




Bulletin of the EU Military Staff

IMPETUS

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PREPARATION



Knowledge Management

ESDP and the Law



THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Photo: EU/SSR/Colmeiro/Esau, July 2009

EU Military Capabilities

Lieutenant General David Leakey, Director General EU Military Staff (DGEUMS), answers interviewer's' questions on '10 years of ESDP'.

Impetus: Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina – your impressions?

Lt Gen Leakey: My first experience with ESDP was in Bosnia and Herzegovina as Commander of EUFOR ALTHEA in 2004, when the EU took over from NATO. We set up the EU headquarters in Sarajevo, took over some 7000 soldiers and 5 years later we're still delivering the stability there. I think the EU did a very good job. The military effect which the EU has developed has delivered on the ground.

Q: Is the EU becoming militarily capable, competent, and effective?

Lt Gen Leakey: If I look at other operations which have been done by the EU over the same time frame, the EU has proved itself as being militarily capable, militarily competent, and militarily effective. It's not easy to

3500 soldiers to Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA). This is one of the most inhospitable, difficult-to-reach places in the world, where the climate varies from the hot-dry summer, where nothing grows, where it's almost too hot to walk outside, to the rainy season when often you're better travelling around in a boat or helicopter because wheeled vehicles cannot go anywhere due to flooding.

This is a part of central Africa, middle Africa, which is as far away from any seaport as you can get, so for the EU to have delivered 3 5 0 0 soldiers, secured its lines of

communication from the port, set up a command and control structure, and done what we said we would do with the mission is indeed an achievement and reflects well on current capabilities. Our EU soldiers delivered security, security for the refugees, for the internally displaced people; they enabled the humanitarian, non-governmental organisations not only to conduct their activities with an umbrella of security around them, but also allowing them access to places where access had been denied, either by the activities of armed groups, or indeed just sheer banditry. That the Chad/RCA operation delivered security, set up the infrastructure and the operation which we handed over to the UN (MINURCAT), exactly as we promised we would do, to time, I think proves that the EU has got a really usable, capable, expeditionary military capability, which is useful for the international community, and useful for the European interests.

Q: Euro - army?

Lt Gen Leakey: We don't have as some people think a Euro-army; there is no standing EU army. I don't think there ever will be a euro-army. That is a myth that euro-sceptics talk about. We are like the UN, like NATO,

like the OSCE, just an umbrella organisation, we don't have standing forces. When there is an operation, when there is political will by the EU member states to deliver an operation on the ground, then the EU Military Staff has the job of starting to generate from the Member States the military capabilities to enable that operation to take place.

Q: And what about EU military capabilities?

Lt Gen Leakey: There are three aspects to EU military capabilities. The first is the raw hardware of the military capability. The EU doesn't have a standing military capability. As I said we do not have a euro-army. We do have the battlegroups

though. At any one time the EU has two battlegroups on stand-by, able to deploy at very few days notice, to be operational on the ground within 30 days. So the EU does have a rapid response capability. This is in response to the genesis of ESDP, back in the 1990s, when the Europeans collectively were not able to act when the Balkans caught fire. Now we can. Not just in the Balkans if we needed to, but in Africa, in the Caucasus, in Asia....

A second aspect to EU capabilities is that of Defence budgets. In short, EU military capability may well be directly compromised by lack of sufficient funding. This is a huge challenge in these tough financial times. The EU can play


its part by encouraging Member States to develop capability more economically through enhanced co-operation with the European Defence Agency and collaboration between Member States.

The third aspect is the willingness to be "employed". A lot of people say: "well we haven't deployed the battlegroups; we haven't deployed forces". **Deploying** is a benign activity, it's an administrative activity, and it's a logistic activity. It's the **employment** which is the business end of the military capability. I think that the one thing which we as Europeans need to look out for is our willingness to **employ** our soldiers on operations.

We need to preserve, as Europeans, our willingness to **employ**. If you put the military on the ground,

“We need to preserve our willingness to employ.”

“A Euro-army is a myth that euro-sceptics talk about.”



With some 3500 soldiers deployed in a hostile environment, EUFOR Tchad/RCA was one of the most challenging operations for the EU. (Photo EUFOR Tchad/RCA).

soldiers, sailors, the air forces, they have to be prepared to fight, they have to be prepared to take risks, that's what the military are for. They have to be prepared to take life, to sacrifice life and it means not only the military has to be prepared to do that but the political class has to be prepared to take decisions to do that, the media have to be prepared to understand that and to support it, and our populations in our member states countries have to be prepared to accept those risks and to support their military when they're employed on operations.

Q: What else is important?

Lt Gen Leakey: Military ethos, the warrior ethos. And that warrior ethos needs to be sustained. It is very much part of military capability. I think that Europeans have in recent years come in for some criticisms for not being prepared

to take those risks, to share the burdens in combat operations, and I think we need to focus as much on the warrior ethos of our military capability as on the hardware.

Q: So there is still work to be done?

Lt Gen Leakey: If we allow our military capabilities to decline, not to be modernised, we are in serious trouble. We must adapt to the contemporary environment. Where we're not fighting conventional forces - force on force operations - our operations are more and more amongst the people: where you never know where your enemy are; your enemy seldom wears a uniform; they're seldom identified; they're seldom in one place lined up against you. We need to continue to develop and modernise our military capability to



“Individual States cannot deliver singly.”

Member states cannot do these things on their own. We need to share resources, pool resources, collaborate on developing capabilities in order to do it economically as well as efficiently. As I said at the outset, “the military effect which the EU has developed has delivered on the ground” - the question now is - “can we continue to deliver that military capability into the future?”

¹ Council Secretariat Press Office video interview, 30 July 2009. See www.esdp10years.eu



The Europeans need to share and pool resources to address their needs in capabilities. (Photo EUFOR Tchad/IRCA).



Diplomat and Commander

Interview with **General Henri Bentegeat**, the outgoing **Chairman of the EU Military Committee**.

Impetus: As you approach the end of your term in office, would you describe it as a successful tenure?

Gen Bentegeat: Since its foundation almost 10 years ago, the European Security and Defence Policy has progressed steadily. The Military Committee, with the invaluable support of the Military Staff, has been directly involved in this progress, given its multifaceted role in supervising capability development, agreeing common concepts and procedures, guiding the Strategic Military Planning Process, advising the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and monitoring the ongoing operations.

In particular, I would like to mention that during the last three years we have updated almost all the concepts as a result of our internal lessons learned process and cooperated with the European Defence Agency in preparing an innovative Capability Development Plan for the more economical use of our shrinking financial resources.

“We have updated almost all the concepts as a result of our internal lessons learned.”

That said, the most visible step forward of ESDP has been the two most recent military operations - EUFOR Tchad/RCA and EUNAVFOR Op Atalanta - and the civilian missions - EULEX Kosovo and EUMM Georgia that have been launched since 2007, in conjunction with other previous commitments in crisis areas, such as Operation Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina.

Speaking about the military side, the EU has proven itself capable to launch and conduct, independently and successfully, not only a land operation with extreme logistical challenges - as was the case in Chad and the Central African Republic - but also a counter piracy maritime operation off the coast of Somalia. This is the result of the attention given to the development

of suitable command and control structures, both common - the Military Staff, the Operations Centre but also the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability - and national - the five national Operation Headquarters.

Of course, nothing could and can be done without the commitment, in terms of assets and funds, of Member States, but it is a fact that ESDP is more and more perceived, within and outside the Union, as a capable and effective tool for crisis management.

Q: What are the challenges ahead for your successor Gen Hakan Syrén?

Gen Bentegeat: On 6 November 2009, Gen. Syrén will assume the role of Chairman of the European Union Military Committee. May I emphasise that the Military Committee, being the forum for the Chiefs of Defence, or their Military Representatives, of the 27 Member States of the European Union, is chaired by its Chairman but decides collectively.

