



Bulletin of the EU Military Staff

# IMPETUS

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Issue #7

## REACTIVENESS

From Georgia to Counter-Piracy

Stabilisation  
in Bosnia

EUFOR Chad/RCA:  
Mission Accomplished



THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

# Progress Report

*Lt Gen David Leakey, Director General of the EUMS*

As Director General of the EU Military Staff (EUMS), I would once again like to avail of this opportunity to update the readership of IMPETUS on the main EUMS activities and developments since the last EU Military Committee (EUMC) meeting at Chiefs of Defence (CHODs) level of 29 October 2008.

The last six months has indeed been a very challenging and productive period for EUMS as we continue to be directed by and focussed towards the EUMC.

Additionally, the EUMS has played an integral part in the Council General Secretariat's (CGS) process, particularly in support of the SG/HR and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC).

In this update I will focus on Operations and Missions, Exercises and Training, Military Co-operation, Concepts and Doctrine, and Capabilities Development.

## OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS

### EUFOR ALTHEA

The EUMS has contributed to the development of possible future options for the EU military operation in BiH and has continued to provide support to the OHQ as required. The EUMS was also involved in the preparation of the works related to the Ninth SG/HR Operation ALTHEA

Six Monthly Review.

### EUFOR TCHAD/RCA

EUFOR TCHAD/RCA was handed over on 15 March 2009 and 'replaced in position' by the follow-on UN operation MINURCAT. Nevertheless the EUMS continues to be actively involved in all aspects of the recovery phase through the EUMS Mission Monitoring Team (MMT) EUFOR Tchad/RCA in order to adequately advise the EUMC and to support the OpCdr/OHQ as required. In this respect

the EUMS Liaison Officer at the UN in New York continues to play a key role.

### EU NAVFOR - ATALANTA (COUNTER PIRACY)

Op ATALANTA was launched on 8 December 2008 in order to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Somali coast. It took over the responsibilities of the EU Naval Coordination Cell (EU NAVCO). To facilitate the handover of early planning the EUMS MMT "Somalia Anti-Piracy" provided planning support directly to the EU OHQ at Northwood during November 2008. It furthermore supported both the EUMC and the OHQ in the processing of the various planning documents up to the launch of the operation and ensured the proper consideration of military

inputs into the Joint Action. The MMT continues to be closely involved in all relevant aspects of the operation in order to adequately advise the EUMC and to support the OpCdr/OHQ as required, in particular about interaction with Third States or their participation in the operation.

### EUSEC RD Congo

The EUMS continues to monitor the mission to adequately advise the EUMC if required, in particular with respect to the military aspects of the mission. The EUMS has also supported the drafting of the Head of Mission action plan.

### EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) Georgia

Following the major contribution by the EUMS to the planning, preparation and deployment phase of the EUMM Georgia, the secondment of EUMS experts to the mission has been significantly

**The EU Concept for Special Operations has been agreed.**



reduced. However, on-call support by specialised military experts from the EUMS, for example in Medical, Logistic and Communications issues, remains crucial for the ongoing mission and the related planning process.

The EUMS contributed significantly to the Lessons Identified during the planning phase of the EUMM. The lessons were noted by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) on 31 March 2009. The PSC looks forward to the follow-up of recommendations on rapid deployment, including the civilian-military co-operation.

### EU Security Sector Reform (SSR) Guinea Bissau

As the first six month extension of the Mission, until 30 November 2009, has been agreed by PSC, the EUMS recognizes that the progress of the mission, particularly in the military domain, has been slower than expected. In accordance with the CONOPS and the OPLAN, the EUMS continues to support the CPCC with regard to the military

aspects of the mission.

### EXERCISES AND TRAINING

#### MILEX Exercise (MILEX 09)

The EUMS developed and planned the execution of the next MILEX exercise as per the EU Exercise Program 2009-2013. MILEX 09, is a Command Post Exercise (CPX), focusing on the interaction between the EU OHQ (Larissa) and the EU FHQ (Naples), in an EU-led military operation which includes maritime aspects, without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. The exercise will take place from 17-26 June 2009. The EUMS has completed the preparation phase having hosted the manning conference in February 2009.

#### Crisis Management Exercise (CME) 08/09

The EUMS contributed to the planning as well as to the scenario of CME 08, which took place between

24 November and 05 December 2008. The EUMS participated with over 30 personnel in the Directing Staff of CME 08 and activated a Mission Monitoring Team within the Operations Directorate, with contributions from all other Directorates. CME 08 provided for the first time an opportunity to undertake co-ordinated and synchronised planning for a ESDP military operation and the reconfiguration of an existing civilian ESDP mission in the same theatre. The EU OHQ (at Mont Valérien, Paris) conducted an ESDP operation and planned the ESDP operation within the exercise at the same time.

The next Crisis Management Exercise, CME 09, will require even more direct support from the EUMS. CME 09 will feature an EU Crisis Rapid Response which will include operational planning for both a military and civilian operation, with the EU Operations Centre in the EUMS being activated as the EU OHQ. The exercise is due to take place in December 2009.

**The EUMS continues to contribute to HG 2010.**

### MILITARY CO-OPERATION

#### NATO

In order to enhance transparency with NATO as a Strategic Partner to the EU, the EUMS continued its regular meetings between DG EUMS and D-IMS and between Deputy DGEUMS and the AD P&P IMS. The EUMS participated in a number of joint NATO meetings and contributed to the examination of Force Planning procedures,



*An additional 6 months will allow the mission in Guinea-Bissau to achieve its current mandate. (Photo EU SSR Guinea-Bissau)*

Capability Development, and EU Headline Goal Questionnaire/ NATO Defence Planning Questionnaire.

## African Capabilities – Enhancement of African Crisis Capacities

The EUMS continued to provide direct support through experts and expertise to the operationalisation of the African Stand-by Force (ASF), Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) and the Training Plan.

With effect from April for a period of twelve months, the EU Commission contracted four experts, funded by the Instrument for Stability, to support the AU Strategic Planning and Management Unit in Addis Ababa, responsible for the planning and conduct of AMISOM. In the light of the urgency of this support, the EUMS provided three staff officers as experts in Addis Ababa to bridge the two month gap until the arrival of the four Commission experts.

## CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE

### Recent Work on Concepts

Since October 2008, the EUMS drafted the EU Concept for Special Operations and the revision of the EU Military Rapid Response Concept, which have been agreed. Following a comprehensive EUMS assessment in the framework of the annual review process of future military concepts, EUMS emphasis for the remaining part of 2009 will be on the Military Impact of a Comprehensive Approach (MICA), the completion of the revision of the EU Use of Force Concept as well as the update of the EU Maritime and Air Rapid Response Concepts.

## CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT

### Capability development process (HLG 2010)

In accordance with the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM) and the methodology for measuring

progress and reviewing priorities adopted in November 2008, the EUMS updated the Force Catalogue 2007 in support of the EUMCWG/HTF on the basis of current contributions from several Member States.

The EUMS' first quantitative analysis indicates some reductions in deficit areas such as; Helicopters (Medium/heavy Transport, MEDEVAC), Bare Base Kits, and Logistics Units in general.


## CONCLUSION

I am very conscious of the fact that this article reflects only a snapshot of the work which has been and is currently being conducted by the members of the EU Military Staff over the reporting period. I again thank all my staff for their professionalism, dedication and "can do" attitude. I look forward with confidence to another very productive, always challenging and sometimes intense six months ahead! ■




EUFOR Chad/RCA handed over to UN mission MINURCAT on 15 March 2009. (Photo EUFOR Chad/RCA)

EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY STAFF ( EUMS ) May 09



EUMS

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EUMS

# Logistics Directorate : Close to the Core Business

By Brig Gen Michael Finn, Director EUMS Logistics Directorate.

As the Chairman of the European Union Military Committee, General Bentégeat, stated in an address to the European Defence Agency in 2008, “Logistics, the science of the movement and support of the armed forces, is at the heart of the success of military operations,” Nowhere has this been more forcefully demonstrated than in the recent and ongoing EU’s operations. The lessons deriving from EUFOR Tchad/RCA, as well as the experiences of EUFOR RD Congo and, indeed, the current naval operation, EUNAVFOR Somalia (Op ATALANTA), to varying degrees, illustrate that logistics sets the operational limits of any campaign and that the time needed to arrange logistic support and resolve logistic concerns requires continuous integration of logistic issues into the planning process from the earliest stages.

## Common Principles

The business end of logistics covers a broad range of disciplines or functions, including supply, maintenance, services/life support, movement and transportation, infrastructure engineering and health & medical support. In addition, critical logistic-related functions such as reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOM&I) and Financing and Budgeting are to be taken into consideration.

The Logistics Directorate of the EU Military Staff, in conjunction with the Member States, has developed an overarching Logistic Support concept, together with subsidiary concepts addressing the logistic



EUFOR Tchad/RCA was implemented with around 3,700 troops from 23 EU Member States and 3 third countries. (Photo EUFOR, February 2009)

functional and related areas, all of which have been agreed by the EU Military Committee. These concepts set out principles which should be applied by military commanders and their staffs - principles such

**Logistics sets the operational limits of any campaign.**

as ‘collective responsibility’, ‘co-operation’, ‘co-ordination’, ‘effectiveness/efficiency’, ‘synergy’ and ‘multi-nationality’.

Experience of operations to date has clearly demonstrated that the application of many of these principles is a challenge for EU planners, military commanders and their staffs and also for Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs). As the Secretary-General / High Representative, Mr Solana, stated

recently, “While member states increasingly operate side-by-side, the larger part of their equipment is not interoperable. [...] in all military operations there are as many logistical chains as there are national flags [...] the result is duplication and waste of money”.

