP military operations...*



*Cdr Ramón GODÍNEZ MARÍN DE ESPINOSA (left) with Lt Col Jiří ŠTIRBA.*

## Introduction

Article 41 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) sets the principles for the financing of civilian and military crisis management operations. Under that provision, the expenditure related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) shall be charged to the Union budget, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications and cases where the Council unanimously decides otherwise.

In September 2003, the Council decided that the European Union should acquire a flexible capacity for managing the financing of common costs of military operations through a permanent mechanism which would also define the scope of such common costs.

Consequently, the Council of the EU established a special mechanism called “**ATHENA**”, in February 2004<sup>1</sup>.

## Common Funding of military operations

The ATHENA mechanism has a permanent structure and legal capacity and is managed under the authority of a Special Committee (SC) which is composed by one representative of each Member State of the European Union, with the exception of Denmark.

The Military Operation Commander (OpCdr), is the authorising officer for an operation and discharges his/her duties on behalf of ATHENA in relation to the financing of the common costs<sup>2</sup> of the operation.

Where there is no OpCdr, the ATHENA Administrator is the authorising officer.

## Common Costs

ATHENA manages the common costs from the preparatory phase to the termination of each military operation. Common costs are listed in the annexes of the Council decision on ATHENA.

During **the preparatory phase** of an operation (i.e. from the date of the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) approval to the date of appointment of the OpCdr), ATHENA mainly finances the costs for transport, accommodation and use of operational communications tools necessary for exploratory missions and preparations (in particular fact-finding missions) by military forces.

From the date the OpCdr is appointed, **the active phase** begins and ATHENA finances most incremental costs for Operation/Force and Component Headquarters, as well as incremental costs for infrastructure for the forces as a whole, MEDEVAC and Role 2 and 3 facilities at theatre operational element level (i.e. Ports of disembarkation). Furthermore, the Council may decide to fund in common transport costs of the forces and costs for multinational task force HQs. Based on the OpCdr request, the SC may approve financing of some pre-defined costs related, for example, to the lodging of forces deployed for the operation, essential additional equipment, Role 2 medical facilities in theatre (other than those mentioned above), acquisition of information or other critical theatre-level capabilities.

During **the winding up phase** costs mainly incurred for financing the final destination for equipment and infrastructure are commonly funded.

Finally, both the Council of the EU and the SC may decide on a case-by-case basis that certain expenditures can be financed in common for a given operation.

## Contributions by MS and Early financing

In accordance with the TEU, contributions to ATHENA are based on Gross National Income (GNI) scales (See Figure 2). Third states may also contribute to the financing of a given military operation.

In order to improve the rapid reaction capability of the European Union, an early financing process has been set up. 18 Member States (MS) have participated in the provisional financing scheme and ATHENA is endowed with provisional appropriations exceeding €12m. The remainder of MS shall pay their contributions to the common costs within 5 days following the Council

<sup>1</sup> Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP of 23 February 2004, last amended by the Council Decision 2008/975/CFSP of 18 December 2008 (Official Journal of the EU, No. L 345/96, 31.12.2008).

<sup>2</sup> Military expenditure not eligible as common costs are financed directly by Troop Contributing Nations.

decision to conduct an EU Military Rapid Response operation. In addition, each of the 18 Member States may decide individually that its contribution to the provisional appropriations (up to 75%) can be used for an operation other than Rapid Response.

**EU - led military operations common costs**

In order to illustrate the amount of incremental common costs of recent EU-led military operations, payment appropriations from ATHENA annual budgets are listed below:

**Figure 1. Annual Budgets**

	2008	2009	2010
EUFOR ALTHEA	€21.8M	€25.7M	€23M
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA	€119.6M	€19M	
EU NAVFOR Somalia:		€8.4M	€9.3M

Although it can be considered as a significant amount, the ratio of costs financed in common to total costs for an operation is relatively small - normally less than 10%.