That said, I believe that the Committee, and Gen. Syrén, will face three main challenges in the near future: the future of EUFOR Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina; the reinforcement of EU cooperation with other global security actors, such as the United Nations and NATO; and the continued development of our Battlegroups concept. Moreover, should the Lisbon Treaty enter into force, the Committee will be closely involved in its implementation.



Gen. Henri Bentegeat (Photo EUMC)

Q: Can you outline for Impetus your thoughts on the working relationship between the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff?

Gen. Bentegeat: The European Union Military Staff is the main body supporting the Military Committee. All documents, concepts, military advices and matters discussed during the meetings of the EUMC are generally initiated and staffed by the EUMS, thus the need to have it adequately manned and well led at all times.

Mindful of how important the role of the EUMS is to the proper functioning of the Military Committee, I must say that the relationship between us is extremely co-operative and professional, a fact that the members of the Committee have often acknowledged at our meetings. I should also add that my personal relationship with General Leakey (DGEUMS) has always been very friendly and trustful.

Q: Any final thoughts or reflections prior to your departure as Chairman EUMC?

Gen. Bentegeat: Once my candidature was welcomed by the Chiefs of Defence I was conscious that I was

going to play a much more diplomatic role than that of a Commander, with significant units and assets under my direct command.

After having followed and given orders for forty years, you can appreciate that this was not a minor change. However, after almost three years of service in my appointment, I can say that I have only very occasionally regretted it. As Chairman of the European Union Military Committee, I not only had the honour of being “primus inter pares”, but the professional satisfaction of having positively contributed to the development of the ESDP and, more generally, of the European Union as a global actor in crisis management ■

The Military Committee is the highest military body within the EU council, and was set up within the framework of the European Policy of Security and Defence. It is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of each member state or their Military Representatives. The EUMC provides the Political and Security Committee (PSC) with military advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU.



The outgoing Chairman EUMC, General Bentegeat (right) in discussion with his successor, Swedish General Hakan Syrén.

Reaching Forward

The EUMS CIS Directorate goes into the field!

Lt Col Chris Stace from the Communications & Information Systems Directorate helps us to better understand a complex capability.

The Communications and Information Systems (CIS) Directorate mission statement comprises diverse tasks - from contribution to ESDP Policies and guidance for implementation, operation and maintenance of CIS in support of ESDP, to providing CIS expertise for strategic and operational planning. One of the most interesting part of the mission is operating the CIS Deployable Package (DP) to support the EU Operations Centre (OPSCEN) and providing daily Information Technology (IT) support to the EUMS and the OPSCEN...

The Deployable Package

• A Battlefield Concept

According to the "higher-to-lower" principle stated inside the EU Concepts for EU-led Operations, the EU OPSCEN, when activated, has to maintain strategic communications with the subordinate formations installed in remote areas. This requirement is accomplished via the DP, which is fully supported by the CIS IT & Security Branch.




"The Deployable Package is designed to be deployed at the theatre of operations in a very short time. It was deployed for the first time during MILEX 07, has supported MILEX 08 and 09, and is regularly deployed and tested for maintenance and training purposes."

Maj Loukas, CIS Directorate.

The Deployable Package is a critical capability in operations. (Photo: Major Loukas, EUMS)

• A Satellite Capability

The DP is a collection of CIS assets, providing secure communications between the OPSCEN and the Force Headquarters (FHQ) at its deployed position, and in particular aiming at the fast and easy installation of EU Secure Office Local Area Network (SOLAN) extension as well other secure applications and facilities at the operations theatre. The DP CIS services are provided over a commercial satellite link, and currently they comprise Data, Video Tele-Conference (VTC) and Voice services in the future.



The Deployable package is a dedicated EUMS Capability. Source: EUMS.

• A Critical Enabler

The DP is managed, maintained and operated by a small team of 8 from CIS Directorate and is critical to enabling the EU OPSCEN's current and emerging operational deployment requirements.

Comprehensive CIS – at home and in the field

• CIS Requirements

The CIS Directorate's main role is to set requirements. This is done in close harmony with our contemporaries elsewhere in the General Secretariat (DGA5, INFOSEC Office, and Security Accreditation Authority), through work within the EDA project teams, and most importantly, interaction with EU Member States CIS staff.

• Brussels Networks

Practically, EUMS staff works with nominated operational headquarters (HQs) to plan and put in place the CIS to meet operational requirements. Within Brussels, in collaboration with the DGA5 CIS providers, the CIS Directorate provides user level security administration services for local networks within the EUMS. The Directorate also ensures CIS infrastructure readiness and availability, locally or remotely, in order to achieve satisfactory situational awareness for the decision-makers.

• Support to Civilian Missions

Notably too, the CIS Directorate provides close support to the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). This support consists of planning advice and in the case of EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Rafah and EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) Georgia, on the ground hands-on assistance to set up the required CIS infrastructure ■

EUBAM RAFAH

In January 2009, as requested by CPCC, EUMS officers supported a mission devoted to potential reactivation of EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah (EUBAM RAFAH) whose activities had been frozen after an eruption of violence in the Gaza Strip. The required skills were medical and CIS.

"...for EUMS this was a good opportunity to have officers working in their field of expertise within EU missions. They can maintain their CIS skills but also increase their ESDP experience. Also, from a Comprehensive Approach perspective this is a valuable way to improve civilian-military interactions." Lt Col Albertini-Rosso, CIS Directorate.

African Union Mission in Somalia

In October last year, the Commission of the African Union (AU) Department of Peace and Security submitted a formal request to the EU for external staff support to the Strategic Planning and Management Unit (SPMU) of the AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) in different areas of expertise, including CIS.

The support provided by EUMS greatly underlined how serious the EU is committed to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and in particular to the Peace and Security Partnership. In terms of CIS the tasks and responsibilities were diverse, including CIS current and contingency planning and conducting of CIS operational support to AMISOM.

"Proposals for manning, job descriptions and training for AMISOM troops in the areas of CIS were well received by the AU decision-makers." Lt Col Tiganus, CIS Directorate.

From Preparation to Implementation

The Challenging Mission of the EUMS Operations Directorate-Crisis Response/Current Ops Branch

Capt (N) Antoine Devaux completed his three year appointment as **Branch Chief Crisis Response/ Current Operations** this summer. In this article he shares his impressions on the work being conducted within the branch.

Carl von Clausewitz stated that "Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war." This is indeed what we in EUMS are experiencing in a different context and what we have to overcome on a daily basis.

After three years in the Operations Directorate, looking back gives me a great degree of satisfaction. My previous experience as a DSACEUR¹ liaison officer at the EUMS for operations Concordia and Althea has been richly enhanced during my time as an EUMS Branch Chief. In this position, in addition to Op Althea (BiH) and the 2005 - 2007 support to AMIS in Darfur, I have

been directly involvement in three challenging military operations since summer 2006: EUFOR RD Congo from July to December 2006, EUFOR Tchad/RCA from January 2008 to Summer 2009 and EU NAVCO (now EUNAVFOR - Op Atalanta) from September 2008.

After the lessons learned from our initial military operations Concordia and Artemis, and Althea to an extent, we can say that ESDP has now really matured and achieved a good balance between civilian missions and military operations. The EU, through its ESDP capability is indeed recognised as a serious actor in crisis management.

The work within EUMS has evolved as well, in particular with the so-called post-Wiesbaden measures. Those measures derived from the experience of EUFOR RD Congo are aimed at improving the operational effectiveness of the planning process at EUMS level, pending the creation of a permanent Operation Headquarters (OHQ) or the activation of a specific OHQ for an operation.

Focusing efforts on Preparation

This has specifically highlighted the necessity for EUMS to conduct more advance or early planning and to be in position to provide a sound military input to the draft political-military documents. EUMS is now more engaged in the process. The action officers of the Current Operations Branch contribute on an ongoing basis to such activities, bringing into the related teams their expertise, operational experience and sense of realism.