## Working on Deployability

To focus on one function only, movement and transportation, the EUMS organises a “Deployability Conference” every 12 - 18 months. The latest such conference was excellently hosted by the Czech Republic as the current EU Presidency on 04/05 Mar 09. This conference aimed at gaining a holistic understanding of the deployment challenges that the EU faces, and at updating participants on the key initiatives put in place or being explored by Member States

and other EU actors to address these challenges.

The conference featured briefs from a range of actors in the world of movement and transportation, but focussed in particular on deployability issues relating to the recent operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, with key inputs from staff who served at the OHQ at Mont Valérien and from the main TCNs. It was refreshing that contributors spoke openly about their experiences and were conscious of the need to ensure that observations and recommendations they proffered would feed into the Lessons Learned process

**A mutual understanding of logistic requirements is key.**

This deployability conference fell at an opportune time, during the closing days of the EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation and just prior to the initiation of a comprehensive revision of EU HQ Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs). EU HQ SOPs should be a natural bridge to translate the strategic concepts into operational and tactical procedures and best practice. The assistance of the Member States and the staffs in OHQs, particularly the OHQ in Mont Valérien, will be crucial to ensure optimum procedures are incorporated and to develop new ones to respond to new logistic challenges, e.g. Third Party Logistic Support.

**Harmonizing Practices**

The endeavours of EU Logs Directorate to improve logistic practices is harmonised with those of NATO to the maximum extent possible. This harmonisation covers not only the logistic doctrine and conceptual level (e.g. bilateral EUMS - IMS talks twice a year, attendance at selected NATO Log meetings), but also the use of common tools and mechanisms, e.g. use of NATO LOGFAS, in particular, the ADAMS and EVE applications.

Another key milestone for the logistic community is the annual EU Logistic Conference, which will be hosted by EUMS Logistics Directorate in Brussels on 09/10 Jun 09. The aim of this conference is to promote mutual understanding of logistic requirements, including interoperability and planning in order to optimise the logistic support to EU-led military operations. In addition to further evaluation of all logistic aspects of EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, this conference will be paying special attention to the maritime dimension, falling as it does at mid point of the current ATALANTA mandate.

**Conclusion**

The critical challenge for EU planners at all levels, for OpCdrs and FCdrs and their staffs and for planners in each Member State is to keep at the forefront the principles set out in the EU Logistic Support Concept and its subsidiary concepts. Application of these principles will ensure the timely and effective delivery of logistic support in an environment where the

**PROFILE**

**Brig Gen Michael Finn**, (IE), has served as Director of Logistics in the EU Military Staff since March 2007.

He has previously served as Officer in Charge of Overseas Operations, managing and co-ordinating Ireland's contributions to UN, EU and NATO-led military operations. During this period, he had specific responsibility for planning Ireland's contribution to EUFOR ALTHEA.

Brig Gen Finn also has considerable overseas experience, including staff and command appointments with UNIFIL (South Lebanon) and UNTSO (Syria & Lebanon). He also commanded the first Infantry Group from the Defence Forces to operate under NATO leadership, in the UN-authorized KFOR mission in Kosovo between September 2003 and April 2004.

military are required to deploy and react rapidly to emerging crises. Logistics today is equally as vital as it was 2,500 years ago when Sun Tzu wrote that "the line between disorder and order lies in logistics" The collective responsibility and challenge for all of us is to bring more order by providing improved and more efficient logistic support to our military operations ■



The EU Deployability Conference was attended by more than 60 delegates from EU Member States, EUMS, the EDA, movement coordination centres, and NATO. Brig Gen Finn is second on the right. (Photo MOD of the Czech Republic, March 2009)



# The Launch of EUMM Georgia

[200 monitors from over 20 member states in 2 weeks]

*Mr. Kees Klompenhouwer, EU Civilian Operations Commander and Director of Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) is justifiably proud of the launch of EUMM Georgia; but "there is always things that can be improved".*

With what is no doubt one of the quickest deployments of a crisis management mission ever, the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) has exceeded the expectations of even the strongest supporters of the ESDP. Deploying more than two hundred monitors from over twenty-odd Member States in two weeks is not a small feat. It is proof of the growing ability of the EU to respond to crises. It is also the fruit of a lot of hard work from committed staff members who worked day and night through a few very hectic weeks in September 2008.

Following the war in August between Russia and Georgia, the EU acted with autonomy, decisiveness and rapidity. Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities the EU was actively engaged in the diplomatic efforts to put an end to the

violence. Part of the solution was to launch an EU monitoring mission in Georgia.

## Overcoming the challenge

The deployment of EUMM in record time is due to a number of factors. First of all there was the strong political backing by the EU Member States. In particular the French Presidency and President Sarkozy made the mission an inseparable part of the cease-fire agreement. Secondly, the quick deployment was made easier through the combined efforts of both civilian and military experts within the General Secretariat of the Council. The collaboration on issues such as logistics, medical issues and intelligence were fundamental. One has to acknowledge that we are more effective when working

**EU acted with autonomy, decisiveness and rapidity.**

together. Thirdly, Member States' readiness to provide and deploy monitors and equipment was a necessity for success. Another key issue was the immediate availability of funds for the mission which were quickly made available. Finally, we should not forget that the effective deployment of EUMM was helped by building on the existing presences of various EU actors on the ground, especially the EC Delegation and the office of the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus.

## Lessons Learnt

However, there are always things that can be improved. We cannot ignore some of the difficulties experienced during the start-up phase of the mission, especially in terms of logistics and procurement. Shortcuts had to be taken and results were not always optimal. With the imaginative approach of the preparatory team on the ground we managed to get the mission up and running in two weeks - but this is maybe not to be recommended



Head of Mission, Ambassador Haber, and his team are doing an excellent job in running the mission on the ground. (Photo EU Council)

**MANDATE**

EUMM's mandate is to monitor the implementation of the Agreements of 12 August and 8 September. The mission is tasked to contribute to the stabilisation and normalisation of the situation in the areas affected by the recent conflict, to oversee the deployment of the Georgian police and armed forces and to observe compliance of all parties with human rights and humanitarian law. Another important task of EUMM is to help build confidence between the parties of the August conflict.

## CHRONOLOGY

### August 2008

- Outbreak of hostilities (8.8);
- Council conclusions (13.8) referring to possible ESDP action;
- GSC calls for CMCT and issues option paper;
- GSC deploys SITCEN (15.8) and technical team (21.8);
- Commission deploys crisis assessment team (26.08);
- PSC (26.8) agreement on immediate actions (incl. reinforcement EUSR's office);
- Support for option 1 (support to UN and/or OSCE lead on monitoring and/or interposition/protect effort);
- GSC in close coordination with Commission tasked to develop option 2 (explore EU civilian Monitoring Mission);

### September 2008

- Extra-ordinary European Council (01.09) incl. appointment EUSR for the crisis in Georgia and commitment to prepare ESDP "presence on the ground";
- GSC/Cion sends exploratory team (01.09);
- Approval by the Council of the "Preparatory measures" (03.09);
- Agreement with the Russian federation on implementation of 6 point plan (08.09);
- CPCC sends advance team and activates operations room (08.08);
- Preparation planning documents;
- Finalisation by Committees (CIVCOM/ RELEX/EUMC);
- Approval CONOPS and JA by Council (15.09);
- Appointment HoM (16.09);
- Force generation (16.9); revision of documents (amending JA adopted 25.09);
- Planning deployment ("RSOM"); approval OPLAN (29.09);

### October 2008

- Mission operational by 1.10;
- Monitoring of compliance with 6 point plan;
- Withdrawal of Russian checkpoints by 10.10;
- Geneva talks start (15.10); adoption SOMA (20.10);
- International Donors Conference (22.10).

for the next time. Lessons have been identified and will hopefully be learnt. One thing is undoubtedly to look at the useful partnership between the civilian and military side and reflect on ways how to improve it.

**The quick deployment was facilitated by combined efforts of both civilian and military experts.**

But the most valuable lesson learned is that if there is a will there is a way. I refer to what one of our monitors told me during my last visit to the mission: "At that time nothing mattered: there was a crisis, and the EU decided to set up an ESDP mission - so we just had to do it".

But achieving the ability for rapid deployment has not been a short or easy path. A lot of work has been put in institutionally and we have learned from our previous missions. We now have better resources, more experience and even more qualified people. Today the EU is harvesting the results from previous investments in all areas of crisis resolution.

### Successful Reconfiguration

Today EUMM continues to implement its mandate. The mission is reducing tensions between parties, acts proactively in confidence building and is producing solid reporting in order to support the political process. Thanks to serious planning, the reconfiguration of the mission was completed at the beginning of 2009, adapting all temporary arrangements to a more standard ESDP mission. The Head of Mission, Ambassador Haber, and his team are doing an excellent job in running the mission on the ground.

EUMM Georgia is proof of progress made. However, we cannot relax or see the process of capacity building as finalised.

The success of EUMM should



EUMM Georgia monitors in direct contact with local Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). (Photo EU Council)

encourage us to build on our work and keep on strengthening our capacity to act in the international arena for a secure Europe in a better world. In this context and given the absence of clarity on the future presence of other international actors in Georgia, the EU must be ready to keep its commitment to the stability of the region beyond the current mission mandate ■

## PROFILE

**Kees Jan René Klompenhouwer** (NL and FR) was born in Switzerland. He



was appointed as EU Civilian Operations Commander and Director of the Civilian Planning and

Conduct Capability (CPCC) at the Council of the European Union on 14 May 2008.