**Figure 2. GNI Scales**

in percentage

Member State	GNI Scale
Belgium	2,935
Bulgaria	0,295
Czech Republic	1,105
Germany	20,795
Estonia	0,115
Ireland	1,165
Greece	2,091
Spain	8,886
France	16,833
Italy	13,043
Cyprus	0,152
Latvia	0,156
Lithuania	0,228
Luxemburg	0,247
Hungary	0,727
Malta	0,050
Netherlands	5,011
Austria	2,362
Poland	2,474
Portugal	1,338
Romania	1,123
Slovenia	0,313
Slovakia	0,597
Finland	1,550
Sweden	2,539
United Kingdom	13,871
<b>Total 26 MS</b>	<b>100%</b>

Note: Denmark does not participate in the ATHENA mechanism.

**Manning and Training**

It is of vital importance to have financial experts available from the preparatory phase of operational planning to the closure of all financial aspects of the operation.

A significant increase in the number of OHQ/FHQ J8 Key nucleus and Primary Augmentee posts was

reflected in the latest revision of the EU Manning Guide (2009). Moreover, regular ATHENA Training Seminars, open to financial and other military/civilian experts, were attended by over 400 participants during the period 2007-2009. In addition to regular training, pre-deployment training specifically tailored for appointed financial officers is provided by ATHENA with EUMS/EU HQs support.

**Administrative arrangements**

Financial and procurement rules applicable to expenditures financed through ATHENA are defined by the SC<sup>3</sup>.

The key contracting rule of full transparency and equal treatment requires strict adherence to the financial procedures agreed by MS.

The Third Party Logistics Support (TPLS) database project has been developed under the European Defence Agency (EDA) to facilitate such transparency.

Furthermore, three administrative arrangements (with MCCE; AMSCC; EdA)<sup>4</sup> have been signed by the ATHENA Administrator. Both, TPLS and administrative arrangements, have as a key purpose to ensure a choice of suppliers to facilitate the launch and running of operations.

**Comprehensive approach**

Civilian crisis-management missions are funded from the CFSP budget. This means in practice, that there are two separate funding mechanisms for funding CFSP initiatives. Moreover, other different sources of funding exist such as those dedicated to contribute to consolidate and promote democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law, to support sustainable development at the economic, social and environmental level of the partner countries and more particularly the developing countries. Member states or troop contributing nations may also provide funds directly for national use in an operation area. The different funding arrangements must be adapted as necessary to timely meet the requirements for comprehensive planning and action.

**Conclusions**

The ATHENA mechanism, has only been in existence since 2004 and has already been revised on 4 occasions. It is recognised as a "living mechanism" which makes use of lessons from operations and adapts to new requirements from any new type of military operation or mission. The ATHENA mechanism is a flexible tool defining the normal minimum level of common costs.

Financial experts remain a key member of the commander's staff in all phases of an operation.

The challenge in future complex operations will be to ensure timely financial funding stemming from different funding regimes to conduct comprehensive actions. 🇪🇺

<sup>3</sup> Act of the Special Committee "Financial Rules applicable to expenditures financed through ATHENA", (ATHENA doc. 1203/2008 and 1107/1/09 REV1).

<sup>4</sup> MCCE - Movement Coordination Centre Europe; AMSCC - Athens Multinational Sealift Coordination Centre; EdA (FR) - Economat des Armées.



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## SG/HR Farewell to EUMS



Despite a rather hectic schedule of events on his final day in office as Secretary General/High Representative, Mr Javier Solana still took the opportunity to bid farewell to Lt Gen Leakey (DG) and the members of the EUMS, on 30 November.

## Long service medals



Our EUMS colleagues, Ms Julie Bloom (Assistant to DDG) and Mr Eddy Dehaes (Assistant Admin - Registry) proudly display their Robert Schumann medals to mark 20 years of service as European Public Servants.

## Visit of Finnish Minister of Defence



Lt Gen Leakey (DG) welcomes Mr Jyri Häkämies, Minister of Defence Finland, during the Finnish delegation visit to EUMS

## Visit from 'Down Under'



Col Blommestijn (centre), Chief EXO, with members of the Australian Parliament during their courtesy visit to EUMS.

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