Once the OHQ for an operation has been set up, the responsibility of planning work lies naturally with the Branch, in the form of so-called Mission Monitoring Teams (MMTs). Such teams consist of about twenty

¹ Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe

officers from different directorates of the EUMS, providing a very broad and comprehensive range of expertise. The aim of the MMT is twofold: support the EU Military Committee and support the Operation Commander.

Firstly, MMT supports the EU Military Committee in formulating the guidance to the Operation Commander and providing its military advice to the political authorities, following the work of the various committees dealing with the preparation of the operation. Second, MMT supports the Operation Commander in various forms, such as sending liaison officers or specific experts, providing handover teams regarding the advance planning performed, providing EU "cultural" support, linking the OHQ with non-military EU or non-EU actors, giving advice on

issues sensitive to Member States or on the coherence of the draft documents with received guidance or EU concepts. Furthermore, since there is no permanent OHQ structure, the experience gained from former operations lies to a great extent within the EUMS and must be shared as required.

MMTs have naturally not only been activated for all operations, but recently, for all exercises as well. This is important because it provides the OHQs with the proper level of interaction as they would have when preparing a real operation. Again, this entails a significant burden for the MMT, but is linked

to the ephemeral nature of our command structure.

Developing Information Strategy

There are also other activities for the Branch beyond operations. They are partially linked to the EUMS experience with other tasks linked in particular to the implementation of various "information activities". Whilst we are moving increasingly into an information society, those activities have gained importance. This is the case even if we are operating in different societies since there are significant interactions with the deployed force itself.

We move indeed more and more away from purely "kinetic" activities and we therefore need to fully consider those other aspects that can influence perceptions and understandings from the very onset. In this regard, the EU has adopted a really comprehensive approach with the concept of EU Information Strategy that is managed at the Brussels level and relates to every aspect of the EU action.

To prepare for action, the EU has adopted a number of mechanisms or structures to address military rapid response. The Branch is obviously the EUMS lead here and uses this to help the OHQs in framing their operations. At the same time, thinking upstream on implementation develops awareness in this framework to enhance the

operational and realistic character of these concepts.

Improving Coordination

Again, comprehensiveness comes at a premium in the operational context, and recent operations have allowed for the development of progress in this regard. EUFOR Tchad/RCA has witnessed a real in-depth EU-wide and inter-pillar approach to the operation. Tangible results on the ground have met the efforts invested both in Brussels and in theatre. Op Atalanta success on the other hand is clearly linked to the unity of purpose between the various EU actors. The Crisis Response Coordination Team (CRCT), led by DGE 8, coordinates this work effectively, implementing the strategic direction given by the Political and Security Committee (PSC).

Obviously, as is often said when the crystal ball is not transparent, ESDP is at a crossroads. Further progress in the field of the comprehensive approach lies primarily with the proposed establishment of the Civil Military Planning Directorate (CMPD) and the definition of its relationship with the other EU actors in the potential framework of the Lisbon Treaty. However, EU is already an efficient and recognised actor on security and defence issues as highlighted by the success of the Chad/CAR operation and Op Atalanta. However, any limit to its further development will depend on the political willingness of the Member States. Whatever they decide, we will implement ■



EU Missions and Operations



Since 2003, the EU has conducted, or is conducting, 23 missions and operations under ESDP. Six of these are military operations. The rest are civilian missions, although in many cases, a high proportion of personnel are also military. Currently, the EU is undertaking 12 missions and operations under ESDP (2 military, 10 civilian) ■

Missions/Operations	EUROPE	AFRICA	MIDDLE EAST	ASIA
Military	CONCORDIA (FYROM) Mar - Dec 03	ARTEMIS (Ituri province, Congo RDC) Jun - Sep 03		
	EUFOR ALTHEA (Bosnia i Herzegovina) Dec 04 -	EUFOR RD Congo (Congo RDC) Jun 06 - Nov 06		
		EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (Chad-Central African Republic) Jan 08 - Mar 09		
		EU NAVFOR ATALANTA (Coast of Somalia) Dec 08 -		
Civilian	EUPOL Proxima (FYROM) Dec 03 - Dec 05	EUSEC RD Congo (Congo RDC) Jun 05 -	EUPOL-COPPS (Palestinian Territories) Jan 06 -	AMM (Aceh province, Indonesia) Sep 05 - Dec 06
	EUPAT (FYROM) Followed EUPOL Proxima Dec 05 - June 06	EUPOL Kinshasa (Congo RDC) Apr 05 - June 07	EUJUST LEX (Iraq) Jul 05 -	EUPOL (Afghanistan) 15 Jun 07 -
	EUPM BiH (Bosnia i Herzegovina) 01 Jan 03 - 31 Dec 09	EUPOL RD Congo (Congo RDC) Jul 07 - Jun 10	EUBAM Rafah (Palestinian Territories) 30 Nov 05 -	
	EUJUST Themis (Georgia) Jul 04 - Jul 05	EU SSR Guinea-Bissau Feb 08 -		
	EUPT Kosovo Apr 06 - 08	AMIS II Support (Darfur province, Sudan) Jul 05 - Dec 07		
	EULEX Kosovo 16 Feb 08 -			
	EUMM Georgia 01 Oct 08 -			

Note: Missions/Operations in **blue bold** are ongoing. Missions/Operations in *italics* are completed

CIVILIAN MISSIONS

MILITARY MISSIONS

Bosnia



EUPM

Type: **Police mission.** EUPM was the first ESDP operation launched by the EU on 1st January 2003.


Objectives: EUPM seeks to establish effective policing arrangements **under BiH ownership** in accordance with best European and international practice. EUPM aims through mentoring, monitoring, and inspecting to establish a sustainable, professional and multiethnic police service in BiH. Provides assistance in the fight against organised crime and corruption.

Mandate: Initiated in January 2003. EUPM I extended into EUPM II (Jan 2006-31 Dec 2007) with a refocused mandate on the above mentioned objectives. EUPM II has been extended into EUPM III from 1 Jan 2008 **until 31 Dec 2009**. Another extension of other 2 years is foreseen for the end of the year.

Commitment: Mission staff total: **363**, includes 152 International Police, 27 International Civilian staff from **33 countries** (27 EU and 6 non-EU) and **211** BiH staff. The budget is **€14.8 M** (2008)

Head of Mission: **Brig. Gen. Stefan Feller** (De) is the Head of Mission.

EUSR: **Valentin Inzko** (AT) is the EUSR* in BiH.



EUROPE

Georgia



EUMM Georgia

Type: **EU Monitoring Mission** under ESDP framework.

Objectives: Contribute to stability throughout Georgia and the surrounding regions in accordance with the six-point Agreement and the subsequent implementing measures. This scope includes Russian troop withdrawals, as well as violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. The focus includes: support to the **stabilisation** process, **normalisation** building, return of **IDPs and refugees**, reduction of tensions, **confidence-building** measures and **information** on EU policy making.

Mandate: The mission was launched on 1 October 2008. The expected initial duration is 12 months. Mandate extended **until 14 September 2010**.

Commitment: Approximately **350 staff** (including personnel of HQs and field offices) and out of it over **200 monitors**. 26 EU MS are contributing to the mission. The budget is **€49.6 M**. The mission is headquartered in Tbilisi with 3 regional field offices and 3 Forward Bases.

Head of Mission: **Hansjörg Haber** (DE) is the Head of Mission. (**Pierre Morel** (F) is the EUSR* for the crisis in Georgia).

EUSR: **Peter Semneby** (SW) is the EUSR* for the South Caucasus.

Bosnia



EUFOR ALTHEA

Type: **Military EU-led operation.**

Objectives: Ensure compliance with the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. Contribute to a **safe and secure environment** in BiH. Organize the transfer of Joint Military Affairs (JMA) tasks to relevant national authorities.