Before this position, he was engaged in a diplomatic career for the Dutch MOD as Director East- and South Eastern Europe Department, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Serbia (1999-2002), and Defence Counsellor at the Netherlands Permanent Mission to NATO (1995-1999). From 2002 to 2006, he was Director for Foreign Intelligence General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD).



# Maritime Security: a Global Challenge for the EU



The German warship FGS Rheinland-Pfalz on patrol with EU NAVFOR. (Photo EU NAVFOR – Atalanta, March 2009)

*Commander Alistair Worsley, Press Information Officer at EUNAVFOR OHQ (Northwood, UK) outlines the background to and development of the first EU maritime operation - Operation ATALANTA.*

The European Union launched Operation ATALANTA, its first maritime operation, on 9 December 2008 as a contribution to combating the increasing threat of piracy off the coast of Somalia, particularly in the Gulf of Aden where over 20% of world shipping regularly travels.

Established for one year, Operation ATALANTA was given three aims:

- To protect World Food Programme Shipments that deliver sufficient aid each month to feed approximately half of the 3 million displaced people of Somalia;
- To protect vulnerable shipping transiting through the region (irrespective of nationality);
- To deter and disrupt acts of piracy.

Supported by the United Nations it was agreed that

the Operation would be commanded by a Royal Navy Rear Admiral Philip Jones, and manned by support staff from all 9 of the troop contributing Member States. The French Deputy Operation Commander would be relieved by a German Officer after 6 months and the Force Commanders, each of whom would operate from sea for a 4 month period, would be Greek, Spanish and Dutch respectively. The nerve centre of the operation is the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa ([www.mschoa.org](http://www.mschoa.org)) which is based at the Operation Headquarters (OHQ) in Northwood near London.

## Activating Stakeholders

The origin of the criminal activities off Somalia, which are in many ways more akin to hijacking than piracy, lie ashore as a result of political instability where the rule of law has collapsed and the lack of a visible coastguard has allowed maritime crime to thrive. However, the

mandate made no provision for action on land so a solution could only be pursued by means of naval action off the coast of Somalia and, more importantly, via cooperation and communication with the wider maritime community.

Many other stakeholders, who had been indirectly affected by piracy also had to be considered in addition to those who had become immediate victims of the crime. These include financiers and insurers, the Somali population and its diaspora, the global community outside of Europe, and the EU Member States themselves, all of whom were contributing in some way to the operation. As a result the Operation soon began to develop into an Information Operations campaign as much as a more traditional constabulary/peace keeping operation.

Owners and operators who have vessels transiting the region are strongly encouraged to register their movements on the [www.mschoa.org](http://www.mschoa.org) website where they can download information about combating piracy and what action to take should they come under attack. The earlier a warning can be given of a potential attack the greater the chance a warship has of reaching the vessel in time to offer assistance, so keeping a good all round lookout, particularly astern in poor or low visibility, is essential.

## Building Coordination

Critical to the success of the operation is not just ATALANTA's relationship with other maritime stakeholders but also clear and timely lines of communication.

As many of the merchant ships do not possess military radio or signalling equipment the EU warships have often found communicating a considerable challenge. So, after some detailed consultation, a solution was found through innovative use of the internet.

Using an existing web domain established by Lloyds of London/Fairplay, the international maritime insurance organisation, a website was created which enabled a

**There are limited resources for a vast operational area.**

wide cross section of target audiences both on land and at sea to gain access to information about the operation. In addition to media feeds and general announcements that kept both the press and the general public well informed the site also allowed the merchant community to communicate directly with one another and the military in a separate secure domain. This enables advice, guidance and sensitive information to be shared quickly across all appropriate stakeholders without compromising security.

As the size of the operational area is vast and the asset resources limited it is also essential that all available warships are used to best effect. This requires that vessels being protected participate in two crucial ways. The first is by being prepared to engage in some form of self protection, not just to save themselves from capture but also to delay the hijacking for sufficient time to enable a warship to arrive on scene, usually with an armed helicopter, to assist them. The second is in keeping a good lookout and communicating any suspected attack promptly. This is key to both securing their own safety and that of others who could also fall prey to attack.

## Securing Transit

In order to ensure maximum benefit is gained from these tactics, the OHQ has established an Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor (IRTC) in the Gulf of Aden through which vessels are encouraged to travel together in what are known as "Group Transits". This tactic enables those ships involved to be more easily monitored by the warships than would be the case for a number of single units and enables vessels to look out for one another and provide the best opportunity of early warning of an attack. Their timings are published on [www.mschoa.org](http://www.mschoa.org).

However, for this to work successfully, vessel movements and the Master's intent to join a "Group Transit" need to be registered on the website so the warships stationed along the IRTC are aware of their

**Vessels are encouraged to travel together as "Group Transits" in the Gulf of Aden.**



EU NAVFOR Atalanta deters and disrupts acts of piracy. (Photo German Navy, March 2009)

presence and an assessment can be made of the vessel's potential risk; dependant on such factors as size, speed, free-board (the height of its side) and cargo so the most appropriate measures can be taken to ensure its relative safety.

The particular challenge of the vast area of operation cannot be overestimated. The IRTC is over 500 miles long and the total operational area is over 1 million square miles which equates to about one and a half time the total land mass of all the EU nations combined. With this comes a wide range of time/distance challenges that have to be carefully calculated and considered, not least how to embed journalists, a vital component in ensuring our target audiences understand the contribution being made by ATALANTA units.

As the global impact of the problem rose, so the profile and interest in the Operation increased, making personal engagement from both the OHQ and FHQ an essential part of promoting its benefit. This meant that, in addition to the media and those already committed

**The website [www.mschoa.org](http://www.mschoa.org) develops better coordination.**

the visits program both in the area of operations and at the Northwood headquarters has, at times, been hectic but has resulted in greater engagement from both the maritime community and previously uncommitted nations.

So with just over 4 months into the operation what progress has been made?

Rear Admiral Jones, the operation Commander explains:

“The escorting of World Food Programme Shipments is an undoubted success with sufficient aid to feed over a million and a half displaced people being safely delivered each month”.

About the development of piracy, he remains prudent: “Whilst the indicators are positive it is still a little early to say. Successful attacks are still taking place but have significantly decreased and the pool of captured vessels is declining. However, the weather has been poor and there is no conclusive evidence to suggest the will of the pirates has been broken. Military presence, not just from

## MODUS OPERANDI

The hijackers' tactics are simple enough: they put to sea with food, water, fuel, guns and a ladder and try to board a slow moving vessel whose side is low enough in the water to allow access. Before boarding they often open fire with rocket propelled grenades at the bridge to slow the vessel and once on board take control by gaining access to the wheelhouse and threatening the Master and his crew.

Once the hijackers have gained control of the vessel and taken the crew hostage it is very difficult to take military action without compromising the crew's safety. In addition, the captured vessel remains the property of the ship owner and no military action would be undertaken without their permission.


Op ATALANTA units, has increased with the number of nations committing personnel and warships to counter-piracy steadily rising. Suspects are being arrested and detained for prosecution and the merchant community is taking active measures to avoid and combat attacks. However, perhaps the most significant indicators are to be found in what the analysts call the "atmospherics", such as the behaviour of the pirates. When they are aware they have been detected they run, when chased they are quick to ditch the evidence, and when caught they surrender with little resistance. Perhaps the clearest evidence that the message is understood – piracy will not be tolerated and if you are caught the consequences will be serious".

Admiral Jones highlights the commitment of men and women who serve at sea on EUNAVFOR's behalf: "I sense a real feeling of achievement. The sailors and marines feel they are making a difference not just to the safety of the shipping community but also to the plight of the hungry displaced and battle scarred Somali people" ■

## Who was Atalanta?

According to Greek mythology Atalanta was the only woman among the crew of Ago, the ship in which the Argonauts sailed with Jason to fetch the Golden Fleece from Colchis

## ATALANTA THEATRE OF OPERATION



## PROFILE



**Rear-Admiral Philip Jones** (UK) was appointed Operation Commander of EU NAVFOR Somalia (Operation ATALANTA) in November 2008.

His international experience includes the NATO Response Force in the Baltic (2007) and a deployment with the NATO Standing Naval Forces (1994).

Rear. Adm. Jones has in-depth experience of conducting naval operations in challenging theatres. Before ATALANTA, he was COMUKMARFOR and in 2006-2007, he was the Commander of the British Amphibious Task Group.

# Crisis Management Exercise 2008 (CME 08)

By Col Hans Folmer, Branch Chief OPSCEN/Watch Keeping Capability, EUMS

CME08, originally scheduled for September 2008 but subsequently postponed due to the crisis in Georgia, was held in December 2008 in Brussels, Paris and the capitals of EU Member States.

The objective of CME 08 was to exercise and evaluate a range of EU crisis management structures, procedures and consultation arrangements in the context of a crisis management operation, including the EU decision-making process using both civilian and military instruments.