Mandate: In December 2004, ALTHEA took over from SFOR, a NATO-led mission. The preparatory work for a possible evolution towards a non-executive capacity-building and training operation is under progress and the planning work is under regular review.

Commitment: About **2,000 troops** from **21 EU member states** and **5 Third States**. They are backed up by over-the-horizon reserves. EUFOR was successfully **reconfigured during 2007** and remain ready to respond to possible security challenges. The common costs (**€27 M**) are paid through contributions by MS to the financial mechanism Athena.

Command: **The operation is conducted under Berlin+ arrangements, where NATO SHAPE is a OHQ and DSACEUR Gen. John McColl** (UK) was appointed EUFOR Operation Commander in Oct 2007. **Maj Gen Stefano Castagnotto** (IT), succeeded by **Maj Gen Bernhard Bair** (AT) as of December 09, is the EU Force Commander.

EUSR: **Valentin Inzko** (AT) is the EUSR* in BiH.

Kosovo



EULEX Kosovo

Type: The **EU Rule of Law Mission** in Kosovo (EULEX) is the **largest civilian mission** ever launched under the ESDP.

Objectives: The central aim is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the rule of law area, specifically in the **police, judiciary and customs**. In the framework of the UNSC resolution 1244 this technical mission will mentor, monitor and advise competent institutions whilst retaining a number of **limited executive powers**.

Commitment: Currently **1650 international** and **800 local staff** deployed. Staffing target: approx 3,000 (1,850 international - 1,100 local). Contributing States: **most EU MS + 6 non EU** (Croatia, Norway, Switzerland, Canada, Turkey and USA). Budget: **€265 M** (until 14 June 2010). The HQs is located in **Pristina**.

Mandate: EULEX KOSOVO was launched on 04 February 2008 (Joint Action) and has reached initial operational capability on 9 December 2008 and **full operational capability by 6 April 2009**. The initial mandate is for **2 years** but the mission is foreseen to be terminated according to real progresses and achievements in the rule of law.

Head of Mission: **Yves de Kermabon** (FR) is the EULEX Head of Mission. **Roy Reeve** (UK) is the Deputy Head of EULEX KOSOVO and Head of EUPT (established in April 2006 to prepare EULEX Kosovo and is now in the liquidation phase).

EUSR: **Pieter Feith** (NL) is the EUSR* in Kosovo.

AFRICA

Guinea-Bissau



EU SSR Guinea-Bissau

Type: Support to **Security Sector Reform (SSR)**. This is the first mission entirely planned by the newly established headquarters-equivalent for EU civilian crisis management operations - the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC).

Objectives: Provide **advice and assistance** on the modernization of Armed Forces and security forces. Contribute to creating the conditions for implementation of the National Security Sector Reform Strategy.

Commitment: 19 (out of 27) internationals staff (military and civilian advisors) and 18 (out of 19) local staff. **6 EU MS** are contributing. The mission budget is **€5.6 M**.

Mandate: Launched in June 2008, after a 3-month preparatory phase, for an initial period of 12 months. The mandate of the initial period run until May 2009 and has been extended **until 30 November 2009**.

Command: **General Juan Esteban Verástegui (ES)** is the Head of Mission.



Democratic Republic of Congo



EUSEC DR Congo

Type: Support mission in the field of **Security Sector Reform in the defense domain**.

Objectives: Provide advice and assistance for the reform of the security sector. Focus on **restructuring and reconstructing** the armed forces. In the year ahead, the support will also focus on organising a **future Rapid Reaction Force**.

Commitment: The mission strength is now **60**. Civilian and military expertises include defence, human resources, logistic, training, administrative and financial regulations. HQs are located in **Kinshasa** with 4 regional offices. The mission budget is **€24.45 M** since June 2005 plus a **further €10.7 M** for 2009-2010.

Mandate: Launched in June 2005, extended in July 2007 for a period of 12 months. The mandate runs until 30 September 2009. A new mandate has been adopted by the Council on 15 September 2009 which extends the mission until 30 September 2010.

Head of Mission: **Gen. Jean-Paul Michel (FR)** is the Head of Mission.

EUSR: **Roeland Van de Geer (NL)** is the EUSR* for the African Great Lakes Region and **Koen Vervaeke (B)** is the EUSR to the African Union.

Democratic Republic of Congo



EUPOL RD CONGO (ex- EUPOL Kinshasa)

Type: **Police mission** with a justice interface.

Objectives: Support **Security Sector Reform (SSR)** in the field of police and its interface with justice. Provides technical support to the reform process of the police mainly through support to the *Comité de Suivi de la Réforme de la Police (CSR)* and also delivers more operational support such as mentoring and advising to the judiciary police.

Commitment: **53 international staff** (9 EU Member States), **1 third country** (Angola) and **15 local staff**. Expertises include police, judiciary, rule of law, human rights and gender balance. The budget is **€16.02 M**.

Mandate: EUPOL RD Congo builds on EUPOL Kinshasa (2005-2007, the first EU mission in Africa). Launched 1 July 2007 initially for a year, it was extended twice, up to the end of June 2010. The Force HQs are located in **Kinshasa** and an 'East antenna' was established in 2008 with mission deployment in Goma (North Kivu) and Bukavu (South Kivu).

Head of Mission: **Superintendent Adilio Ruivo Custodio (PT)** is the Head of Mission.

EUSR: **Roeland van de Geer (NL)** is the EUSR* for the Great Lakes Region and **Koen Vervaeke (B)** is the EUSR* to the African Union.

Somalia



EU NAVFOR Somalia (Operation Atalanta)

Type: **Anti-piracy** maritime operation. First EU maritime operation, conducted in the framework of the ESDP.

Objectives: In support of 3 UN Security Council Resolutions adopted in 2008, the area of intervention is the Somali Coast and Somalia's territorial waters. The mission includes:
 - **Protection** of vessels of the World Food Programme and vulnerable vessels;
 - **Deterrence, prevention and repression**;
 - Capacity to arrest, detain and transfer persons who have committed, or are suspected of having committed, acts of piracy or armed robbery.
 - **All necessary measures**, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene.

Commitment: Initial Operational Capability was reached on 13 December 2008. EU NAVFOR will include up to 20 vessels and maritime patrol aircrafts and more than **1 800** military personnel. **9 EU MS** are contributing and Norway is the first non-EU Member State to join EU NAVFOR. Approximately 1200 people taking part in the operation at any one time. The estimated financial reference amount for the common costs of the operation is **€8,3 M**. The EU Operational Headquarters is located at **Northwood (UK)**. EU NAVFOR also coordinates activities of surveillance and protection operations led by certain Member States.

Mandate: Launched on 8 December 2008 and planned for a period of 12 months. Extended **until December 2010**. The area of operation is comparable to that of the Mediterranean.

Command: **Rear Admiral Philip Jones (UK)** is the Operation Commander. **Commodore Pieter Bindt (NL)** is the third Force Commander of EUNAVFOR. **Gen. Pierre-Michel Joana (F)** is the Personal Representative* of HR Javier Solana for Somalia

MIDDLE-EAST/ASIA

Palestinian Territories



EUPOL-COPPS

Type: **Police and Rule-of-Law** mission.


Objectives: Provide support to the Palestinian Authority in establishing sustainable and effective arrangements in the wider context of **security sector** including **criminal justice reform**. Coordinate and facilitate EU MS assistance, and - where requested - international assistance. The expansion of the Mission's rule of law section has been approved in June 2008.

Commitment: Approximately **50 unarmed** personnel, most of them police experts, judges and prosecutors (seconded from **14 EU MS** plus Norway, Canada, and Turkey has been allowed to second personnel in 2009) and **19 local personnel**. The 2009 budget is **€7.2 M**. The mission is Headquartered in **Ramallah**.

Mandate: Began on 1 January 2006 for an initial duration of **3 years**. EUPOL-COPPS runs **until 31 Dec 2010**.