## Exercise Scenario

*“Notwithstanding a number of successful steps in the implementation of the Peace Process, including the adoption of a new Constitution by the Transitional Government of Alisia in January 2008, mistrust and uncertainty among the increasingly active warring Havas and Silas ethnic factions in Alisia is growing. The relative stability which had even led to a situation whereby the United Nations decided to reduce their presence to just 200 Observers has by now been fully reversed.*

*The EU, through its appointed EU Special Representative (EUSR)*

*continues to play a key role in the peace and stabilisation process. The EU is also continuing to monitor the Human Rights situation in the country in line with the various EU guidelines on Human Rights. The EUPOL Alisia mission provides advice in the development of the police and criminal justice sector in Alisia, and also contributes to the coherence of security sector reform and where requested, co-ordinates EU Member States and international assistance in these areas.*

*National elections in Alisia are due in March 2009. EU involvement has been considered crucial. EU envisages the deployment of a military force EUFOR Alisia, including*



Mr. Hervé Morin, French Minister of Defence (right) discusses CME 08 with Mr Javier Solana. SG/HR (centre) and Deputy DGEUMS RADM Fernando Lista (left). - (Photo EUMS)



Brig Gen Triquand, Deputy OpCdr for CME 08 with Mr. Kees Klompenhouwer, Civilian Operations Commander. (Photo EUMS)

a Force Headquarters (FHQ) with supporting components comprising a protection element, intelligence, with liaison to be embedded in the Alisia military chain of command, and any force enablers required to support the Force. Furthermore a temporary placement of an Integrated Police Unit (IPU) under military responsibility, within EUFOR Alisia and subsequent transfer of the IPU to EUPOL Alisia and finally the attribution of executive functions to EUPOL Alisia in the form of partial substitution, after its manpower has been strengthened and the IPU has been transferred to it"

### **Military/Civilian input to CME 08**

For the military part of this operation the already activated EU OHQ at Mont Valérien (Paris) was appointed in the Joint Action. The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability

(CPCC) was appointed to plan the civilian part of the operation. At the EUMS, a Mission Monitor Team (MMT) was established to advise the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and its Chairman on the Military Directive to the Operations Commander (OpCdr) and on the Military Advice to the Political and Security Committee (PSC). (The Civ/ Mil structures employed in CME 08 reflected those for use in a real situation).

### **CME 08**

At the start of the exercise the PSC provided guidance to the Civilian Operations Commander to commence planning. At the same time the PSC requested the EUMC to draft an Initiating Military Directive (IMD) in order to provide guidance to the military operations commander.

Based on the provided exercise documentation (Crisis Management Concept and Military Strategic Options) the MMT drafted the IMD and sent it to delegations for comments. After a EUMC meeting the IMD was approved by the PSC at the end of week one of the exercise. The OHQ was kept informed about the developments, in order to continue parallel planning.

Simultaneously both the CPCC and the OHQ started the process of drafting their Concept of Operations. Essential in this process and key to the success of the exercise was the interaction between the civilian and military planners. One of the first identified challenges which arose was the lack of police expertise in the OHQ. As a result the police expert from the MMT was sent to the OHQ. The coordination between the planners was achieved via a daily Video Tele Conference (VTC). The MMT also participated in these very useful sessions. A challenge to the discussions proved to be the different perceptions of the level of detail required for a Concept of Operations. With the establishment of a direct contact via VTC these challenges were addressed without the need for individual meetings, thus saving much time in the planning process.

Concurrently the PSC informed Third States in "real" sessions on possible EU engagement in Alisia.

Many non-EU Member States e.g. Russia, Turkey, Norway and Switzerland showed keen interest in participating in the mission. During a second round of information exchange by DGE, CPCC and EUMS almost 10 Third States participated. In particular, the comprehensive approach of the exercise and the command and control structure were discussed.

At the end of the first week of the exercise the initial drafts of both the military and the civilian CONOPS were finalised. This marked the start of a consultation process in the second week of the exercise with Member States. The Civilian CONOPS was discussed

in the CIVCOM, while the military CONOPS was presented by the Operations Commander in the EUMC. The MMT provided a Military Advice. CPCC and OHQ continued their co-operation. In the second week of the exercise a delegation of the OHQ met with the CPCC in Brussels to solve some outstanding issues. Both OpCdrs also met face to face.

Revised versions of each CONOPS were then sent to Member States. The exercise was concluded by a presentation of both CONOPS by the respective operation commanders to the PSC. The PSC took note of both documents and the military advice and forwarded

the documents for approval to the Council.

## Conclusions

The exercise showed that civilian and military interaction in the planning process is both possible and essential. The objectives of the exercise were met, while naturally some observations will need some more attention. After the approval of the Final Exercise Report by the PSC those appropriate actions will be taken, in order to further improve civilian and military co-operation in the planning of a crisis management operation/mission ■



*The exercise scenario focused on the deployment of an Integrated Police Unit under military responsibility. (Photo EUPOL Kinshasa, 2006)*

# EU Missions and Operations



Since 2003, the EU has conducted, or is conducting, 22 missions and operations under ESDP. Six of these are military operations. The rest are civilian missions, although in many cases, a high proportion of personnel are also military. Currently, the EU is undertaking 12 missions and operations under ESDP.

EULEX Kosovo, EU SSRGuinea-Bissau and EUPOL Afghanistan. The emphasis is mainly on operational aspects and planning methodology, as well as in specific fields of expertise such as Security Sector Reform, Intelligence, Security, Weapons Policy, Rules of Engagement, Communication and Information Services, Logistics and Medical Support.

The EUMS, mainly through its Civ/Mil Cell, is considerably involved primarily in the planning of all civilian ESDP operations and, in particular, in the preparation and the deployment of EUMM Georgia,

In the broad framework of an EU comprehensive approach to crisis management, therefore, it is expected that, cooperation between the EUMS and the CPCC will further increase ■

Missions/Operations	EUROPE	AFRICA	MIDDLE EAST	ASIA
<b>Military</b>	<p><i>CONCORDIA (FYROM)</i> Mar - Dec 03</p> <p><b>EUFOR ALTHEA</b> (Bosnia i Hercegovina) Dec 04 -</p>	<p><i>ARTEMIS (Ituri province, Congo RDC)</i> Jun - Sep 03</p> <p><i>EUFOR RD Congo (Congo RDC)</i> Jun 06 - Nov 06</p> <p><i>EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (Chad-Central African Republic)</i> Jan 08 - Mar 09</p> <p><b>EU NAVFOR ATALANTA</b> (Coast of Somalia) Dec 08 -</p>		
<b>Civilian</b>	<p><b>EUPM BiH</b> (Bosnia i Hercegovina) Jan 03 -</p> <p><i>EUPOL Proxima (FYROM)</i> Dec 03 - Dec 05</p> <p><i>EUJUST Themis (Georgia)</i> Jul 04 - Jul 05</p> <p><i>EUPAT (FYROM)</i> Followed <i>EUPOL Proxima</i> Dec 05 - June 06</p> <p><i>EUPT Kosovo</i> Apr 06 - 08</p> <p><b>EULEX Kosovo</b> Feb 08 -</p> <p><b>EUMM Georgia</b> Oct 08 -</p>	<p><i>EUPOL Kinshasa (Congo RDC)</i> Apr 05 - June 07</p> <p><b>EUSEC RD Congo</b> (Congo RDC) Jun 05 -</p> <p><i>AMIS II Support (Darfur province, Sudan)</i> Jul 05 - Dec 07</p> <p><b>EUPOL RD Congo</b> (Congo RDC) July 07 -</p> <p><b>EU SSR Guinea-Bissau</b> Feb 08 -</p>	<p><b>EUJUST LEX</b> (Iraq) Jul 05 -</p> <p><b>EUBAM Rafah</b> (Palestinian Territories) Nov 05 -</p> <p><b>EUPOL-COPPS</b> (Palestinian Territories) Jan 06 -</p>	<p><i>AMM (Aceh province, Indonesia)</i> Sept 05 - Dec 06</p> <p><b>EUPOL</b> (Afghanistan) Jun 07 -</p>

Note: Missions/Operations in **blue bold** are ongoing. Missions/Operations in *italics* are completed

# EUROPE

## Bosnia



### EUPM

**Type:** **Police mission.** EUPM was the first ESDP operation launched by the EU on 1st January 2003.

**Objectives:** EUPM seeks to establish effective policing arrangements **under BiH ownership** in accordance with best European and international practice. EUPM aims through mentoring, monitoring, and inspecting to establish a sustainable, professional and multiethnic police service in BiH. Provides assistance in the fight against organised crime and corruption.

**Mandate:** Initiated in January 2003. EUPM I extended into EUPM II (Jan 2006-31 Dec 2007) with a refocused mandate on the above mentioned objectives. EUPM II has been **extended into EUPM III** from 1 Jan 2008 to 31 Dec 2009.

**Commitment:** 176 international staff from 33 countries (27 EU and 6 non-EU) and 218 BiH staff. The budget is **€14.8 M** (2008).

**Head of Mission:** **Brig. Gen. Stefan Feller** (De) is the Head of Mission. **(Valentin Inzko** (AT) is the EUSR\* in BiH.)

## Georgia



### EUMM Georgia

**Type:** **EU Monitoring Mission** under ESDP framework.

**Objectives:** Contribute to stability throughout Georgia and the surrounding regions in accordance with the six-point Agreement and the subsequent implementing measures. This scope includes Russian troop withdrawals, as well as violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. The focus includes: support to the **stabilisation** process, normalisation building, **return of IDPs and refugees**, reduction of tensions and **confidence-building** measures.

**Mandate:** The mission was launched on 1 October 2008. The expected initial duration is **12 months**.

**Commitment:** Approximately **340 staff** (including personnel of HQs and field offices) and over **200 monitors**. They are working in close coordination with the OSCE and the UN teams in Georgia. 26 EU Member States are contributing to the mission. The foreseen budget is **€35 M**.

**Head of Mission:** **Hansjörg Haber** (DE) is the Head of Mission. **(Pierre Morel** (F) is the EUSR\* for the crisis in Georgia).

## Kosovo



### EULEX Kosovo

**Type:** The **EU Rule of Law Mission** in Kosovo (EULEX) is the **largest civilian mission** ever launched under the ESDP.

**Objectives:** The central aim is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the rule of law area, specifically in the **police, judiciary and customs**. In the framework of the UNSC resolution 1244 this technical mission will mentor, monitor and advise competent institutions whilst retaining a number of **limited executive powers**.

**Commitment:** Currently **1700 international** and **800 local staff** deployed. Staffing target: approx 3,000 (1,850 international - 1,100 local). Contributing States: **most EU MS + 6 non EU** (Croatia, Norway, Switzerland, Canada, Turkey and USA). Budget: **€205 M**. The HQs is located in **Pristina**.

**Mandate:** EULEX KOSOVO was launched on 04 February 2008 (Joint Action) and has reached initial operational capability on 9 December 2008 and will have reached **full operational capability by 6 April 2009**. The initial mandate is for **2 years** but the mission is foreseen to be terminated according to real progresses and achievements of Kosovo authorities in the rule of law.

**Head of Mission:** **Yves de Kermabon** (FR) is the EULEX Head of Mission. **Roy Reeve** (UK) is the Deputy Head of EULEX KOSOVO and Head of EUPT (established in April 2006 to prepare EULEX Kosovo). **(Pieter Feith** (NL) is the EUSR\* in Kosovo).

## Bosnia



### EUFOR ALTHEA


**Type:** **Military EU-led operation.**

**Objectives:** Ensure compliance with the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. Contribute to a **safe and secure environment** in BiH. Organize the transfer of Joint Military Affairs (JMA) tasks to relevant national authorities.

**Mandate:** In December 2004, ALTHEA took over from SFOR, a NATO-led mission. The preparatory work for a **possible development** of the operation will be submitted to the Council in March 2009

**Commitment:** Some **2,200 troops** from **21 EU member states** and **5 Third States**. They are backed up by over-the-horizon reserves. EUFOR was successfully **reconfigured during 2007** and remain ready to respond to possible security challenges. The common costs (**€27 M**) are paid through contributions by MS to the financial mechanism Athena.

**Command:** **Gen. John McColl** (UK) was appointed EUFOR Operation Commander in Oct 2007. **Major General Stefano Castagnotto** (IT) is the EU Force Commander. **(Valentin Inzko** (AT) is the EUSR\* in BiH.)



# AFRICA



## Guinea-Bissau

### EU SSR Guinea-Bissau


**Type:** Support to **Security Sector Reform (SSR)**. This is the first mission entirely planned by the newly established headquarters-equivalent for EU civilian crisis management operations - the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC).

**Objectives:** Provide **advice and assistance** on the modernization of Armed Forces and security forces. Contribute to creating the conditions for implementation of the National Security Sector Reform Strategy.

**Commitment:** **21 internationals staff** (military and civilian advisers) and **13 local staff**. **6 EU MS** are contributing. The financial reference amount to cover expenditure relating to the Mission is around **5.6 M**.

**Mandate:** Launched in June 2008, after a 3-month preparatory phase, for an initial period of 12 months. The mandate of the initial period runs **until May 2009** and should soon be **extended** until 30 November 2009.

**Command:** **General Juan Esteban Verástegui** (ES) is the Head of Mission.



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## Somalia

### EU NAVFOR Somalia (Operation "Atalanta")

**Type:** **Anti-piracy** maritime operation. First EU maritime operation, conducted in the framework of the ESDP.

**Objectives:** In support of 3 UN Security Council Resolutions adopted in 2008, the area of intervention is the Somali Coast and Somalia's territorial waters. The mission includes:

- **Protection** of vessels of the World Food Programme and vulnerable vessels;
- **Deterrence, prevention and repression;**
- Capacity to arrest, detain and transfer persons who have committed, or are suspected of having committed, acts of piracy or armed robbery.
- **All necessary measures**, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene.

**Commitment:** Initial Operational Capability was reached on 13 December 2008. EU NAVFOR will include up to 6 frigates and 3 maritime patrol aircrafts. Approximately **1200 people** taking part in the operation at any one time. The estimated financial reference amount for the common costs of the operation is **8,3 M**. The EU Operational Headquarters is located at **Northwood** (UK). EU NAVFOR also coordinates activities of surveillance and protection operations led by certain Member States.

**Mandate:** Launched on 8 December 2008 and planned for a period of **12 months**.

**Command:** **Rear Admiral Philip Jones** (UK) is the Operation Commander. The appointment of Force Commander will rotate between Greece, Spain and the Netherlands during the 12 months of the mission.

## Democratic Republic of Congo



### EUSEC DR Congo

**Type:** Support mission in the field of **Security Sector Reform**

**Objectives:** Provide advice and assistance for the reform of the security sector. Focus on **restructuring** and **reconstructing the armed forces**. In the year ahead, the support will also focus on organising a **future Rapid Reaction Force**.

**Commitment:** The mission strength is now **50**, eventually **up to 60**. Civilian and military expertises include defence, police, security, rule of Law, human resources, administrative and financial regulations. HQs are located in **Kinshasa**. The mission budget is **16 M** since June 2005 plus a **further 8,45 M** for 2008-2009

**Mandate:** Launched in June 2005, extended in July 2007 for a period of 12 months. The mandate runs **until 30 June 2009**.

**Head of Mission:** **Gen. Jean-Paul Michel** (FR) is the Head of Mission. **(Roeland Van de Geer** (NL) is the EUSR\* for the African Great Lakes Region and **Koen Vervaeke** (B) is the EUSR to the African Union).

## Democratic Republic of Congo



### EUPOL RD CONGO (ex- EUPOL Kinshasa)

**Type:** **Police mission** with a justice interface.

**Objectives:** Support **Security Sector Reform (SSR)** in the field of police and its interface with justice. Provides technical support to the reform process of the police mainly through support to the Comité de Suivi de la Réforme de la Police (CSR) and also delivers more operational support such as mentoring and advising to the judiciary police.

**Commitment:** **53 international staff** (9 EU Member States), **1 third country** (Angola) and **9 local staff**. Expertises include police, judiciary, rule of law, human rights and gender balance. The budget is **6.92 M**.

**Mandate:** Launched 1 July 2007 initially for a year and **extended to 30 June 2009**. EUPOL RD Congo builds on EUPOL Kinshasa (2005-2007, the first EU mission in Africa). The Force HQs are located in **Kinshasa** and an 'East antenna' was established in 2008 with mission deployment in Goma (North Kivu) and Bukavu (South Kivu).

**Head of Mission:** **Superintendent Adilio Ruivo Custodio** (PT) is the Head of Mission

# MIDDLE-EAST/ASIA



## Palestinian Territories

**EUPOL-COPPS**

Type: **Police and Rule-of-Law mission.**

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Objectives: Provide support to the Palestinian Authority in establishing sustainable and effective arrangements in the wider context of **security sector** including **criminal justice reform**. Coordinate and facilitate EU MS assistance, and - where requested - international assistance. The expansion of the Mission's rule of law section has been approved in June 2008.

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Commitment: Approximately **41 unarmed** personnel, most of them police experts, judges and prosecutors seconded from **15 EU MS** plus Norway, Canada and Turkey and **15 local** personnel. The 2009 budget amounts to **3,6 M**.

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Mandate: Began on 1 January 2006 for an initial duration of **3 years**. EUPOL-COPPS runs to **31 Dec 2010**.

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Senior Officer: **Chief Constable Paul Kernaghan** (UK) is the Head of Mission. (**Marc Otte** (BE) is the EUSR\* for the Middle East Peace Process).



## Palestinian Territories

**EU BAM RAFAH**

Type: **Border Control Assistance and Monitoring mission.**

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Objectives: Provide a Third Party presence to build confidence at the **Rafah Crossing Point** (Gaza-Egypt border). Provide border assistance in support to the **"Agreement on Movement and Access"** reached between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA).

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Commitment: **32 EU staff** (from 12 EU MS) and **7 local staff**. HQs are located in **Ashkelon**. The reference budget is **2.5 M**.

---

Mandate: Operational phase began on 25 November 2005 with duration of 12 months. **Extended three times**, EUBAM runs **till 24 November 2009**. Since the closing of the crossing point in June 2007, **operations are suspended** and the mission has remained on standby, **ready to re-engage in 10 days** and awaiting a political solution.

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Senior Officer: **Alain Faugeras** (F) is Head of Mission. (**Marc Otte** (BE) is the EUSR\* for the Middle East Peace Process).



## Afghanistan

**EUPOL Afghanistan**

Type: **Police Mission with links into wider Rule of Law.**

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Objectives: Support to Government of Afghanistan in reforming the police system of the country through advising, mentoring, monitoring and training in **criminal investigation**, training strategy, **border management**, **counter-narcotics** actions, **human rights** and **gender balance**, etc.

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Commitment: Some **400 personnel** (authorized strength), mainly police, law enforcement and justice experts including 221 international and 124 local staff. **19 EU MS** plus **4 non EU** (Canada, Croatia, New Zealand and Norway) are contributing to the mission. Staff is deployed in Kabul and in provinces, through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The mission has a budget of **64 M** to run until November 2009.

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Mandate: Launched in June 2007 and established for a period of at least 3 years, **up to 15 June 2010**.

---

Senior Officer: **Kai Vittrup** (DE) is Head of Mission. (**Ettore F. Sequi** (IT) is the EUSR\* for Afghanistan).



## Iraq

**EUJUST LEX**

Type: **Integrated Rule of Law Mission.** EUJUST LEX is the first EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission.