Senior Officer: **Chief Constable Paul Kernaghan (UK)** is the Head of Mission.

EUSR: **Marc Otte (BE)** is the EUSR* for the Middle East Peace Process.



Afghanistan



EUPOL Afghanistan

Type: **Police Mission** with links into wider **Rule of Law**.

Objectives: Support to Government of Afghanistan in reforming the police system of the country through advising, mentoring, monitoring and training mainly in **criminal investigation, intelligence-led policing, police chain of command, control and communication, anti-corruption, police-prosecutors' linkages** and mainstreaming **human rights and gender** within the Ministry of Interior.

Commitment: Some **400 personnel** (authorized strength), mainly police, law enforcement and justice experts. Mission strength as of 18 September 2009: 270 international and 166 local staff. **21 EU MS** plus **4 non EU** (Canada, Croatia, New Zealand and Norway) are contributing to the mission. Staff is deployed in Kabul and in 16 provinces, through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The mission has a budget of **€64 M** to run until November 2009.

Mandate: Launched in June 2007 and established for a period of at least 3 years, **up to 15 June 2010**.

Senior Officer: **Kai Vittrup (DE)** is Head of Mission.

EUSR: **Ettore F. Sequi (IT)** is the EUSR* for Afghanistan.

Palestinian Territories



EU BAM RAFAH

Type: **Border Control Assistance and Monitoring** mission.

Objectives: Provide a third Party presence to build confidence at the **Rafah Crossing Point** (Gaza-Egypt border). Provide border assistance in support to the **"Agreement on Movement and Access"** reached between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA).

Commitment: **23 EU staff** (from 8 EU MS) and **8 local staff**. HQs are located in **Ashkelon**. The reference budget is **€2.5 M** a year.

Mandate: Operational phase began on 25 November 2005 with duration of 12 months. **Extended three times**, EUBAM runs **until 24 November 2009**. Since the closing of the crossing point in June 2007, **operations are suspended** and the mission has maintained its full operational capability and remained on standby, **ready to re-engage in 15 days** and awaiting a political solution. Nevertheless Member States may decide to reduce it to the minimum establishment strictly necessary for maintenance of premises and equipment.

Senior Officer: **Alain Faugeras (F)** is Head of Mission.

EUSR: **Marc Otte (BE)** is the EUSR* for the Middle East Peace Process.

Iraq



EUJUST LEX

Type: **Integrated Rule of Law** Mission. EUJUST LEX is the first EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission.

Objectives: Strengthen the Iraqi Criminal Justice System (CJS) through **training** in management and criminal investigation and other professional disciplines for senior officials from the judiciary, the police and the penitentiary. **Improve capacity and coordination**. To-date, the mission has trained over 2710 Iraqi senior criminal justice officials on more than 100 integrated and specialist courses and 18 practical work experience secondments. In 2009 EUJUST LEX launched a pilot phase for in-Country activities starting with three courses in different locations of Iraq

Commitment: **53 EU staff** in Brussels and Baghdad. An estimated total of **€40 M** from the EU budget cover the common costs from July 2005 to June 2009. In addition, EU MS continue to contribute training courses, trainers and staff.

Mandate: Launched in March 2005 for an initial period of 12 months. Extended three times **until 30 June 2010**. For the first time, pilot projects will be carried out in Iraq, as and where conditions allow, to follow-up and make the results achieved so far more sustainable.

Senior Officer: **Stephen White (UK)** is Head of Mission.

EUSRs* and Personal Representatives* are mentioned for info only: they are not in any chain of command. **Kees Klompenhouwer (NL, FR)** is the Civilian Operations Commander for all civilian ESDP missions. Heads of missions exercise command at operational level.



By **Commander John Harbour**, Chief Press Information Officer, EUNAVFOR OHQ

Since the recent EU Council decision to extend EU NAVFOR Somalia (Op Atalanta) by one year until Dec 2010, the Media department of EU NAVFOR OHQ Northwood (UK) has been hard at work giving the EU NAVFOR image a facelift, or in more formal language, rebranding the product.

with easy access to accurate copy and photographs is essential. Furthermore, whilst the MSCHOA web address has done an excellent job (and still does) in publicising the good work of Op ATALANTA, the operation itself is not readily identifiable as EUNAVFOR, the first EU military maritime ESDP operation.

From the start of the operation it was clear that a wide cross section of target audiences, both on land and at sea had to gain up-to-date access to information about this maritime operation. Using an existing web domain established by Lloyds of London/Fairplay, the international maritime insurance organisation, a Maritime Security Centre - Horn Of Africa (www.mschoa.eu) website was created to fill the gap. Although this site is an excellent working trade site, especially for vessel owners and operators, it is not the EU NAVFOR brand.

If EU NAVFOR is to continue communicating its message to the world media in a clear and consistent manner, a recognisable brand, together

Our logo makes ESDP a powerful symbol of protection and support.



Rebranding EU NAVFOR

As a result, a new website has now been launched and an official EU NAVFOR Logo has been devised. The website can be accessed through www.eunavfor.eu and email addresses are expected to follow suit. The first emails to go live are those of the Chief PIO (spokesperson@eunavfor.eu) and the Media office (media@eunavfor.eu). The Logo was designed at the OHQ by one of the Media Team (Lt Cdr Daniel Auwerman) and was officially approved by the Operation Commander Rear Admiral Hudson at the beginning of October. It depicts the Horn of Africa with a warship bow neatly following the outline of the Somali coast. The yellow stars of the EU encircle the name of the force,

EU NAVFOR – Somalia. The name of the operation – “Atalanta” – was not used in this rebranding exercise to ensure that it was clear, to any outsider, exactly where the operation was taking place.

Media Engagement

Since the start of the operation, the EU NAVFOR OHQ Media department has built up a very effective and professional rapport with world media as it continually presents factual, accurate and timely information in an easily recognisable format on a website that relates directly to the work of EU NAVFOR. This rapport will only be enhanced with the development of www.eunavfor.eu.

Another extremely important part of working with international media is timing. The speed at which EU NAVFOR OHQ Media department can obtain and publish accurate information on operational incidents helps to reduce the chances of spurious, speculative and negative reporting by the press. Early publication of factual information by EU NAVFOR is extremely important as media organisations such as Associated Press and Reuters will invariably publish those facts immediately. The OHQ has developed a Media Plan incorporating a reporting system for press releases through the Force Headquarters from the units at sea to ensure that this happens as efficiently as possible. Publication of information through the new website will give greater clarity and accuracy to newsworthy incidents

The operational challenges to EU NAVFOR in fighting piracy are considerable but the force has proven its ability to reduce the successful hijackings in the area. The new EU NAVFOR website will help to ensure accurate, timely reporting on EU NAVFOR activities. It is our expectation that the website and the new Logo will become a brand that epitomises ESDP professionalism and security and which will continue to derive the merchant navy and international community respect as powerful symbols of protection and support



Homepage of the EU NAVFOR website. (Source: EU NAVFOR)



On 14 September, EU NAVFOR Belgian warship Louise-Marie discovered a sinking skiff in the Gulf of Aden with 46 people on board. Louise-Marie provided assistance and brought people on board for basic medical care.

(Photo EU NAVFOR, September 2009)

Building Up Comprehensive Responses

Before taking up his new role as Chairman of the EU Military Committee Working Group (CEUMCWG) on 01 October, Brig Gen Eckart Klink reflected on his most recent appointment - Branch Chief, Military Assessment and Planning, Operations Directorate EUMS.

As I reach the end of a most stimulating and interesting tour with the EUMS, I thought I would put pen to paper and write about the Military Assessment and Planning (MAP) Branch, which it has been my good fortune to both stand up and lead.

The MAP Branch was formed as part of a post-Wiesbaden initiative to enhance the EUMS's ability to conduct strategic planning, which is ostensibly the translation of political intent into a tangible EU lead military activity, whatever that activity might be. To that end, it was agreed that the task should be undertaken by forming the MAP Branch and populate it with the 10 dedicated military planners.