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Objectives: Strengthen the Iraqi Criminal Justice System (CJS) through **training** in management and criminal investigation and other professional disciplines for senior officials from the judiciary, the police and the penitentiary. **Improve capacity and coordination**. To-date, the mission has trained over 2000 Iraqi senior criminal justice officials in 93 courses.

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Commitment: **37 EU staff** in Brussels and Baghdad. **29.8 M** from the EU budget cover the common costs from July 2005 to June 2009. In addition, EU MS continue to contribute training courses, trainers and staff.


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Mandate: Launched in March 2005 for an initial period of 12 months. **Extended twice and further extended until 30 June 2010**. During this extension period the Mission will for the first time carry out **pilot projects** in Iraq, as and where conditions allow, to follow-up and make the results achieved so far more sustainable.

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Senior Officer: **Stephen White** (UK) is Head of Mission.

EUSRs \* are mentioned for info only: they are not in any chain of command. **Kees Klompenhouwer** (NL, FR) is the Civilian Operations Commander for all civilian ESDP missions. Heads of missions exercise command at operational level.



**General Sir John McColl**, in his double-hatted role as both **Operation Commander for the EU's Operation ALTHEA** and **NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (DSACEUR)**, writes about the current situation in the EU-led military operation, Operation ALTHEA, which is part of the European Security and Defence Policy support to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).

Operation ALTHEA was launched in December 2004 as the successor to NATO's SFOR. It was the third EU-led military operation<sup>1</sup>, and the second operation under the "Berlin Plus arrangements" following Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2003). Operation ALTHEA contributes to peace and stability in BiH and supports the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity, which includes progress on constitutional reform. A medium term objective has been to support BiH's progress towards EU integration by its own efforts, through the implementation of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA).

**The EU-NATO strategic partnership relies on shared values.**

organisations (see box page 23). Through this the EU and NATO have built a genuine strategic partnership founded on the shared values of the two organisations. For this partnership to work both organizations ensure effective consultation, cooperation and transparency. This partnership is also about ensuring efficient crisis management and working together in order to identify the best possible response to a crisis.

Under the Berlin Plus arrangements, Op ALTHEA utilises NATO's Command and Control arrangements (C2), Communication and Information Systems (CIS)<sup>2</sup> and Intelligence Systems (especially the intelligence database).

### Strategic Partnership

The December 2002 EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP established the Berlin Plus arrangements, a strategic partnership in crisis management between the two

### Operational Tasks

Thanks to the ongoing EU – NATO cooperation, BiH has been progressively stabilised and its institutions have continued to develop and operate along recognisably

1 After Concordia (2003) and Artemis (2003).

2 With access to NATO classified networks.



Gen McColl (centre) meeting Head of Mission EUPM, Commissioner Feller, accompanied by Lt Gen Zamarripa, Head of EUCE (double-hatted as NATO's JFC Naples COS). (Photo EUFOR)

democratic lines.

In this context, ALTHEA continues to fulfil its UNSCR mandate under Annexes 1A and 2 of the General Framework for Peace (GFAP), contributing to the Safe and Secure Environment (SASE) which now exists in BiH, and remains able to react to any threat with both in-Theatre and over the horizon reserve forces.

The operation also contributes to the achievement of the EU Special Representative/High Representative's (EUSR/HR) Mission Implementation Plan, within means and capabilities, with its military presence, backing up the OHR's current Bonn Powers. In addition, ALTHEA units also provide support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and relevant authorities, including the detention of Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWC's); and, through close liaison with the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in BiH, support the local police's action against organized crime, within EUFOR's means and capabilities.

In the meantime ALTHEA, also under the terms of the GFAP, has successfully transferred a number of the remaining joint military affairs tasks to local BiH control: weapons and ammunition storage and management, mine clearance, and military movement control have been completed although EUFOR still continues to monitor, mentor and advise the BiH authorities in these areas. With some 30,000 tonnes of ammunition and a multitude of weapons still in country, the correct control of these stocks and ongoing assistance with their disposal, remains a key element in maintaining the SASE. The remaining area, Civilian Movement Control, is still pending legislation between the state and entity

**The EU is currently examining a possible evolution of the mission.**

levels, before this can finally be handed over fully.

## Chain of Command

Operation ALTHEA is conducted under the authority of the EU's General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). The political control and strategic direction of the military operation is exercised by the Political and Security Committee. The EU Military Committee monitors the proper execution of the EU military operation and its chairman acts as my primary point of contact as the Operation Commander.

I command the operation with the support of the EU OHQ at SHAPE, again under the Berlin Plus arrangements, which means that I have the resources of SHAPE at my disposal, if needed. The core nucleus within the EU OHQ of the EU Staff Group (EUSG), which acts as part of my close staff, and my double-hatted status as DSACEUR, are truly facilitating the Berlin Plus cooperation.

The Force Commander of the European Force (COMEUFOR) and I are directly linked. However, the EU Command Element (EUCE) located in Naples, ensures the necessary coordination with NATO at the regional level. The EUCE also provides mutual support, transparency and coordination, primarily regarding the use of Reserve Forces, which are a shared asset between EU and NATO based upon the agreement of the nations concerned, who offer their troops for the whole Balkans AOI.

## Forces Structures

Located in Butmir Camp, ALTHEA represents at this moment some 2,200 personnel, contributed by 21 EU



Gen McColl (right) on his way to KFOR in Pristina, Kosovo, after meeting with COMEUFOR MG Castagnotto (left). (Photo EUFOR)

and 5 non-EU nations, together with other national assets, including helicopters. A Six Monthly Review process allows me to recommend any adaptation to the Force according to the situation and the needs, although this is ratified at the level of the PSC and the GAERC. At this stage, the personnel are distributed as follows:

EUSG (Mons) : 19 personnel  
 EUCE (Naples) : 8 personnel  
 EUFOR (Sarajevo) : 2,200 personnel

Concerning the Force in the field, the EUFOR HQ is located at Sarajevo (Camp Butmir) and the force comprises three main components, in addition to the force enablers such as helicopters, medical, EOD and military police etc:

The Situational Awareness (SA) Matrix, which is based in the field throughout the country;

The Multinational Manoeuvre Battalion (MNB) and;

The Integrated Police Unit (IPU)

The SA matrix are the eyes and ears of the operation and provide me with up-to-date information on the situation in country, enabling the Force Commander and I to assess and make plans accordingly, should the situation show any signs of deterioration. The matrix comprises some 40 Liaison and Observation Teams (LOTs), living in the community, and various other elements which provide intelligence gathering and reconnaissance capabilities.

Should such a scenario develop, then in addition to the troops stationed in BiH, EUFOR can be reinforced by over the horizon forces from nation-based Operational Reserves if required. Reinforcement could also come from NATO's KFOR troops if necessary, as part of the Tactical Reserve Mutual Support agreement between EUFOR and KFOR, with EUFOR able to provide assistance to KFOR, if needed, in the form of an IPU Company initially. I should point out that we have never had to deploy any reserve assets in real terms within BiH since the inception of EUFOR in 2004.

### THE BERLIN PLUS ARRANGEMENTS

The Berlin Plus Arrangements, based on the conclusions of the 1999 NATO Washington Summit and the European Council at Nice in 2000, provide for EU recourse to NATO common assets and capabilities for EU-led military operations. They comprise four elements:

- Assured access to NATO planning capabilities;
- Presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets;
- Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further identifying the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities;
- Further adaptation of NATO's defence planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations.

### Future and Challenges Ahead

To sum up, Op ALTHEA is a success. As the Council noted last November, it has made significant progress towards completing its mandate. For this reason the EU is currently examining a possible evolution towards a non-executive operation. Preparatory work on a possible evolution continues so that, once the necessary conditions have been met, the EU is in a position to implement a decision quickly. A non-executive operation would focus on training and capacity building, to meet continuing requirements to improve and sustain local military capacities ■



High Representative and EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Valentin Inzko (left) meets COM EUFOR Major General Stefano Castagnotto at EUFOR HQ. (Photo EUFOR, March 2009)



# Moving Forward

*EUJUST LEX, the Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq, is a civilian crisis management mission implemented under the auspices of the ESDP. Stephen White, Head of EUJUST LEX highlights the objective of supporting Iraqi authorities in implementing EU best practices in a wide range of areas.*

Since March 2005, when the Council of the European Union launched EUJUST LEX (its first ESDP Integrated Rule of Law [ROL] Mission) the Mission has achieved all its mandated objectives. In order to promote the Rule of Law and respect for Human Rights in Iraq, the Mission has designed and facilitated more than 100 training interventions – mostly in EU Member States. Over 2000 senior Iraqi criminal justice officials have experienced European best practice in the disciplines of policing, judicial and penitentiary management. Recently, the EU unanimously agreed to extend and expand the Mission’s mandate for another 12 months up to 30 June 2010.

**EUJUSTLEX promotes ESDP activities in general to a worldwide audience.**

In their addresses the main guests concluded that the Mission’s success was founded on its integrated approach to ROL; the priority given to partnership approaches with Iraqi authorities; and, its focus on leadership.

Another recent event included the Mission receiving, from the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Motorola Webber Seavey Award for “Excellence in Law Enforcement and Leadership”. This prestigious award raises the visibility of the Mission and highlights the EU’s commitment to promoting a more stable and secure Iraq. Importantly, it promotes ESDP activities in general to a worldwide audience of police and law enforcement officials.

## Key Milestones

In March the Mission celebrated its fourth year anniversary by holding a medal award ceremony. The Civilian Operations Commander and Iraq’s Deputy Ambassador to the EU attended the event as main guests where Stephen White, the Head of Mission, highlighted several significant milestones. These included participation of the 2000th Iraqi participant and the conclusion of a series of regional seminars.