Advance Planning

The Military Assessment and Planning Branch is the EU Military Staff's Advance and Crisis Management planning capability. The team of capable military planners endeavours to be proactive by conducting prudent assessment and planning on areas of potential or ongoing turmoil. In EUMS parlance, this is known as Advance Planning. The rationale and premise for such activity is not difficult to understand. We live in a world that appears increasingly riddled with violence, be it ethnically, religiously, criminally or politically motivated. In the light of this, one can begin to appreciate that there is a need to gain an early insight into the potential military options that the EU may want to implement should it deem action appropriate.

One of the EU's great strengths is its inherent ability to implement a broad ranging reaction to a crisis by employing all departments of the organisation, a so called 'comprehensive' response. Of course pulling together all the various strands of an organisation

as diverse and large as the EU, of which the military element would be but one component of such a response is a challenge in itself. However, from the military perspective, it is vital that any adopted military options would have to be designed to dovetail neatly into an overall comprehensive EU response. Whilst traditionally the military is well versed in planning and incorporating a multitude of considerations into its plans, coordinating with the other EU elements of such a comprehensive response is indeed a challenge for all involved. This consideration heightens the need for early and timely consideration of the EU's potential military options and in turn requires advance planning to ensure adequate situational awareness and a good starting point for subsequent more focussed planning.

This is one of the reasons behind the initiative to form the MAP Branch. As with many initiatives, the devil lies in the detail and I think it is fair to say that at the outset of the Branch's formation, the nature of that detail - specifically how, when and with what the MAP Branch would function - was new to all and needed careful interpretation. Further, the MAP Branch's ability to conduct Crisis Management planning in response to an EU political will to act in respect of an unforeseen or ongoing but worsening crisis is also paramount.

So what is that all important detail and how did we reach a more in depth understanding of the MAP's function? I will focus a little more on the 'Advance' area of the planning space.

Proactive Mindset

In this respect the MAP Branch enables the EUMS to be less reactive and more proactive when determining the military response options to a crisis. MAP Branch

planners are assigned geographical regions which they monitor and assess, which allied with the information from other EU agencies, such as the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), provides one of the stimuli for enhanced research into a given country or issue; though more typically such Advance Planning is directed by the hierarchy.

This is the start of the MAP Branch's advance planning activity and it is achieved through the production of dossiers. These dossiers take a broad look at a given country or issue by examining various features - history, geography, politics, culture, infrastructure, military, economics etc - and they provide a starting point for any enhanced planning activity which may be necessary to begin defining possible options for an EU military response. It follows that this advance planning effort will have, hopefully, foreseen and tracked an emerging crisis, but not all crises can be foreseen; for example, the consequences of natural disasters.

A further consideration in these early days of the MAP Branch is the need to build up a library of such dossiers on areas of potential interest, and one's imagination does not need to wander too far to realise that the list of such areas is long. It is also worth pointing out that the vast majority of this Advance Planning activity will be unlikely to proceed any further. However, the advantages, most notably early insight and understanding, more than outweigh the aforementioned disadvantage.

Since its inception the MAP Branch has produced a number of dossiers on regions and countries in Europe, Asia, but mainly Africa. In respect of some of these

dossiers, MAP Action Officers have been able to travel to the areas in question and gain an all important first hand appreciation of the situation at hand; the value of this essential part of Advance Planning cannot be overstated - first hand insight is nothing short of vital. However, dossiers were not the only MAP products and the MAP has been tasked with providing short-term assessments of current developments in other crisis areas.

Coordinated Responses

In terms of operations, the MAP Branch coordinated and provided the EUMS input to the CMC and held the pen for the initial Military Planning of Operation ATALANTA in the first half of 2008; ostensibly the development of the Military Strategic Options. Subsequently, the MAP participated in a EUMS wide project working group, known as a Mission Monitoring Team, on Op ATALANTA. In 2008 the MAP Branch supported the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) in the planning and preparation of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM). In this instance, one officer joined the planning staff in Brussels and another deployed into theatre to assist in the deployment and preparation phase of the mission. Also in 2008/9, the MAP has contributed to options papers, although this evaluation did not result in an operation.

Another important facet of the MAP Branch's creation has been the need to forge linkages with other departments and organisations. There is still a way to go in this respect, but the Branch has so far been successful in establishing good working relationships with various internal and external bodies. These relationships are vital if the MAP Branch is to be effective in its efforts.


All in all, the MAP Branch has made a good start and it continues to improve and gain momentum in its vital planning activities. The ability to be able to plan a response to a crisis armed with a good level of foreknowledge, as a result of good Advance Planning must not be underestimated ■



Post-Wiesbaden

'New' Considerations on Intelligence Development

Lt Col Philip Brennan from the EUMS Intelligence Directorate highlights the challenge of developing Intelligence capabilities.



(Int Dir) has been involved in the introduction of concepts including the EU Concept for Computer Network Operations in EU-led Military Operations and the EU Conceptual Framework for Military Human Intelligence (HUMINT). The latter, along with providing guidance to identify and select activities appropriate to EU Military HUMINT, seeks to identify EU development opportunities (particularly in training), which could strengthen capacities to support EU-led military operations through Military HUMINT. A range of topics are considered across the HUMINT spectrum, methods, characteristics, utility, mission criteria, and integration and capability development.

Asymmetric Environment

This HUMINT concept suggests that MS' be invited to examine additional capacities, to improve HUMINT personnel, including in language needs and cultural awareness. This highlights the demands of the environments in which EU military operations are conducted, where stability operations and post conflict reconstruction are among the challenges.

Asymmetric environment (contemporary operating environment maybe better), cultural awareness and change of paradigms are overused 'buzzwords', but this does not make them any less important. In an environment characterized by multiple intertwined military and non-military factors,

Intelligence support will have to cover all mission relevant parameters. Any numbers of experiences and books are redefining the operating environment, including General Sir Rupert Smith's 'Utility of Force – 'war among the people', Amal Saad Ghorayeb's 'Hizbollah project - last war next war', and David Kilcullen's study of the 'insurgencies' in Iraq. And while

There is no one size fits all solution in operational design.

According to the Headline Goal (HLG) 2010, information superiority is a crucial requirement for EU-led military operations. Towards this end, the EU established standards for Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), where Military Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is recognised as one of the most important sources of intelligence in an asymmetric environment.

In parallel, post Wiesbaden, the Council agreed four measures towards improving capabilities, including an intelligence measure to enhance intelligence and information support to the EUMS and three others with their emphasis on early planning and planning skills, equally as relevant to the intelligence function in the EUMS.

Reacting to Shortfalls

Against this backdrop EUMS Intelligence Directorate

these add to and often rehash some of the classic words of T.E. Lawrence, they also clearly emphasize that today - we do not have a level playing field or chess board for an operational environment.

Cultural Awareness


From an intelligence perspective, while understanding an enemy's intentions, capabilities, and tactics is essential, it is also important to know all the actors in the environment. It is often the case now that there is no enemy or adversary – just simply actors. The motive in stability operations is usually associated with the social, economic, and or political development of the people. In the end it is the host population that determines if stabilisation will work and determine the outcome of the mission (JFQ, Issue 36, 12).

Hence, in operations the value of 'pure' military intelligence is exceeded by social and cultural intelligence. We need to understand and look deeply into the fault lines of societies, where much is under the surface like an iceberg, and where increasingly we find the parameters of national security (JFQ, Issue 36, 12).

Conclusions for Intelligence and Planning

In any planning there is no laid down prescription or no one size fits all solution in operational design – though sometimes we may think that there is. We are told that the planning process is not simply a case of ticking the boxes as we work through the 'Guidelines on Operational Planning (GOP)' – and that planning pitfalls include using planning as a scripting process, and planning in too much detail. From any perspective – and there is any amount of guidance, we are told to think outside the box, and go beyond the traditional military dimension of planning. Certainly there is a case for designing lines of operations for all the actors in one's operational environment.

Either way we require leaders, planners, analysts with multiple skill sets - and real subject matter experts.



This begs the question - experts in what other than in intelligence and planning? In this context there are many considerations for intelligence planners – history, anthropology, investigative mindsets, experience and imagination might help ■

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Why EU and ESDP is Good News for the UN

Colonel Sverker Ulving (SE) provides IMPETUS with an interesting insight into life as the EU Military Liaison Officer to the United Nations.

Arriving in New York on 1 December 2008 as the new "EU Military Liaison Officer to the UN", I initially thought it was extremely bad timing! As it turned out, it was the opposite. Even though the city itself was at its worst with gloomy, damp weather and UN protocol administration proved a hard nut to crack, the operational side of the EU - UN cooperation was at an all time high. Everyone seemed on edge about the transfer of authority from EUFOR Tchad/RCA to the UN mission MINURCAT on 15 March 2009. No sooner had I adjusted my office chair and received the "go" from the admin and computer people in Brussels, than my phone started to ring.

The two organisations needed to learn more from each other.

Understandably, my colleagues in the EUMS wanted to know what was going on in the UN corridors. Will the EU be asked to stay longer than 15 March? Does the UN have a plan in motion? When will the Security Council resolution be passed? And so on. It was time to identify a couple of solid interlocutors in the UN Secretariat, especially in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS). Luckily for me, I knew my way around; having spent four years with the Swedish UN Mission in New York

previously.

As it happened, I was also was in urgent need of



Colonel Sverker Ulving at the UN Headquarters.

interlocutors with knowledge about the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). During that first week in December, the situation in DRC went from bad to worse. Both MONUC and the Congolese National forces were at great peril in the Goma region. Rumours began to surface about a possible request to the EU for a rapid military intervention. Eventually, the rumours materialized in a formal request from the UN.

At the same time, the EU NAVFOR Op ATALANTA was launched on 08 December 2008. It was met with deep satisfaction from within the UN family, especially the World Food Programme (WFP), and of course many queries began to surface from other parts of the UN Secretariat. Could the modern, European maritime fleet do more? Could it support the African Union forces in Somalia (AMISOM)? Could it also support other UN shipments with heavy equipment to UN troop missions in other parts of Africa, especially in Sudan?

Keeping the balance

In a nutshell, I realized my role as a liaison officer. I was the person to ask questions and I was the one to provide information to both organisations. More often than not, that was - and is - a rather delicate balancing act. The amount of information I receive from the UN corridors is linked to the amount of trust that the UN Secretariat has in me. I must be seen as a reliable partner representing the EU as a whole.

When the 'fog' had cleared that spring, I was in a position to make a number of observations. One was that the bridging operation in Chad/RCA was a real success, albeit with several strategic lessons still to be learned. Most importantly perhaps, the EUFOR mission proved to the UN that an ESDP military mission could indeed add value to the UN by providing a lengthy, complex bridging operation in the middle of Africa, with no resident infrastructure at all from the outset. As was the case with the previous two UN - EU military operations in the DRC in 2003 and 2006, the Chad mission also showed that the two organisations needed to learn more from each other at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

In that respect, I also endeavour to inform relevant UN officials on 'the ways and means of the ESDP'. It is much easier since the EU Chad/RCA operation, with the UN clearly having great respect for the military capabilities of the EU. But they also miss them sorely, in their own

missions! UN officials and Force Commanders miss the helicopters, the Special Forces, the operational linked media campaigns, the situational awareness, the integrated logistics and admin and the robustness and steadfastness of the EU troops. But at the same time, those UN officials hope - and expect - to see European troops and capabilities in future UN led missions. Why? We have to remember that several major European troop contributors decided to remain under the UN flag in Chad, even though the resolution from the Security Council was not passed until the very last moment. That impressed the officials in the Secretariat. The hope now is that the UN mission in Chad, MINURCAT, will prove to the Europeans that the UN has the same ability as the EU to plan and conduct a complex military mission with the participation of several European countries.

UN into the future

So what lies ahead for the UN? One thing is certain: the UN will continue to and maybe even expand its peacekeeping missions in trouble spots all over the world. The UN cannot pick and choose missions like the EU and NATO. There is, more often than not, no other organisation to call for when there is a dire need for global crises management.

If new initiatives are pulled through, we will hopefully see much more enhanced UN peacekeeping with more transparent planning, more realistic resolutions from the Security Council, a more adapted logistic system and a swifter deployment of robust, well trained forces - possibly even European forces - because, as they say in the UN Secretariat, the presence of just one European contingent or capability in a UN led mission can make a difference.

Oh, almost forgot to mention how it is to live here in New York. Well, believe it or not, there comes a rainy Monday and a sunny Friday even in Manhattan, where I reside with my family. But it is grand, of course, to have the opportunity to live and work in this beautiful, complex, challenging and charming city and country. In order to see a little bit more than just the skyscrapers and diners of New York City, my wife and I use our motorcycle for road trips around the continent. Can't find a better place for that! The roads are pristine, the people are friendly, the logistics are cheap and everywhere and the beautiful scenery just never, never stops ■

EU Operations and the Law

Mr Gert-Jan Van Hegelsom (NL) from the Council Legal Service (CLS) highlights the CLS association with the EU military structures.

Article 82 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions provides that legal advisors shall be available to military commanders at the appropriate level. As all EU Member States are party to this Protocol, the phenomenon of legal advisors is well known to our military personnel. In each Member State, the status and roles of the legal advisors vary: some States have opted for civilian lawyers, others for military lawyers and some for a mixture of both. Competences of legal advisors may encompass different roles, some being exclusively advisors on public international law matters while others perform all functions usually related to the legal domain: military justice and discipline, civil law (contracts), administrative law and public international law, including human rights law and the law of armed conflict.

Experience and role

In 2000 therefore, the discussion on the establishment of EU military structures was not about whether legal advice should be available to the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) but rather whether the individual concerned should be a seconded national expert (SNE) like most of the members of the staff.

Eventually, the interim Political and Security Committee (PSC) opted for a civilian lawyer who would be a member

of the Council Legal Service (CLS). Recognising that the specialised expertise required for such advice was at the time not readily available within the CLS, initially 3 lawyers were recruited to assist in the development of the European Security and Defence policy.

All of them had extensive experience in the military dimension of crisis management, including in UN, NATO and at the Western European Union. Integrated in the external relations team of the CLS, these lawyers serve the various working parties engaging in crisis management such as the Military Committee and its Working Group (EUMCWG), the Committee on the Civilians Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and the Politico-Military Group (PMG).

Their integration in the CLS also entails a variety of other tasks not necessarily related directly to crisis management, such as representation on the Security Committee, the Committee on Maritime issues and the Committee dealing with non-proliferation. Currently the number of lawyers dealing with crisis management operations has risen from 3 to 5.

The Relex team in which they are embedded further deals with the broader aspects of CFSP, the traditional external relations of the European Community, including aspects related to the World Trade Organisation and Enlargement. Hence, they are able to advise on a very

The Legal Advisor is involved in every day work at the EUMS.



Atalanta is a "lawyer-heavy" operation with four lawyers mobilised full time. (Photo EU NAVFOR, July 2009)

broad range of issues calling upon colleagues if specific expertise is required regarding institutional or cross pillar issues.

Special position

The Council Legal Service is a service of the Council and as such maintains a special position within the General Secretariat of the Council. It is represented at all working parties of the Council and is entitled to intervene, where appropriate at its own initiative, should legal or institutional aspects arise during their proceedings. The Director-General of the Legal Service attends the European Council and is the Legal Advisor to the Intergovernmental Conferences that adopt the Treaties. In the expression of its legal opinion, the CLS is professional and completely independent.