To date, EUJUST LEX has trained a critical mass of 2056 senior Iraqi criminal justice officials (1174 from the police, 588 from the judiciary and 294 from the penitentiary sector). The Mission has successfully facilitated 95 EUJUST LEX courses and 17 Work Experience Secondments. The Mission continuously amends and redesigns the courses offered and their curricula in response to the needs of the Iraqi Criminal Justice System. As some positive signs of progress



Head of Mission (on the right) with Mission staff and the Iraqi Chief of Justice at the Regional Thematic Seminar. (Photo EU Council)



Head of Mission (right) at the IACP conference in San Diego on 10 November 2008, receiving the Webber Seavey Award on behalf of EUJUST LEX. (Photo EU Council)

emerge from Iraq (e.g. in terms of security and political development) the Mission responds positively to new and additional demands. For example, “Management of Training” and “Train the Trainer” courses are being delivered to support Iraqi ownership and capacity building.

Recently, as part of its current mandate, the Mission organised three regional “thematic” seminars. The themes were identified by the Iraqi Ministries of Interior, Justice and Chief Justice i.e.: juvenile justice; rehabilitation of prisoners; and, community policing.

**The future for the Mission looks bright.**

These topics and priorities provide evidence that Iraq is focussing on mainstream issues and

not just countering insurgency and terrorism – a very encouraging sign. Supported by EU experts the Mission facilitated “in depth” discussions on Iraq’s current and future needs to develop comprehensive strategies in these important areas.

**New Mandate**

Building on the Mission’s achievements to date, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the Council of the EU has agreed to extend the Mission’s mandate

for a further 12 months, until 30 June 2010. During this extended period it is expected that the Mission will pilot a number of activities in Iraq - security situation permitting, in addition to continuing out of country training.

During all EUJUST LEX training interventions, Iraqi participants produce personal “action plans” to implement on return to duties in Iraq. These plans will, security permitting, be followed-up in detail. The objectives are:

- to measure the impact of interventions;
- to monitor institutional improvements made in the Iraqi Criminal Justice System;
- to provide strategic advice and support to ROL authorities;
- to facilitate mentoring of key Iraqi officials.

The EUJUST LEX Mission consists of a small team of 37 staff, based in Brussels and Baghdad, including representatives from EU police services, judicial institutions and penitentiary administrations. The future for the Mission looks bright – based on the solid foundations and partnerships already formed.

As Mr White stated, “What we are doing is very much about taking a strategic approach to things, while others perhaps have had to deal with the ‘here and now’ problems in Iraq. That is the key message of this Mission: invest now in the leadership, the future policy makers, the future strategists, so that in years to come they will have a better idea of what success might look like.” ■

**PROFILE**



**Stephen White** (UK) is a former senior police officer. He had a successful (26 years) career in the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). His responsibilities included counter terrorism, public order duties, community policing, and training.

He also assisted in many international policing interventions. From July 2003 to January 2004 he worked in Iraq as the Director of Law and Order and Senior Police Advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority, based in Basra. He was responsible for establishing Southern Iraq regional police training academy and oversaw a range of reconstruction efforts in the criminal justice sector. After his retirement, in 2004 and 2005, he was the Senior Police Expert on the EU’s Iraq Expert Team, which was established to provide needs analysis for the Iraqi criminal justice system.



# Tchad/RCA: Mission Accomplished



*On 15 March 2009, EUFOR Tchad/RCA officially handed over to the UN mission MINURCAT. **Brig Gen J.P. Ganascia, Force Commander EUFOR Tchad/RCA**, reflects on a very busy yet satisfying 12 months of operations.*

Authorised on 25 September 2007 by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007) and formally established on 15 October 2007 by the EU Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP, EUFOR Tchad-RCA declared initial operational capability on 15 March 2008.

Acting for a period of one year from that date, its 3,200 soldiers from 26 European countries (including non-EU member-states Albania, Croatia and Russia) were given the difficult task of contributing to improve security conditions in Eastern Chad and North-eastern Central African Republic, two regions deeply affected by the Darfur conflict and its consequences. Well over 240,000 Sudanese refugees and 160,000 Chadian internally displaced persons (IDPs) had relocated to camps and sites in this remote and impoverished area, about the size of Great Britain, where non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and UN agencies had dispatched a massive relief effort for years.

**EUFOR strictly kept to its mandate of contributing to the protection of populations.**

As a result of the continuing humanitarian crisis, EUFOR's mandate was threefold: contributing to the protection

of endangered civilians, in particular refugees and IDPs, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian staff, and finally, contributing to the protection and the freedom of movement of United Nations personnel.

Conceived as the military arm of a larger multilateral security and relief effort, EUFOR was mandated to work hand in hand with the UN Mission in Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) also authorised by UN Security Council Resolution 1778. This mission was tasked, mainly, with the vetting and training of a new Chadian security component – later known as *Détachement Intégré de Sécurité* (DIS) – aimed to provide security within the refugee camps and the IDPs sites and in the main townships used as logistics bases by humanitarian organisations.

### Trust-based Interactions

In an environment that had been destabilised by recurrent rebel attacks shortly prior to the arrival of its troops, EUFOR strictly kept to its mandate of contributing to the protection of refugees, IDPs, the broader population of the East and to the security of United Nations and humanitarian personnel in its area of operations.

Covering over 500 villages through countless long-distance patrols, reaching the most remote populations and building trust with them, the European soldiers produced a compendium of detailed security information relevant to the immense and largely uncharted territory of Eastern Chad and North-eastern Central African Republic. Establishing a trust-based interaction with the population and its United Nations and humanitarian partners, EUFOR identified with growing accuracy violence-affected 'grey zones' where it concentrated its deterrent effort. In its three most significant operations, in May, July and November-December 2008, EUFOR troops directly prevented imminent attacks against local villages.



*Dialogue with population in a village. (Photo EUFOR, February 2009)*

Fed by small arms proliferation, impunity and inter-communal conflict, the criminal threat to the population and to humanitarian workers required the multidimensional response announced by Resolution 1778. Providing a strong military presence across the area, EUFOR was thus able to reduce threats to the population whilst setting the stage for the broader policing effort carried out by MINURCAT with the cooperation of a dedicated Chadian body, CONAFIT.

### Security Umbrella

In parallel, by keeping to its strictly military tasks, EUFOR was able to frame a constructive dialogue with the humanitarian community. By providing weekly information about its convoys and detailed digests about the security situation, it gave them the option to benefit from EUFOR's security umbrella along the roads of Eastern Chad. In Sam Ouandja, Central African Republic, a rescue operation was carried out to extract nine endangered humanitarian workers.

As the Chadian policing component trained by MINURCAT was dispatched in Eastern Chad, the multidimensional approach envisioned in UN Security Council 1778 could be fully implemented: MINURCAT's deployment in the East took place under EUFOR protection and EUFOR and MINURCAT jointly devised and drilled security exercises for the benefit of the population and the humanitarian workers. Finally, as IDPs started returning to their areas of origin, EUFOR maintained a focus on securing these regions, often the most affected by earlier conflict and where the European Commission supported development projects.

### Comprehensive Response

By providing comfort to endangered populations, by showing openness and respect to the humanitarian community, by covering areas where a particular development effort was made for the benefit of returning displaced persons and finally, by devising coordinated security responses with MINURCAT, EUFOR successfully sketched out – within its one-year time limit – a model of bridging with a UN peace operation and illustrated the capacity of the European Union to apply a truly comprehensive approach in response to complex crisis situations. With a distinctly wide footprint, EUFOR, a military operation, set the stage



French Troops "re-hatting" from EUFOR Tchad/RCA to the UN mission MINURCAT. (Photo EUFOR)

**EUFOR has outlined a new model of bridging with a UN peace operation.**

for the wider, longer-term international involvement envisioned by Resolution 1778, including inter alia, the deployment of a full-fledged civil and military UN operation from 15 March 2009.

During the course of its one-year mandate, EUFOR provided wide area security and facilitated the return of a feeling of security through the region where it operated. The multidimensional effort now underway under the helm of our colleagues of the United Nations is expected to build upon this existing sense of improvement and to restore lasting confidence among the inhabitants of this troubled area, while solutions are being sought at the wider, regional scale ■

### PROFILE



**Brig Gen J.P. Ganascia** is Deputy Commander, French Joint Force and Training HQ.

With a military Engineer background, Brig Gen Ganascia has served with Parachute and Foreign Legion Units and commanded a Foreign Legion Engineer Regiment. His international and multilateral experience was developed in operations in the Lebanon; in Bosnia and Kosovo.

# Working in the “Milky Way” Sphere

*Cdr Christophe Eugene completes almost three years as Military Assistant (MA) to Director General EU Military Staff in July of this year before taking up an appointment as Commanding Officer of a French Naval warship. In this interview Cdr Eugene gives IMPETUS an insight into the role of MA to DG and some personal impressions of EU Military Staff and ESDP.*

*Impetus: What was the background to your appointment?*

**Cdr Eugene:** In mid 2006, I was completing my French Staff Course (Collège Interarmées de Défense) in Paris when it was suggested to me that I should apply for the position of Military Assistant, based on my previous experience in a multinational environment and the fact that I had served for five years over two tours of duty as an exchange officer with the Royal Navy.

*Impetus: What is the role of the MA to DGEUMS?*

**Cdr Eugene:** I am often asked about my role as Military

Assistant, what exactly it is I do and how I fit into the “landscape” of DGEUMS’ outer office. Without wishing to go through my job description, I essentially prepare the Director General for the weekly EU Military Committee (EUMC) meeting, including of course his speaking notes, as well as the twice weekly Political and Security Committee (PSC) where all 27 Member states are represented respectively by their Military Representatives and Ambassadors.