Dedicated Support

Since its initial operational capability as foreseen by Council Decision of January 2001, the EU Military Staff has direct access to dedicated lawyers within the Council Legal Service. Being officials of the Communities, these lawyers do not follow the same rotating career pattern as Seconded National Experts. Throughout the years they have seen the crisis management capabilities of the European Union evolve and contributed to them. This contribution is exercised at two different levels:

- the development of doctrine, concepts and operational documents at staff level; the legal advisor features on the signature sheet of all documents submitted to the Director-General of the EUMS;
- the participation in the relevant working parties as representatives of the Council Legal Service.

In practice therefore the Legal Advisor to the Director General of the EUMS is involved in every day work in the EUMS. In operations and exercises, the LA provides assistance in the development of all planning documents. He addresses issues such as the assessment of the overall legal conditions under which an operation is to take place (is there a mandate of the United Nations Security Council, what does it imply, what is the attitude of the host nation, what is the applicable law), the use of force policy (Annex E of an Oplan and the Rules of Engagement), relations with host nations of operations (Annex AA of an Oplan, Status of Forces agreements) and various other legal aspects.

The CLS assist the policy departments in the negotiations with third parties regarding the required agreements as these will normally be based on article 24 of the Treaty on European Union. During operations the team is always available to answer queries Operation Commanders and Heads of Mission may have with regard to legal and institutional aspects.

Demanding Operations - also from Legal perspective

Operation Atalanta has shown the importance of the development of an adequate legal framework for European Union military operations. In addition to the agreements with the host Nations on operations and Status of forces, agreements on the transfer of suspected pirates were required. As indicated by the Operation Commander, this framework is a critical enabler for a successful operation. Atalanta is a "lawyer-heavy" operation, with at least two at the OHQ, one at the FHQ and one permanently stationed in Kenya. This number might increase even further. In contrast, previous military operations such as EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR Tchad/RCA had three lawyers each at the most. The CLS lawyers cooperate closely with their counterparts in the Operational Headquarters on a daily basis and provide advice on questions of principle which may affect the EU as a whole.

ESDP has grown exponentially in the last 10 years. The expression "attorney-client privilege" has become well known with the proliferation of crime series on television. In addition to its professionalism and independence as guaranteed by the Council Rules of Procedure, the CLS continuously builds on the relation of trust with all who call upon its services, be it the Chairman of the Military Committee, the Presidency, individual delegations, the Military Staff or the wider General Secretariat of the Council

PROFILE



Gert-Jan van Hegelsom (NL) is specialised in Public International Law from the Leyden University. He performed his military service as a reserve officer in the Royal Netherlands Navy, lecturing on public international law issues at the Naval War College in Den Helder and developing operational training

modules.

He joined the Directorate of Legal Affairs of the Dutch MoD in 1981 and was Head of the Department of International and Legal Policy Affairs (1994-2001). He joined the external relations Team of the Legal Service of the Council of the European Union (CLS) in March 2001. He is the dedicated Legal Advisor to the DG EUMS and the Representative of the CLS to the European Union Military Committee.

Mr van Hegelsom is a graduate of the NATO Defence College (Course 68) and holds the Diploma (Public International Law) of the Hague Academy of International Law. He has published on legal aspects of military operations.

He lives in Brussels with his wife Ingrid de Bree and his son, Maarten.



INTERNAL TRAINING

Knowledge Management at the EUMS

Col Georges Dejaeger, EUMS Exercise /Training/Analysis Branch Chief and Lt Col Silviu Costache. focus on some key training programmes at the EUMS.

The EUMS organises regular training for its military personnel which is tailored to the needs at a specific stage of a Tour of Duty and for specific tasks.

While members of the EUMS are by definition 'Seconded National Experts' and their experience, skills and expertises are high, they invariably need a form of induction training to familiarise them with the Council General Secretariat (CGS) - its functions, bodies and staff processes.

Regular Package

Consequently, the Deputy Director General adopted, on recommendation of the EXE/TR/ANL Branch, a training package for newcomers including three different modules: Induction Days, Staff Training for Newcomers

and Strategic Planning Process Staff Training. The objectives of all the three modules are to improve the individuals' abilities to perform their respective duties.

Induction Days are organized, every 3-6 months, depending upon the turnover of personnel and they are aimed at providing a level of general knowledge relating to the organization of the EU and the CFSP/ESDP. Special attention is paid to the introduction of the politico-military structures, the EUMS info-management tools, and the administrative and internal procedures.

The target audience is EUMS newcomers as well as newcomers from other parts of the CGS who are working with aspects of ESDP, including DGE VIII, DGE IX and Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). The last session took place 8-9 September 09 and it was attended by 60 individuals.

Staff Training for Newcomers is the necessary follow-on training for Action Officers (AO). This module is tailored to develop those competences essential to act as an AO and to run projects. The training approach to the curriculum is focused on real life requirements and expected performance, through learning best practices.

The last session took place from 28 September - 02 October 09 and was split into 3 sub-modules. A sub-module was dedicated to Crisis Management Procedures (CMP), including EU Military Operations, Civilian Missions and the Lessons Process. Another practical module focused on how to act as an AO within the EUMS including document drafting and a visit to the EUMC Working Group. The third module was based on pre- and post-mission deployment issues and concerned Hostile Environment Security Training (HEST), Medical preparation, CIS and administrative aspects.

The EUMC post-Wiesbaden Report from June 2008 identified **Strategic Planning Process Staff Training** as part of a specific training need for AOs. The related training requirement is to provide an introduction into the politico-military strategic planning process.

Additional Opportunities

Two new training activities have been scheduled this autumn in accordance with the mandate from the EU Operation Headquarter (OHQ) Training Guide. The first, an **Operational Planning Course** for EUMS "double hatted" personnel took place between 12-16 October 09 for those who are appointed as augmentees for the EU OpsCenter, once activated. Apart from this, a **European Foundation Training Course** for OHQ's augmentees will be conducted from 26-29 October.

All new coming experts invariably need a form of induction training.

In addition to the mandatory internal training and participation in EU exercises, EUMS members also have access to a variety of training opportunities within the CGS/ DGA 1 Learning Department Unit, such as management and language courses, aiming to improve personal skills. Additionally EUMS personnel participate in a wide variety of conferences, seminars and courses organised by external organisations (eg. European Security and Defence College, EU-UN Education Days, NATO School Oberammergau, Member States Institutes etc) ■



Mr Mika-Markus Leinonen (Centre) Director DG IX (Civilian Crisis Management) addresses participants at the Induction Days (Photo EUMS)

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Swedish Presidency



Prior to taking over the role of Presidency of the Council for the second semester 2009, the Swedish Minister for Defence, Mr Sten Tolgfors, took the opportunity to visit EU Ops Centre and CPCC on 19 May. Our picture shows Minister Tolgfors being welcomed to the Kortenbergh building by Rear Admiral Fernando Lista, Deputy Director General EU Military Staff.

EU OPEN DAY 09

Once again the EUMS information stand at the annual EU Open Day proved very popular with the general public on Saturday 09 May. This year's event attracted an attendance of over 6,500 to the Justus Lipsius building.

Photo: The EUMS team!



Briefing the French Secretaire d'Etat

Mr Pierre Lellouche, French Minister of State for European Affairs, visited the Kortenbergh building on 05 October. He

was briefed on ESDP issues by EUMS, DG VIII (Defence Issues), CPCC and SITCEN. On the photo: (L-R) Mr Kees Klompenhouwer Civilian Operations Commander CPCC, Minister Lellouche, Lt Gen David Leakey Director General EU Military Staff, Mme Claude-France Arnould Director DG VIII (Defence Issues).

EUMS Nordic National Day

Our Nordic members of staff (SW, FI, DK) combined their efforts to host a most enjoyable joint national day celebration in EUMS on 03 June.



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