In order to best support the DG, my preparatory work consists of going through all the documents being presented or discussed at these meetings. The topics range from Military Capabilities to Operations. Additionally, I tend to look at the substantive documents

“The contribution of EUMS to the development of the ESDP should not be underestimated.”



*Cdr Eugene (centre) discusses the merits of another proposed EUMS presentation with fellow colleagues. (Photo EUMS)*



Competence and professionalism contribute to the development of ESDP. (Photo EUFOR Tchad/RCA, January 2009)

drafted by the EUMS and approved by the DG. This work in particular involves a high level of interaction with EUMS staff officers, the General Secretariat and delegations.

*Impetus: What has given you most satisfaction as MA to DG?*

**Cdr Eugene:** Without doubt the professional and personal relationships that I have developed with the staff of the EUMS. I will of course not mention anyone by name but it is fair to say that there are many very professional and competent people in the EUMS and their contribution to the development of the ESDP should not be underestimated.

Directors, Branch Chiefs and Action Officers have the challenging task in trying to satisfy both the DG and each of the 27 member state delegations. They know what consensus is all about!! I do hope that when they look back at what was achieved during their appointment in the Military Staff, they will come to this same conclusion: the ESDP has demonstrated its ability to further develop itself and improve its effectiveness and efficiency on the ground.

*Impetus: EUMS has been directly involved in the launch and progression of several Military ESDP missions during your time in Brussels...*

**Cdr Eugene:** Indeed, over the last three years, I have

witnessed the launch of EUFOR Tchad/RCA and the subsequent handover of that mission to the United Nations (MINURCAT); the launch of the counter piracy operation and first maritime mission EUNAVFOR - Somalia / Operation Atalanta; the possible evolution of one current operation to a non-executive one (EUFOR Althea) and also the closure of EUFOR RD Congo.

It is important to mention that during this time the EU simultaneously conducted three operations from three different OHQs.

*Impetus: And what of the future of EUMS?*

**Cdr Eugene:** The future of the EUMS is not at risk! Quite the contrary, military expertise is a much needed resource, which plays a key role in any Crisis Management decision-making process. The support provided by the EU Military Staff in the early stages of civilian missions highlights this fact. The Civilian/Military approach to crisis management is going to continue to occupy those at the Brussels Political-Military level for many years to come. The EUMS will continue to be at the very heart of the process into the future.

*Impetus: Any advice to your successor?*

**Cdr Eugene:** Never forget that working in the "Milky Way sphere" as the Military Assistant, doesn't make you a "little DG" or even a "petit Napoléon" as may have been suggested on occasions! ■

# Preparing for the Future

**Brig Gen Gabor Horvath (HU)** has been appointed **Director of Concepts and Capabilities at the EUMS**. In this article he speaks of his military experience and his new appointment.

*Impetus: Could you outline your previous experience in Brussels before taking up your appointment?*

**Brig Gen Horvath:** In 2003, when I was the Chief of Staff of the 25th Mechanized Brigade (an appointment which I remember with great nostalgia), I was appointed - to my surprise - as the very first EU Deputy MILREP of Hungary, a post I held until 2006. Immediately after, I was selected to be the Head of the NATO Permanent Liaison Team (NPLT) to the EUMS, a post that I filled for about 14 months, again in Brussels.

*Impetus: You mentioned that you served as the Head of the NATO Permanent Liaison Team (NPLT) to EUMS between Jul 06 and Aug 07. Can you give IMPETUS an insight into that role and how it may have served as preparation for your new appointment?*

**Brig Gen Horvath:** My time with the Hungarian Delegation and also the time with the NPLT gave me a great deal of experience. It gave me not only an in depth appreciation of the life and the functioning of the EUMS, but also a perspective on the political and strategic dynamics related to the EU-NATO relationship, which had to be learned and approached with great care and sensibility. As for the benefit to my current appointment, the main payoffs from that tour of duty are a better understanding of the complex civil-military environment of the Council General Secretariat, a growing sensitivity to the specificities associated with decision making at the political-military strategic level, and not least, the valuable net of many colleagues and personal friends to whom I am very grateful for having helped me to perform my tasks in the past.

*Impetus: Although you were only out of the Kortenbergh building for some 16 months before assuming the role of Director Con/Cap, have you noticed any significant changes during that time?*

**Brig Gen Horvath:** The latest changes in the EUMS were related to the Post-Wiesbaden process, which was initiated during my tenure as a member of the NPLT, so

these changes were not entirely new to me. However, it was interesting to see the migration of the exercise-training-analysis functions closer to the concept-doctrine side. I think that it is still a challenge to find the right and balanced way to ensure that these vital functions do not de-couple from the operations and, at the same time, also serve the capability development through exercises and the well-processed operational lessons.

*Impetus: In your opinion, why do you consider your Directorate to be an integral element of the EUMS?*

**Brig Gen Horvath:** The Concepts and Capabilities Directorate is a very integral part of the EUMS indeed, because it is the custodian and main actor for many overarching areas. The concepts branch is the real “engine room” for establishing the military professional framework for ESDP operations in an ever changing environment. They have to draft, revise and update those capstone military products that the EU Military Committee requires for EU military crisis management. These important documents are not only drafted for the use of EU forces in operations, but are also taken into consideration by the national military authorities of the member states when they need some orientation and guidance for the development of their own doctrinal products.

The force capability branch of the directorate is the unique manager of the Headline Goal process. They compile, assess and evaluate the member states offers and therefore have probably the best knowledge, at any given time, on what the EU military can or can not offer - theoretically - to solve a crisis situation. They are also the main actors, at working level, of capability development within the ESDP, with close ties to other important partners like the European Defence Agency. And finally the exercise-training-analysis branch are those officers who plan, prepare and help to conduct the exercises at political-military and military strategic levels, train our personnel for their appointments, and manage the military lessons learned system of the

“**The objectives are focussed on capability planning and capability development.**”

ESDP.

Each branch performs unique and invaluable inherent staff functions, in ensuring that the directorate is an inseparable and vital part of the EUMS.

*Impetus: As Director of Concepts and Capabilities what are your main objectives for 2009?*

**Brig Gen Horvath:** The objectives for this year will be very heavily focussed on capability planning and capability development. As for capability planning, our main objective is to deliver those important documents that are needed for the further development of the Headline Goal process.

“Each branch performs unique and invaluable inherent staff functions.”

We will also study the possibility of closer NATO defence planning with that of the EU capability planning processes. This is a challenging task, but

a successful outcome would be extremely rewarding and beneficial not only for us at the EUMS but also for the NATO planners, and indeed all national defence planners who have to take part in both processes. The challenge is to observe and maintain at all levels the autonomy of the EU and NATO. But I am optimistic that we will find the correct and measured way to advance. On the capability development side, the most important objectives for us are the priority areas of the Capability Development Plan. Work on a number of these areas is led by the EU Military Committee, while the main actors are from the concept and capability branches of this directorate. These tasks are complex and ambitious. For example, to improve our understanding on the military implications of the comprehensive approach requires not only a common effort from the Council General Secretariat, but also an active involvement of the institutional side of the EU, namely the European Commission as well.

It is also worth mentioning that two exercises are to be prepared and at least partially coordinated by us, the CME-09 and the MILEX-09. These exercises will also be very demanding and ambitious if we are to meet the aims and objectives set forth by the Council and the EUMC.

*Impetus: Any other points to conclude?*

**Brig Gen Horvath:** Recently, I just counted my service

years spent in different garrisons at home and realised that it is now exceeded by my service in Brussels in a variety of appointments. This experience highlights our most important obligation: to serve the EU with the same enthusiasm and professionalism as we have served and continue to serve our respective countries. This will be my *ars poetica* for the next three years ■

## PROFILE



**Brigadier General Gabor Horvath (HU)** has kept a balance between the three main strands of a military career: troops, staffs and academic institutions - in both national and international environments.

He was commissioned as a mechanized infantry officer in 1986. After the change of the regime in Hungary, he was sent to learn French and considers this knowledge to have been a distinguishing advantage for further postings. Having graduated from two different French military schools (EEM in 1993 and CID in 1998) and lectured at the Hungarian National Defence University (1995-96), he was then appointed to the General Staff Working Group Team in preparation for the accession of Hungary to NATO.

Brig Gen Horvath has served as a member of the personal staffs of the Hungarian Chiefs of Defence on two occasions. In 1998-99, during NATO accession and the Kosovo conflict, he was the personal staff officer for operations of the CHOD. Later, in 2007-2008, he was chosen as the principal staff officer and personal secretary to another Hungarian CHOD.

He has also served in Brussels as the first Hungarian Deputy MILREP and Head of the NATO Permanent Liaison Team (NPLT) to EUMS.

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## EUMS Sports Day

The EUMS annual Sports Day 2009 was held on 02 February. Our picture shows Rear Admiral Cabral (right), Director Communications and Information Services, proudly accepting the trophy on behalf of the victorious CIS volleyball team from DG EUMS Lt Gen Leakey.



## EUROVAL 2008

Following our successful participation in the EUROSATORY exhibition in June 08, EUMS were delighted to accept an invitation to provide a stand and promote ESDP at the EUROVAL exhibition in Paris (26-31 Oct). The event attracted over 34,000 visitors and 240 exhibitors.

## Farewell

During Christmas week Deputy Director General Rear Admiral Lista made a presentation to one of the “characters” of EUMS, Lt Col Holger Koch, on the occasion of his departure from EUMS.



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